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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays in the area of Law and Economics.
The ﬁrst essay explores the effect of judicial discretion on racial disparities in federal sentencing after the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were struck down in United States v. Booker (2005). Using data on the universe of federal
defendants, I ﬁnd that black defendants are sentenced to almost two months more in prison compared to their white
counterparts, a 4% increase. To identify the sources of racial disparities, I construct a dataset linking judges to over
400,000 defendants. Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges, I ﬁnd that racial disparities are greater
among judges appointed after Booker. Prosecutors also respond to increased judicial discretion by charging black
defendants with longer mandatory minimums.
The second essay estimates the impact of increased judicial discretion on inter-judge disparities, another potential
source of unwarranted disparity in the federal criminal justice system. Relying on the random assignment of cases
to judges, I ﬁnd that inter-judge disparities have increased signiﬁcantly after the Guidelines became advisory using a
random effects model. A defendant who is randomly assigned a one standard deviation “harsher” judge in the district
court received a 2.6 month longer prison sentence before Booker, but received a 5.3 month longer sentence following
Booker.
The third essay analyzes the differential impact of state versus federal regulation of OSHA programs on the use of
traditional enforcement tools, nonfatal injury rates and fatalities, as well as wages and employment. I ﬁnd that certiﬁ-
cation of a state regulated OSHA program leads to an increased use of inspections per capita and issuance of violations
per capita. State regulated programs that adopted stringent standards beyond the federal program are associated with
signiﬁcantly lower fatalities, compared to all other states. A case study on the 2000 California penalty reform reveals
that greater magnitude of sanctions and prosecution are potentially effective enforcement tools in promoting greater
workplace safety and reducing fatalities. Finally, I ﬁnd that there is a compensating differential for workplace safety.
iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract....................................................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................................................... vi
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 1
2. Free At Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing................................................ 3
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1. Adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2. Challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1. United States Sentencing Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3. Federal Judicial Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Conceptual Framework of Judicial Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5. Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.1. Potential Threats to Identiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6.1. Sentence Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6.2. Departures from the Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.3. Robustness Checks for Increasing Racial Disparities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.4. How Constraining is Appellate Review? Evidence from Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough . . . . . . 28
2.6.5. Free at Last? Effects of Judicial Sentencing Philosophies and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.6. Response of Prosecutors to Increased Judicial Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3. Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence From Booker 48
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2. Brief Legal Background of Federal Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.1. Adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.2. Challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3. Framework, Data, and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.1. Judicial Behavior in Criminal Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.2. Sentencing Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.3. Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.4. Testing for Random Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.5. Trends in Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.6. Measuring Inter-Judge Disparity - Analysis of Variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4. Results on Inter-judge and Regional Disparities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.1. Sentence Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.2. Below Range Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.3. Above Range Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4.4. Sentencing Practices by Judge Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4.5. Regional Disparity: Inter-District Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.4.6. Prosecutorial Contributions to Disparities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5. Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5.1. “Topless” Guidelines System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.5.2. “Blakely-ized” Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5.3. Sessions Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4. The Impact of Federal and State OSHA Programs on Workplace Safety, Wages and Employment ..................... 96
iv4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3. Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.1. Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.2. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.3. Federal versus State Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.3.4. Differences in Penalty Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.5. Incentive Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5. Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.5.1. Impact of State OSHA programs on Inspections and Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.5.2. Impact of State OSHA programs on Nonfatal and Fatal Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.5.3. Impact of Changes in Penalty Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.5.4. Impact of State OSHA Programs on Wages and Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.6. Results - Impact of State OSHA programs on Inspections Per Capita and Violations Per Capita . . . . 110
4.6.1. Differential Impact of State OSHA Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.7. Results - Impact of State OSHA programs on Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.7.1. Differential Impact of State OSHA Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.8. 2000 California Penalty Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.9. Results - Impact of State OSHA programs on Wages and Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.10. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................... 143
vACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am deeply grateful for the exceptional guidance provided by my thesis advisors: Lawrence Katz, Claudia Goldin,
and Steve Shavell. Each has provided examples of integrity, curiosity, and dedication that I will cherish for the rest of
my career. I hope this and future work is worthy of their inspiration.
I thank Gary Chamberlain, Raj Chetty, Will Dobbie, Judge Nancy Gertner, Christopher Jencks, Louis Kaplow,
Ilyana Kuziemko, Jeff Miron, Alison Morantz, Shayak Sarkar, and Kate Stith for many helpful comments and sugges-
tions, and participants in the Harvard University Labor Economics/Public Finance Seminar and Law and Economics
Seminar. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University, in particular Sue Long,
generously provided sentencing data for use in this project in my role as a TRAC Fellow of the Center. I also thank the
Olin Center for Law and Economics, and the Harvard University Program in Inequality and Social Policy for ﬁnancial
support.
Thank you Will for inspiring me and keeping me sane.
And ﬁnally, thank you Mom and Dad for everything. This dissertation is dedicated to you.
vi1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three papers relating to the ﬁeld of Law and Economics. The ﬁrst two papers examine
the impact of increased judicial discretion on both racial disparities and inter-judge disparities in the federal criminal
justice system. The third paper analyzes the effects of OSHA programs on workplace safety, wages, and employment.
The common thread throughout this work is a focus on how legal actors and institutions affect substantive outcomes
of individuals.
The ﬁrst paper explores the effect of judicial discretion on racial disparities in federal sentencing. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were created to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar defendants. In this
paper, I analyze the impact of increased judicial discretion on racial disparities in sentencing after the Guidelines were
struck down in United States v. Booker (2005). Using data on the universe of federal defendants, I ﬁnd that black
defendants are sentenced to almost two months more in prison compared to their white counterparts, a 4% increase.
To identify the sources of racial disparities, I construct a dataset linking judges to over 400,000 defendants. Exploiting
the random assignment of cases to judges, I ﬁnd that racial disparities are greater among judges appointed after Booker,
suggesting acculturation to the Guidelines by more experienced judges. Prosecutors also respond to increased judicial
discretion by charging black defendants with longer mandatory minimums.
The second paper estimates the impact of increased judicial discretion on inter-judge disparities, another potential
source of unwarranted disparity in the federal criminal justice system. Using the judge-defendant linked dataset from
the ﬁrst paper, I rely on the random assignment of cases to judges. I ﬁnd that inter-judge disparities have increased
signiﬁcantly after the Guidelines became advisory using a random effects model. A defendant who is randomly
assigned a one standard deviation “harsher” judge in the district court received a 2.6 month longer prison sentence
before Booker, but received a 5.3 month longer sentence following Booker. Inter-judge disparities exist in above range
and below range departures. Some of the recent increase in disparities can be attributed to differential sentencing
behavior by judge demographics. The application of mandatory minimums by prosecutors is another prominent source
of disparities, potentially through the use of superseding indictments.
The third paper analyzes the differential impact of state versus federal regulation of OSHA programs on the use of
traditional enforcement tools, nonfatal injury rates and fatalities, as well as wages and employment. I ﬁnd that certiﬁ-
cation of a state regulated OSHA program leads to an increased use of inspections per capita and issuance of violations
per capita. However, in the more recent period from 1996-2008, state regulated OSHA programs have no signiﬁcantly
lower rate of total nonfatal injuries, compared to federally regulated programs. Disaggregating state regulated OSHA
programs, I ﬁnd that state regulated programs that adopted stringent standards beyond the federal program are associ-
ated with signiﬁcantly lower fatalities, compared to all other states. A case study on the 2000 California penalty reform
reveals that greater magnitude of sanctions and prosecution are potentially effective enforcement tools in promoting
1greater workplace safety and reducing fatalities. Finally, I ﬁnd that there is a compensating differential for workplace
safety, as wages fall signiﬁcantly following certiﬁcation of a state regulated program, with no changes in employment.
22. FREE AT LAST? JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING
2.1. Introduction
Sentencing disparities by race, gender, education, and socioeconomic status are prevalent in the federal criminal
justice system. Black defendants are sentenced to ﬁve months longer in prison than white defendants who commit
similar offenses and have similar observable demographic traits and criminal history. Male defendants are sentenced
to over ﬁve months more in prison than similar female defendants, and defendants with lower educational attainment
and income receive signiﬁcantly longer sentences than otherwise similar offenders (Mustard 2001). Even within the
same court, judges appear to vary signiﬁcantly in their treatment of defendant race (Abrams et al. 2012), suggesting
that racial disparities in the the criminal justice system may be a source of the overrepresentation of blacks in the
prison population.
Inresponsetoconcernsthatjudgeswereintroducingunwarranteddisparitiesinsentencing(Frankel1973), Congress
adopted the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984. While
the Guidelines reduced inter-judge sentencing disparities in its early years (Anderson, Stith, and Kling 1999), it was
criticized for its rigidity (e.g., Freed 1992 and Stith 2008), and for shifting power to prosecutors in their charge and
plea bargaining decisions (Stith and Cabranes 1998, Alschuler 1978, Nagel and Schulhofer 1992).
After almost two decades of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, the Guidelines were struck down in United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker greatly increased the degree of judicial discretion afforded to judges (See,
e.g., Berman 2005), with subsequent cases further increasing judicial discretion by reducing the degree of appellate
scrutiny. Empirical work on the impact of Booker suggests increases in inter-judge sentencing disparities (Scott
2010), but has yielded mixed results on racial disparities, with some researchers ﬁnding large racial disparities in the
aftermath of Booker (United States Sentencing Commission 2006, 2010) and others ﬁnding no signiﬁcant impact on
racial disparities in sentence length (Ulmer et al. 2010).1 Some scholars have even argued that judicial discretion
may actually mitigate recent increases in racial disparities (Fischman and Schanzenbach, forthcoming). In light of
possible evidence of increasing disparities post Booker, the United States Sentencing Commission and policymakers
have considered possible ways to constrain judicial discretion, such as “resurrecting” the mandatory Guidelines.
This paper estimates the impact of increased judicial discretion via Booker on racial disparities in federal sen-
tencing using data on the universe of defendants sentenced between 1994-2009. I use a differences-in-differences
(DD) methodology to compare the sentence disparities between similar defendants within a district court before and
after Booker and ﬁnd that racial disparities increase signiﬁcantly after Booker controlling for extensive offender and
crime characteristics. The black-white sentencing gap increases by almost 2 months in the post Booker period, a 75%
1Both studies fail to account for district court differences, interactions between offender criminal history and offense severity, and condition on
endogenous decisions to deviate from the Guidelines, which explain a large portion of increased racial disparities after Booker.
3increase in the baseline racial gap, and a 4% increase in the average sentence length. Increased racial disparities in
sentence length can be attributed to black defendants being more likely to be sentenced above the Guidelines recom-
mended range, and less likely to be sentenced below the Guidelines recommended range, compared to similar white
offenders. Even conditional on being sentenced within the Guidelines range, black defendants receive signiﬁcantly
longer sentences than similar white defendants. The results are robust to controlling for different racial trends in sen-
tencing outcomes, and changes induced by other laws and court decisions. Racial disparities in sentencing persist after
accounting for differential treatment of offenders based on other observable traits after Booker, such as educational
attainment and criminal history. I also ﬁnd evidence that the racial sentencing gap expands after periods of more def-
erential appellate review, suggesting that judges are particularly responsive to changes in the likelihood of appellate
reversal.
Next, IexaminethesourcesofincreasingdisparitiesafterBooker bystudyinghowdifferenttypesofjudgesrespond
to increased judicial discretion. Many scholars have suggested that judges have different sentencing philosophies
(e.g., Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback 1999), which may be affected by the standard of appellate review (Fischman
and Schanzenbach 2011), with correlations between sentencing practices and judicial characteristics such as race,
gender, and political afﬁliation (Welch 1988, Schanzenbach 2005, Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007, Schanzenbach and
Tiller 2008). However, prior empirical research on inter-judge disparity and the impact of judicial demographics on
sentencing practices has been hampered by the lack of judge identiﬁers. Relying on aggregate district-level variation
in judicial demographics can lead to biased estimates if districts with different judicial compositions differ in ways
that affect all judges within the district court.
I surmount these issues by utilizing a novel dataset constructed for this study. Matching three data sources, I
construct a dataset of over 400,000 criminal defendants linked to sentencing judge from ﬁscal years 2000-2009. Given
that cases are randomly assigned to judges within a district court, any difference in sentencing practices across judges
can be attributable to judge differences, rather than case composition. Exploiting the random assignment of cases to
judges in this dataset, I ﬁnd that much of the increases in racial disparities after Booker are driven by post Booker
appointed judges, even after accounting for the fact that these judges are George W. Bush appointees. My ﬁndings
suggest that judges with experience sentencing under the Guidelines may have become relatively acculturated to the
Guidelines regime, compared to newer judges who began their tenure in a post Booker regime.
I conclude by considering the impact of judicial discretion on other actors in the criminal justice system. Arrest,
charge, trial and plea bargaining decisions made earlier in the process are all ripe avenues for unwarranted bias (Anwar
et al. 2012, Rehavi and Starr 2012). After Booker, prosecutors have commented that they are far less willing to forego
charging mandatory minimums when judges ultimately sentence defendants to terms far below the Guidelines recom-
mended minimum sentence. Consistent with this story, I ﬁnd evidence that increased judicial discretion via Booker
changes the prosecutorial treatment of statutory mandatory minimums, which Booker left intact. Black offenders are
4far more likely to be charged with mandatory minimums than similar white offenders, and after Booker, black de-
fendants are signiﬁcantly more likely to face statutory minimums that exceed their Guidelines minimum compared to
white defendants, consistent with prosecutors attempting to rein in judicial discretion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief legal background of the Guidelines and the Booker
decision. Section 3 describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4 presents a simple conceptual frame-
work for judicial sentencing. Section 5 provides the empirical methodology. Section 6 presents results, and Section 7
concludes.
2.2. Legal Background
2.2.1. Adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
For over a century prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, judges had virtually unfettered discretion to determine
the lengths of sentences. A 1977 study of Virginia state district court judges revealed that while judges generally
agreed on the verdict in legal cases, they applied radically different sentences (Austin and Williams 1977). A 1988
study of federal courts similarly found that white collar offenders who committed similar offenses received very
different sentences depending on the court in which they were sentenced (Wheeler at al. 1988).
By the 1970s, the legal community and public expressed alarm at the widespread disparities in criminal sentencing
that resulted from this indeterminate sentencing regime (Frankel 1973). Some members of the public argued that
judges and parole boards endangered public safety with lenient sentencing of criminals (Tonry 2005). Others were
distressed by inequitable and arbitrary treatment within the criminal justice system. The American Friends Service
Committee claimed that decreasing discretion among judges was the only way to eliminate racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system (American Friends Service Committee 1971).
Policymakers also recognized that judges were often “left to apply [their] own notions of the purposes of sen-
tencing,” leading to “an unjustiﬁably wide range of sentences to offenders convicted for similar crimes” (S. Rep. No.
98-225 1983). In order to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities “among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct,” Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to
adopt and administer the Guidelines. Part of the SRA of 1984, the Guidelines were applied to all federal offenses
committed after November 1, 1987, and prohibited courts from using race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and
socioeconomic status in sentencing decisions.
Under the Guidelines, federal district court judges assign each crime to one of 43 offense levels, and assign each
defendant to one of six criminal history categories. The more serious the offense and the greater the harm associated
with the offense, the higher the base offense level. For example, trespass offenses are assigned a base offense level
of four, while kidnapping is assigned a base offense level of 32. From a base offense level, the ﬁnal offense level is
5calculated by adjusting for applicable offense and defendant characteristics. Relevant adjustments under Chapter Two
of the Guidelines include the amount of loss involved in the offense, use of a ﬁrearm, and the age or condition of the
victim. Chapter Three allows for further adjustments based on aggravating or mitigating factors, such as obstruction
of justice or a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.
The criminal history category reﬂects the frequency and severity of a defendant’s prior criminal convictions, pre-
dictive of recidivism risk. To determine a defendant’s criminal history category, a judge adds points for prior sentences
in the federal system, 50 state systems, all territories and foreign or military courts. For example, three points are added
for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, and two points are added for each prior
sentence of imprisonment of at least 60 days and less than one year and one month. Two points are also added if the
defendant committed the instant offense under any criminal justice sentence. These points are then converted into a
criminal history category.
The intersection of the ﬁnal offense level and criminal history category yields a fairly narrow Guidelines recom-
mended sentencing range, where the top of the range exceeds the bottom by the greater of either six months or 25%.
See Table 2.1 for the Guidelines sentencing chart.
6TABLE 2.1. GUIDELINES SENTENCING CHART
SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category  (Criminal History Points)
Offense
Level
I
(0 or 1)
II
(2 or 3)
III
(4, 5, 6)
IV
(7, 8, 9)
V
(10, 11, 12)
VI
(13 or more)
Zone A
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
Zone D
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
-401- November 1, 2010
Notes: Recommended sentence lengths in months.
If a judge determines that there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances that warrant a departure from the
Guidelines, she would have to justify her reasons for departure to the appellate court, but in general the Guidelines
were treated as sufﬁciently mandatory prior to Booker. Before Booker, judges could only consider factors such as
a defendant’s age, education, employment history, in deciding the sentence length for within range sentences. After
7sentencing, the government is permitted to appeal a sentence resulting in a departure below the Guidelines range, and
the defendant can appeal an upward departure.2
2.2.2. Challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines Regime
The constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines was ﬁrst questioned in reference to the Washington State
Sentencing Guidelines. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from increasing a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum
based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, Washington’s manda-
tory sentencing guidelines were struck down. Shortly after, the reasoning of Blakely was applied to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.
In United States v. Booker, the mandatory Guidelines were also found unconstitutional under the Sixth Amend-
ment. The Booker ruling, however, did not apply to mandatory minimum sentences enacted by Congress. Rather than
invalidating the Guidelines, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines would be “effectively advisory,” as opposed
to mandatory. The Court explained that “district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”
In the aftermath of Booker, circuit courts reached a consensus that sentencing must begin with the calculation
of the applicable Guidelines range. Today, after a sentencing judge has calculated the Guidelines range, she must
consider seven factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) before imposition of punishment: 1) the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, 2) the need for the sentence imposed, 3) the kinds of
sentences available, 4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established, 5) any pertinent policy statement
issued by the Sentencing Commission, 6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and 7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of
the offense.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions furthered weakened the effect of the Guidelines on criminal sentencing by
reducing the degree of appellate review. In Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), the Court held that a sentence
within the Guidelines recommended range could be presumed “reasonable” because a “judge who imposes a sentence
within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus makes a decision that is fully consistent with the Commission’s
judgment in general.” In Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), the Court held that federal appeals courts could
not presume that a sentence outside the range recommended by the Guidelines was unreasonable. Concurrent with
the Gall decision, the Court in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), held that federal district court judges
2There are numerous other ways in which Congress has attempted to limit unwarranted disparities in sentencing. Beginning in 1984, and
subsequently 1986 and 1988, Congress enacted a series of mandatory minimum statutes directed at drug and ﬁrearms offenses. In 2003, Congress
also passed the PROTECT Act to curtail judicial departures due to a concern that the standard for appellate review of departures had led to
undesirably high rates of departures for child sex offenses.
8have the discretion to impose sentences outside the recommended Guidelines range due to policy disagreements with
the Sentencing Commission, such as the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses - the so-called
“100-to-1 ratio.”
2.3. Data
This paper utilizes data from three sources: 1) the United States Sentencing Commission, 2) the Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse, and 3) the Federal Judicial Center. I describe each dataset in turn.
2.3.1. United States Sentencing Commission
I use data from the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) on records of all federal offenders sentenced
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements of the SRA of 1984 in ﬁscal years 1994-2009 (October
1, 1993 - September 30, 2009).3 These data include demographic, Guidelines application, and sentencing information
on federal defendants, but defendant and judge identiﬁers are redacted. This information is obtained from numer-
ous documents on every offender: Indictment, Presentence Report, Report on the Sentencing Hearing, Written Plea
Agreement (if applicable), and Judgment of Conviction.
Demographic variables include defendant’s race, gender, age, citizenship status, educational attainment, and num-
ber of dependents. Data is also provided on the primary offense type, with a total of 35 offense categories. Offense
level variables include the base offense level, the base offense level after Chapter Two adjustments and the ﬁnal offense
level after Chapter Three adjustments. Criminal history variables include whether the defendant has a prior criminal
record, and whether armed career criminal status, or career offender status is applied, which are subject to mandatory
minimums. Data is also provided on the total number of criminal history points applied and the ﬁnal criminal history
category.
For each offender, there is a computed Guidelines range, and a Guidelines range adjusted for applicable mandatory
minimums. From these variables, I construct indicator variables for above range and below range departures from the
Guidelines, as well as months of departure, conditional on an above or below range departure.4 Information is also
provided on whether the offense carries a mandatory minimum sentence under various statutes, and whether departures
from the statutory minimum are granted, either under a substantial assistance motion or application of the safety valve
(described in greater detail later). Sentencing characteristics include the district court in which sentencing occurred
(94 total), in addition to the sentencing month and year.5 Data is also available on whether a case is settled by plea
3Over 90% of felony defendants in the federal criminal justice system are sentenced pursuant to the SRA of 1984 and all cases are assessed to
be constitutional.
4Technically, deviations from the Guidelines range are no longer “departures” after the Guidelines became advisory, but I use this term to
maintain consistency.
5USSC data prior to 2004 actually includes information on the exact sentencing day, but this variable is not available in later years.
9agreement or trial. Sentencing outcomes include incarceration or probation, sentence length, receipt of supervised
release, and length of supervised release.
I apply several sample restrictions. First, I drop individuals sentenced to life imprisonment, about 0.5% of the
sample. Second, I drop individuals with missing or invalid criminal records (offense level, criminal history category,
and offense type), about 6% of the sample. Third, I exclude individuals missing race, about 0.2% of the sample.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the main variables from the USSC data. Panel A indicates that 83% of the
defendants in the dataset are incarcerated versus receiving probation. Those who are not incarcerated serve an average
of 29 months of probation. The average unconditional sentence length is approximately 49 months. Conditional on
incarceration, the average sentence length is 57 months. Approximately 30% of cases carry a statutory minimum and
only 4% of cases are settled by trial. After imprisonment, defendants serve an average of 38 months of supervised
release.
In the dataset, 32% of defendants are white, 26% black and 38% Hispanic.6 About 32% of the defendants are
non U.S. citizens. Defendants have on average 1.6 dependents, and almost a majority have less than a high school
degree. Over 85% of the defendants are male. Defendants are approximately 34 years of age. Most of the defendants
have had some previous interaction with the criminal justice system, as 75% have some prior criminal history. The
most common offense is drug trafﬁcking, followed by immigration, fraud, ﬁrearms, and larceny. Drug trafﬁcking
represents about 39% of the cases, followed by immigration offenses which comprise 18% of the cases. In terms of
Guidelines range calculations, defendants have an average ﬁnal criminal history score of 2.36, and a ﬁnal offense level
of 18.84. This criminal history category and offense level combination yield an average Guidelines recommended
range of 30-37 months in prison.
6The remaining race category is defendants classiﬁed as “other” race, which is comprised primarily of Native Americans.
10TABLE 2.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS
PANEL A. USSC DATA,1 9 9 4 - 2 0 0 9
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incarceration 853008 0.833 0.373 0 1
Probation Length in Months 142627 29.858 22.238 0 997
Sentence Length in Months 847227 49.290 65.108 0 985
Statutory Minimum Applied 853561 0.299 0.458 0 1
Settled by Trial 665073 0.044 0.205 0 1
Supervised Release in Months 852701 38.490 59.829 0 999
White 852875 0.318 0.466 0 1
Black 852875 0.261 0.439 0 1
Hispanic 852875 0.379 0.485 0 1
Non US Citizen 852990 0.320 0.467 0 1
Number of Dependents 854992 1.598 2.023 0 98
Less Than High School 842099 0.461 0.498 0 1
Male 854611 0.859 0.348 0 1
Age 854992 34.696 10.798 16 98
Criminal History Indicator 664422 0.746 0.435 0 1
Drug Trafﬁcking Offense 854992 0.388 0.487 0 1
Immigration Offense 854992 0.179 0.383 0 1
Fraud Offense 854992 0.113 0.317 0 1
Firearm Offense 854992 0.092 0.289 0 1
Criminal History Category (1-6) 854992 2.361 1.699 1 6
Final Offense Level (1-43) 854992 18.841 8.961 1 43
PANEL B. JUDGE MATCHED DATA,2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 9
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incarceration 643990 0.839 0.368 0 1
Probation Length in Months 103822 25.345 22.065 0 120
Sentence Length in Months 641986 45.920 59.871 0 985
Statutory Minimum Applied 633235 0.282 0.450 0 1
Settled by Trial 643990 0.035 0.183 0 1
Supervised Release in Months 643347 38.264 61.330 0 999
White 626500 0.294 0.456 0 1
Black 626500 0.234 0.423 0 1
Hispanic 626500 0.436 0.496 0 1
Non US Citizen 633942 0.384 0.486 0 1
Number of Dependents 595781 1.616 1.739 0 82
Less Than High School 599619 0.489 0.499 0 1
Male 636641 0.867 0.340 0 1
Age 638530 34.548 10.644 16 97
Criminal History Indicator 632772 0.749 0.434 0 1
Drug Trafﬁcking Offense 643990 0.369 0.482 0 1
Immigration Offense 643990 0.251 0.433 0 1
Fraud Offense 643990 0.101 0.301 0 1
Firearm Offense 643990 0.096 0.295 0 1
Criminal History Category (1-6) 643990 2.416 1.705 1 6
Final Offense Level (1-43) 643990 18.451 8.625 1 43
Male Judge 643990 0.807 .395 0 1
White Judge 643990 0.767 .423 0 1
Black Judge 643990 0.083 .275 0 1
Hispanic Judge 643990 0.140 .347 0 1
Democratic Judge 643990 0.437 .496 0 1
Notes: Panel A is from the USSC data from 1994-2009. Panel B is from the USSC, TRAC, and Federal
Judicial Center matched data from 2000-2009.
2.3.2. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) provides sentencing data obtained through FOIA re-
quests. The data do not contain defendant demographics, offense characteristics, and Guidelines application informa-
11tion, but defendants are linked to the sentencing judge. To link defendant and crime characteristics to sentencing judge,
I match sentencing records from the USSC to data provided by TRAC. By district court, matching is conducted on
several key variables: sentencing year, sentencing month, offense type, sentence length in months, probation length in
months, amount of monetary ﬁne, whether the case ended by trial or plea agreement, and whether the case resulted in a
life sentence. For defendants sentenced prior to ﬁscal year 2004, I also match on exact sentencing day.7 I successfully
match over 90% of all cases from ﬁscal years 2000-2009.
2.3.3. Federal Judicial Center
To provide information on judge characteristics, I match the USSC and TRAC combined data to judge biographical
data from the Federal Judicial Center. Federal district judges are Article III judges who serve life term tenures. New
appointments are generally made when a judge retires or dies.8 As of the current day, there are a total of 678 Article
III district judgeships. The largest district court is the Southern District of New York with 28 authorized judgeships.
The majority of other district courts have between two to seven judgeships.
I obtain information on judge race, gender, political afﬁliation of appointing president, and commission year.
Applying the same sample restrictions as described in Section 3.1, the ﬁnal matched dataset consists of 440,025 cases
resulting in prison sentences from ﬁscal years 2000-2009.9 This unique dataset permits an examination of judicial
demographic characteristics on sentencing practices in the wake of increased judicial discretion via Booker. Panel B
of Table 1 presents summary statistics on this matched dataset. Of judges active between 2000-2009, 19% are female,
and over 75% are white. Black judges represent approximately 8% of the share of all judges. Judges appointed by
Democratic presidents represent 44% of all judges.
2.4. Conceptual Framework of Judicial Sentencing
This section provides a very simpliﬁed framework for analyzing judicial sentencing, similar to that used by Gen-
naioli and Shleifer (2008). The framework considers two countervailing forces on judicial sentencing: a judge’s
preferences for sentencing according to her tastes and costs associated with exercising discretion.
Consider a judge who is assigned to a defendant with a true harm or risk of recidivism, r. Let the Guidelines
sentence for a defendant with risk r be s⇤(r). Now suppose that the judge would prefer to sentence the defendant to
sj(r), such that sj(r) 6= s⇤(r). The judge may prefer to impose sj(r) because sentencing a defendant in a particular
way can increase the judge’s utility by advancing her political and ideological goals, or other personal goals.10
7Results are unchanged matching on the same variables across all years.
8On a few occasions, Congress has also increased the number of judgeships within a district in response to changing population or caseload.
9The Federal Judicial Center does not collect demographic information on judges in 3 districts: Guam, Virgin Islands, and Northern Mariana
Islands.
1065% of federal district judges in a 2010 USSC survey indicated that they thought the departure policy statements in the Guidelines Manual
were too restrictive, indicating that many judges prefer to deviate from the Guidelines.
12Assume that a judge suffers disutility from sentencing s 6= sj(r), such that a judge who sentences s experiences
loss of
L =
(s   sj(r))2
2
If judges have sentencing preferences that deviate from the Guidelines and were left unconstrained, a judge would
set s = sj(r) and one would likely observe large inter-judge disparities in sentencing. Consistent with this prediction,
Posner (2005) suggests that the large variances in federal sentences prior to the adoption of the Guidelines were likely
due to differing judicial attitudes towards personal responsibility and deterrence.
However, various mechanisms constrain judges from deviating from recommended sentences. For one, mandatory
rule-based sentencing under a Guidelines regime constrains judge sentencing. Another constraint on judge decision-
making comes from appellate review. A high reversal rate is not only administratively burdensome, but also potentially
harms a trial judge’s prospects for promotion to the appeals court (Posner 2005).
Thus, a judge sentencing away from the Guidelines recommended sentence also incurs a cost associated with
reversal. Assume that pre Booker, a judge faced a cost C =0if s = s⇤(r) and C = 1 if s 6= s⇤(r). Essentially, the
Guidelines were treated as mandatory, implying very high costs to exercising discretion. In this pre Booker regime,
one would see very little deviation from the Guidelines.11
After Booker, the Guidelines were no longer binding, but judges still faced the prospect of reversal upon appellate
review. To capture this idea, assume that the cost of exercising discretion in the post Booker regime is
C = p
(sj(r)   s⇤(r))2
2
where p is the probability of appellate reversal and
(s
j(r) s
⇤(r))
2
2 is the reputational cost associated with reversal.
Given a defendant with true risk r, a judge therefore sets a sentence s(r) to minimize
(s s
j(r))
2
2 +p
(s
j(r) s
⇤(r))
2
2 ,
setting
s(r)=
sj(r)+ps⇤(r)
1+p
Thus, the judge imposes a sentence that is a weighted average of his ideal and the Guidelines recommended
sentence. If p =0 , he sets the sentence to his ideal. The greater the probability of reversal, p, the more the judge
sentences the defendant closer to the Guidelines sentence.
From a Guidelines regime to Booker, the total cost of exercising discretion C falls substantially for judges who
want to depart from the Guidelines sentence. Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough later reduced the level of appellate review
11The rate of departure from the Guidelines was less than 15% in the early 1990s.
13from de novo to substantial abuse of discretion, intuitively lowering p, the probability of appellate reversal. Indeed,
the probability of reversal on sentencing matters fell from 36% in 2006 (under de novo review), to 26% in 2008 (under
abuse of discretion review).12 Thus, as the cost of exercising discretion falls after Booker, the model predicts that
judges would immediately impose sentences that deviate from the Guidelines sentence. As the probability of appellate
reversal falls under Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, the costs of discretion fall even more, and one would expect to see further
deviations from the Guidelines. If the probability of appellate reversal under de novo review was a binding constraint
on judges, one would expect to see relatively larger changes in sentencing after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough than in the
immediate aftermath of Booker.
2.5. Empirical Methodology
The Booker case was decided on January 12, 2005, and applied immediately to all future cases and prior cases
that had not reached sentencing. This paper exploits the timing of this decision to estimate the effect of increased
judicial discretion on racial disparities in sentencing outcomes. I use a differences-in-differences (DD) methodology
to compare the sentence disparities between similar defendants within a district court before and after Booker.
The main speciﬁcation is of the form:
Yijkdtm =  0 +  1 ⇤ Booker⇤ Racei +  2 ⇤ Xi +  3 ⇤ Zi + Guideijk
+Offtypei +  d +  t +  d ⇤  t +  m + ✏ijkdtm (1)
where Yijkdtm is a sentencing outcome for defendant i, with criminal history category j and offense level k, sentenced
in district court d in year t and month m. Main outcomes include sentence length measured in months, a binary indica-
tor for whether the defendant was sentenced above range (such that the sentence length is greater than the prescribed
Guidelines maximum), a binary indicator for below range sentencing (sentence length less than the prescribed Guide-
lines minimum), and sentence length conditional on above, below, or within range sentencing. Additional outcomes
include a binary indicator for incarceration, probation length, receipt of supervised release, term of supervised release,
application of a statutory minimum, and departures from statutory minimums.
The main coefﬁcient of interest is  1, which captures the impact of Booker on racial gaps in sentencing outcomes.
Booker is an indicator variable for defendants sentenced after the Booker decision.13 Racei is a dummy variable for
defendant i’s race: white, black, Hispanic, or other. The Booker indicator and main race dummies are also included
in the speciﬁcation. Xi comprises a vector of demographic characteristics of the defendant including gender, age, age
squared, educational attainment (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate), number
12I calculate rate of appellate reversals using yearly data on the universe of criminal appeals from the USSC. Reversal is deﬁned as all reversals
and remands on appeals arising out of sentencing issues.
13For defendants sentenced in January 2005, the USSC data contains a variable denoting whether the case was heard prior to or after the Booker
decision.
14of dependents, and citizenship status. Zi, an indicator variable for whether the offense carries a mandatory minimum.
Guideijk includes dummy variables for criminal history category j and offense level k, and each unique combina-
tion of criminal history category and offense level. The interaction captures differential sentencing tendencies at each
unique cell of the Guidelines grid (258 total). To proxy for underlying offense seriousness and all aggravating and
mitigating factors, I control for ﬁnal offense level. I also control for ﬁnal criminal history category. Offtypei is a
dummy variable for offense type.
The speciﬁcation also includes district court ﬁxed effects ( d), sentencing year ﬁxed effects ( t), and sentencing
month ﬁxed effects ( m). I also control for district by year ﬁxed effects to control for district trends over time. As a
robustness check, race speciﬁc linear trends are included to account for preexisting trending differences in sentencing
outcomes between defendants of different races. All standard errors are clustered at the district court level to account
for serial correlation.
To analyze the differential sentencing practices of certain types of judges, I use a differences-in-differences-in-
differences (DDD) methodology. The DDD methodology captures how judges differ in their relative treatment of
similar black and white defendants in response to increased judicial discretion, compared to other judges within the
same district court. Because cases are randomly assigned to judges within a district court, judge identiﬁers allow one
to compare judges within the same court, capturing judge differences in sentencing rather than different caseloads.14
I identify the sources of increasing racial disparities post Booker using a speciﬁcation of the form:
Yijkdtm =  0 + ↵ ⇤ Judgei ⇤ Racei ⇤ Booker+  1 ⇤ Booker ⇤ Racei+
 2 ⇤ Judgei ⇤ Racei +  3 ⇤ Xi +  4 ⇤ Zi + Guideijk
+Offtypei +  d +  t +  d ⇤  t +  m + ✏ijkdtm (2)
where Judgei includes judicial demographics such as race, gender, political afﬁliation, an indicator for pre vs. post
Guidelines appointment, and an indicator for pre vs. post Booker appointment. The coefﬁcient ↵ captures the impact
of particular judicial characteristics on racial disparities in the wake of Booker.
2.5.1. Potential Threats to Identiﬁcation
The results presented in this paper may be biased if unobservables that affect sentencing decisions change differ-
entially by defendant race in the wake of Booker. I test for this potential concern by analyzing the extent to which
observable offense and defendant characteristics differ in the post Booker period. I ﬁnd that there is no differential
change in criminal history by defendant race after Booker. If anything, black defendants have lower base offense lev-
els and lower ﬁnal offense levels after Booker compared to their white counterparts, suggesting that black defendants
14According to the Administrative Ofﬁce of the United States Courts, “The majority of courts use some variation of a random drawing.” I also
test for random assignment in Section 6.5.
15commit relatively less severe crimes compared to similar white offenders (See Table 2.3).
TABLE 2.3. DEFENDANT CRIMINAL CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Criminal Total Criminal Criminal History Base Offense Final Offense
History Points Category Level Level
Booker*Black 0.00347 0.104 0.0330 -0.356*** -0.413***
(0.00623) (0.0984) (0.0261) (0.135) (0.112)
Booker*Hispanic -0.00669 0.0438 -0.0295 -0.0805 -0.835***
(0.00769) (0.252) (0.0352) (0.186) (0.148)
Booker*Other 0.0277** 0.115 0.0208 0.431 0.228
(0.0133) (0.156) (0.0517) (0.298) (0.246)
Black 0.0800*** 1.717*** 0.607*** 0.604*** 0.858***
(0.00583) (0.104) (0.0269) (0.147) (0.153)
Hispanic -0.0236*** -0.445** -0.0753** 0.451 0.703***
(0.00787) (0.177) (0.0309) (0.278) (0.261)
Other -0.0671*** -0.980*** -0.273*** -0.330 -0.0818
(0.0146) (0.150) (0.0535) (0.264) (0.231)
Booker -0.00223 -0.224 -0.0398 0.756*** 1.239***
(0.0127) (0.185) (0.0366) (0.196) (0.203)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 636,698 822,908 824,680 553,759 824,680
R-squared 0.224 0.206 0.307 0.541 0.522
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. When the dependent variable is the base offense level, data is from 1999-2009.
Regressions for criminal history, total criminal history points and criminal history category contain controls for ﬁnal offense level.
Regressions for base and ﬁnal offense level control for criminal history category. All regressions contain controls for offense type.
Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district
level. Race trends are included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent
level.
Black defendants sentenced after Booker are more likely to be male, 0.7 years younger, and less likely to be
non U.S. citizens compared to their white counterparts (See Table 2.4). While these changes are signiﬁcant, the
magnitudes are very small. Moreover, as shown later, younger defendants who are U.S. citizens receive relatively
lower sentences compared to otherwise similar, older non U.S. citizens. Thus, any unobservable changes correlated
with these demographics would bias downwards my ﬁndings. Overall, these results suggests that unobservables are
unlikely to change in large enough ways to upwards bias my estimates.
16TABLE 2.4. DEFENDANT DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Age Number Non US Less than
Dependents Citizen HS
Booker*Black 0.0234*** -0.715*** 0.0375 -0.0209*** -0.00324
(0.00698) (0.139) (0.0246) (0.00734) (0.00553)
Booker*Hispanic 0.00756 -0.113 0.0335 0.00909 0.00125
(0.00531) (0.156) (0.0312) (0.00980) (0.00709)
Booker*Other 0.00976 -0.568 -0.0553 0.0205* 0.0247**
(0.0110) (0.342) (0.0517) (0.0108) (0.0117)
Black -0.0258** -4.455*** 0.595*** 0.0274** 0.0743***
(0.0100) (0.166) (0.0287) (0.0120) (0.00768)
Hispanic 0.00317 -4.086*** 0.463*** 0.408*** 0.213***
(0.00665) (0.194) (0.0301) (0.0183) (0.0116)
Other -0.0354*** -3.227*** 0.267*** 0.162*** 0.0319*
(0.00803) (0.271) (0.0521) (0.0314) (0.0178)
Booker -0.00310 0.400 -0.0674 -0.00134 -0.0138
(0.00822) (0.278) (0.0473) (0.00978) (0.0128)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 824,680 824,680 824,680 824,680 824,680
R-squared 0.135 0.182 0.125 0.568 0.240
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies
for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and
sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race trends are included. *** =
signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Another potential threat to the identiﬁcation is if Booker is associated with changes in selection in the types of
defendants that reach the sentencing stage. For instance, if prosecutors disproportionately drop or dismiss charges
against marginal black defendants, the remaining black defendants at the sentencing stage might receive longer sen-
tences compared to similar white offenders. To address potential changes in selection prior to the sentencing stage, I
test the likelihood of guilty pleas, dropped charges, and deferred prosecutions against black defendants compared to
similar white defendants after Booker using data on all federal arrests and bookings from 1994-2009.15 Table 2.5 sug-
gests no signiﬁcant changes in the rates at which black defendants plead guilty, or the likelihood of dropped charges
or deferred prosecution, suggesting no signiﬁcant changes in selection prior to sentencing.16
15Data is obtained from the Federal Justice Statistics Program: Arrests and Bookings for Federal Offenses, which covers all offenders within
the custody of the United Marshals Service.
16A deferred prosecution occurs when a prosecutor agrees to not ﬁle charges in exchange for the defendant taking speciﬁed actions, such as
payment of ﬁnes, and continued cooperation during investigation.
17TABLE 2.5. SELECTION INTO SENTENCING STAGE
(1) (2) (3)
Guilty Plea Dropped Charge Deferred Prosecution
Booker*Black -0.0115 -0.00451* 0.000103
(0.00808) (0.00242) (0.000901)
Black -0.00718 0.00634*** -0.000823
(0.00948) (0.00218) (0.000854)
Booker -0.112*** -0.00186 -5.74e-05
(0.00779) (0.00351) (0.000385)
Observations 1,669,560 1,669,560 1,669,560
R-squared 0.241 0.043 0.032
Notes: Data is from the Arrests and Bookings for Federal Offenses from 1994-2009. All regressions
contain controls for defendant gender, age, marital status, citizenship status, primary offense type, dis-
trict court by arrest year ﬁxed effects, and race trends. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
The coefﬁcient of interest is the interaction of defendant race (omitted group white defendants) with a
Booker indicator for defendants arrested after Booker. Race trends are included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1
percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
2.6. Results
2.6.1. Sentence Length
Figure 2.1 presents graphical evidence of trends in sentence length by defendant race in the raw data. Figure 2.1
indicates no preexisting trending differences in sentence lengths across defendants of different races. However, the
trend in the gap in sentence length between black and white defendants changes post Booker as sentence lengths for
black and white defendants diverge. The evidence is even more striking excluding cases with mandatory minimums,
where it is apparent that sentence lengths for white defendants decrease post Booker, while black sentence lengths
continue to rise, increasing the racial disparities in sentence length.
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FIGURE 2.1. SENTENCE LENGTHS IN MONTHS, BY DEFENDANT RACE
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Data points are quarterly averages.
Table 2.6 presents the regression results for the impact of increased judicial discretion via Booker on disparities in
sentence length. The coefﬁcients on defendant demographics are consistent with prior ﬁndings regarding disparities
in sentencing. On average, black offenders face an approximately 3 month longer sentence length than comparable
white offenders, who are the omitted category. Hispanic offenders receive over a 1 month longer prison sentence
compared to similar white offenders. Additionally, non US citizens face about a 1.5 month longer prison sentence
compared to US citizens. Defendants with greater educational attainment receive shorter months in prison, compared
to defendants with less than a high school degree (the omitted category). I also ﬁnd large sentencing disparities by
gender. Female defendants receive over 5 months less in prison compared to male offenders. Additionally, defendant
age is positively correlated with sentence length, while number of dependents is negatively associated with sentence
19length. The application of a mandatory minimum on average results in a 23 month longer sentence.
The coefﬁcients on the Booker indicator interacted with defendant race suggest growing racial disparities post
Booker. Column 1 suggests that black offenders receive an approximately 2 month longer sentence after Booker
compared to white offenders, over a 70% increase in the racial gap in sentence length, and a 4% increase in the
average sentence length for all offenders. Post Booker, Hispanics offenders receive about a 1.5 month longer sentence
compared to similar white offenders, an approximately 3% increase in the average sentence length for all offenders.
20TABLE 2.6. SENTENCE LENGTH IN MONTHS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 2.373*** 1.653*** 1.343** 1.639** 1.642**
(0.595) (0.524) (0.617) (0.690) (0.689)
Booker*Hispanic 1.687*** 1.559*** 1.112** 1.098** 1.113**
(0.446) (0.547) (0.499) (0.539) (0.539)
Booker*Other 2.711*** 2.053** 2.295** -0.168 -0.105
(0.986) (1.021) (1.113) (1.235) (1.229)
Black 2.638*** 2.485*** 2.639*** 3.185*** 3.188***
(0.363) (0.411) (0.363) (0.591) (0.591)
Hispanic 0.878* 0.850* 0.877* 1.308** 1.306**
(0.461) (0.463) (0.461) (0.524) (0.522)
Other 1.061 0.903 1.057 3.177*** 3.142***
(1.092) (1.271) (1.092) (1.055) (1.050)
Booker -3.144*** -2.840*** -2.656*** -2.593** -3.671***
(1.010) (1.077) (0.995) (1.129) (1.323)
Non US Citizen 1.466*** 1.470*** 1.472*** 1.479*** 1.478***
(0.450) (0.452) (0.450) (0.452) (0.450)
HS Grad -0.554*** -0.554*** -0.555*** -0.554*** -0.546***
(0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185)
Some College -1.633*** -1.631*** -1.633*** -1.633*** -1.627***
(0.180) (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
College Grad -1.896*** -1.897*** -1.897*** -1.900*** -1.893***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235)
# Dependents -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150***
(0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0441) (0.0439)
Female -5.388*** -5.387*** -5.385*** -5.386*** -5.385***
(0.502) (0.502) (0.501) (0.501) (0.501)
Age 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147***
(0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0385)
Age2 -0.00147*** -0.00146*** -0.00146*** -0.00145*** -0.00145***
(0.000429) (0.000430) (0.000429) (0.000431) (0.000429)
Mandatory Min 23.15*** 23.15*** 23.14*** 23.15*** 23.15***
(1.752) (1.752) (1.751) (1.752) (1.752)
RGK -1.954***
(0.570)
RGK*Black 2.112***
(0.616)
RGK*Hispanic 1.198**
(0.502)
RGK*Other 0.871
(1.037)
Race*PROTECT? No Yes No No No
Race*RGK? No No Yes No No
Race Trends? No No No Yes Yes
Year*Month FE? No No No No Yes
Observations 679,159 679,159 679,159 679,159 679,159
R-squared 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense
level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects,
and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * =
signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
I present several robustness checks in Table 2.6. Column 2 controls for possible differential effects of the PRO-
TECTActonracialdisparitiesinsentencingoutcomes. Column3accountsforpotentialeffectsofthe2007Rita/Gall/Kimbrough
decisions on racial disparities.17 Column 3 indicates that while racial disparities ﬁrst emerge in the immediate af-
termath of Booker, they grow larger following Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, suggesting that judges are particularly
17I control for possible differential effects of the PROTECT Act and Rita/Gall/Kimbrough by interacting indicators for these court decisions
with defendant race dummies. Although not shown in Table 2.6, the passage of the PROTECT Act did not change racial disparities in sentencing.
This ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed by Freeborn and Hartmann 2010.
21responsive to more deferential appellate review.
Column 4 includes race speciﬁc linear trends. Column 5 includes race trends and adds a full set of time effects -
sentencing month interacted with sentencing year.18
TABLE 2.7. SENTENCE LENGTH IN MONTHS -R OBUSTNESS CHECKS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 2.311*** 2.514*** 1.355*** 2.588*** 2.340***
(0.683) (0.575) (0.309) (0.658) (0.595)
Booker*Hispanic 1.466*** 1.830*** 1.695*** 1.681*** 1.673***
(0.487) (0.450) (0.356) (0.466) (0.449)
Booker*Other 1.848 1.491 2.249*** 2.927** 2.646***
(1.149) (0.932) (0.735) (1.137) (0.983)
Black 2.885*** 3.555*** 0.577*** 4.501*** 2.680***
(0.422) (0.344) (0.190) (0.474) (0.361)
Hispanic 0.862* 1.596*** -0.0824 0.829 0.863*
(0.478) (0.410) (0.267) (0.530) (0.455)
Other 1.781 1.140 0.474 2.909*** 1.079
(1.200) (1.036) (0.591) (1.022) (1.090)
Booker -2.939*** -3.232*** -2.126*** -1.340 -3.103***
(1.069) (0.991) (0.709) (1.206) (1.015)
Non US Citizen 1.366*** 1.584*** 0.364 -0.176 1.445***
(0.495) (0.454) (0.304) (0.557) (0.449)
HS Grad -0.369 -0.526*** -0.225** -0.0568 -0.554***
(0.236) (0.182) (0.0877) (0.240) (0.182)
Some College -1.523*** -1.790*** -0.752*** -0.644** -1.624***
(0.285) (0.176) (0.117) (0.301) (0.178)
College Grad -2.222*** -2.742*** -1.010*** 0.335 -1.882***
(0.489) (0.225) (0.175) (0.355) (0.235)
# Dependents -0.123 -0.149*** -0.110*** -0.106* -0.140***
(0.136) (0.0450) (0.0252) (0.0598) (0.0439)
Female -5.347*** -5.502*** -2.633*** -7.139*** -5.416***
(0.595) (0.458) (0.223) (0.656) (0.498)
Age 0.134** 0.168*** 0.255*** 0.328*** 0.138***
(0.0622) (0.0394) (0.0255) (0.0647) (0.0377)
Age2 -0.00125 -0.00192*** -0.00267*** -0.00216*** -0.00139***
(0.000757) (0.000443) (0.000304) (0.000674) (0.000423)
Mandatory Min 23.89*** 34.25*** 22.92***
(1.994) (2.135) (1.773)
Mandatory Min Length 0.00609***
(0.00135)
Observations 552,524 679,159 440,930 455,203 678,960
R-squared 0.650 0.732 0.771 0.642 0.741
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Column 1 presents results for all sentences including life sentences top coded at 470
months. Column 2 presents results controlling for mandatory minimum length. Column 3 presents results excluding sentences with
statutory mandatory minimums. Column 4 presents results controlling for Chapter 2 adjusted offense level, which is only available for
years 1999-2009. Column 5 presents results controlling for armed career criminal and career offender classiﬁcation. All regressions
contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain
district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race trends are
excluded. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Finally, in Table 2.8, I replicate speciﬁcation 4 for ten placebo periods prior to Booker. Table 2.8 indicates that the
changes in racial disparities post Booker are much larger than those around placebo periods. Overall, these alternate
speciﬁcations indicate that increases in racial disparities in the aftermath of Booker are highly robust.
18These results are robust to controlling for base offense level after Chapter Two adjustments and additional controls for classiﬁcation as a career
offender and armed career criminal (Table 2.7).
22TABLE 2.8. SENTENCE LENGTH IN MONTHS -P LACEBO TESTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Placebo Case 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Placebo*Black -2.545** -2.924*** -2.429** -1.743** -1.907*** -0.961 -0.959 0.0188 0.672 0.867
(1.080) (0.921) (0.928) (0.787) (0.709) (0.642) (0.649) (0.804) (0.780) (0.739)
Placebo*Hispanic -2.373** -1.758* -0.845 -0.355 -0.838 -0.461 -0.653 -0.316 -0.415 0.688
(0.975) (0.941) (0.738) (0.705) (0.602) (0.602) (0.675) (0.691) (0.658) (0.559)
Placebo*Other -0.854 -1.739 -0.504 0.470 0.549 1.735 0.929 -0.00518 -0.878 0.261
(2.510) (1.919) (1.899) (1.969) (1.623) (1.196) (1.826) (1.974) (1.876) (1.464)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039 692,039
R-squared 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741 0.741
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Coefﬁcients are from DD regressions of placebo case decisions on racial disparities in sentencing, identical to speciﬁcation (4) in Table 2.
All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing
month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race trends are included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at
10 percent level.
2
3While racial disparities in sentence length have increased as a whole, a more disaggregated analysis reveals that
the growing racial disparities after Booker do not appear uniformly across all offenses. Table 2.9 presents results
on sentence lengths disaggregated into the most prevalent seven offenses, which comprise 84% of all offenses in the
dataset. Racial disparities increase signiﬁcantly among defendants convicted of drug trafﬁcking offenses, controlling
for primary type of drug, and fraud offenses. Black and Hispanic defendants convicted of these offenses receive 1.5-2
months longer in prison compared to their white counterparts in the aftermath of Booker.
TABLE 2.9. SENTENCE LENGTHS BY MAJOR OFFENSE CATEGORIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Drugs Immigration Firearms Fraud Bank Larceny Forgery
Robbery
Booker*Black 2.354*** 0.0632 0.475 1.487*** -2.248 0.379 0.278
(0.804) (0.473) (0.853) (0.408) (1.919) (0.791) (0.532)
Booker*Hispanic 1.275* 0.643 1.167 1.996*** -7.224** -0.0837 -0.331
(0.674) (0.503) (1.434) (0.603) (3.042) (1.258) (0.561)
Booker*Other 0.177 -0.112 4.832* 0.703 -3.872 1.627* 1.623
(1.415) (1.007) (2.552) (1.018) (3.737) (0.903) (1.885)
Black 4.265*** -0.00646 1.791*** 0.203 0.908 -0.250 -0.461
(0.647) (0.468) (0.613) (0.172) (0.968) (0.230) (0.332)
Hispanic 3.594*** -0.173 -0.926 -0.672*** 2.745 -0.474 -0.471
(0.454) (0.484) (0.912) (0.224) (2.477) (0.450) (0.317)
Other 1.686 1.047 0.319 -0.137 -1.195 -0.167 0.183
(1.447) (1.116) (2.175) (0.337) (2.698) (0.445) (0.647)
Booker -3.927** -0.859* -2.090 -2.721** -9.703* 0.781 0.859
(1.716) (0.506) (2.520) (1.159) (5.604) (1.380) (2.751)
Observations 299,687 123,882 69,241 59,130 21,704 12,222 9,546
R-squared 0.752 0.812 0.720 0.749 0.687 0.795 0.785
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Column 1 includes controls for primary drug type. All regressions contain dummies
for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month
ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race speciﬁc trends are excluded because of limited variation, but
magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * =
signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
2.6.2. Departures from the Guidelines
Table 2.10 presents results on how Booker impacted departures from the Guidelines. Column 1 replicates spec-
iﬁcation 4 of the sentence length results from Table 2.6. Column 2 indicates that post Booker, black defendants are
sentenced at greater rates above range than white defendants, approximately 2%. However, conditional on above range
sentencing, black defendants receive about the same number of months above range compared to white defendants.
24TABLE 2.10. SENTENCING DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Booker*Black 1.639** 0.0186*** -0.395 -0.0161** -10.74 -0.00247 0.879***
(0.690) (0.00358) (3.255) (0.00743) (6.663) (0.00624) (0.212)
Booker*Hispanic 1.098** 0.00694* 4.562 0.0110 0.854 -0.0179* 0.260*
(0.539) (0.00414) (3.083) (0.0111) (4.852) (0.00949) (0.145)
Booker*Other -0.168 -0.00503 -0.274 0.0226 -3.812 -0.0176 -0.149
(1.235) (0.00592) (7.719) (0.0148) (9.318) (0.0153) (0.392)
Black 3.185*** 0.00132 1.981 -0.0541*** 4.134 0.0527*** -0.358***
(0.591) (0.00312) (2.508) (0.00709) (4.781) (0.00723) (0.116)
Hispanic 1.308** -0.00998*** -5.831** -0.0658*** -0.311 0.0757*** 0.0262
(0.524) (0.00270) (2.226) (0.00952) (3.917) (0.00947) (0.124)
Other 3.177*** 0.0151*** 4.535 -0.0667*** 1.999 0.0516** 0.291
(1.055) (0.00471) (5.593) (0.0242) (6.727) (0.0240) (0.232)
Booker -2.593** 0.00473 1.460 0.0892*** 13.58** -0.0940*** -0.230
(1.129) (0.00764) (4.447) (0.0141) (5.247) (0.0140) (0.280)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 679,159 679,159 41,478 679,159 255,776 679,159 381,901
R-squared 0.741 0.168 0.239 0.193 0.727 0.164 0.981
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and
criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are
clustered at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Column 4 shows that below range departures increase generally post Booker by over 8% for all defendants. The
high rate of below range departures following Booker may be the result of judicial discontent with the mandatory
Guidelines regime. In a USSC survey of federal district judges in 2002, 30-40% of respondents stated that they
believed that the Guidelines avoided unwarranted sentencing disparity only "Sometimes" or "Rarely." In a 2010 USSC
survey of federal district judges after Booker, 65% of respondents indicated that they thought the departure policy
statements in the Guidelines Manual were too restrictive.
While below range departures increase for all defendants in the aftermath of Booker, black offenders are signiﬁ-
cantly less likely to be sentenced below range compared to white defendants. Post Booker, black defendants are 1.6%
less likely to be sentenced below range compared to similar white defendants. These results on below range departures
are robust to excluding cases with statutory minimums.19
Finally, the last two columns indicate that rates of within range sentencing generally decreased by over 9% post
Booker, but not differentially for black and white offenders. However, conditional on being sentenced within range,
black offenders receive a 0.9 month longer sentence compared to their white counterparts post Booker. Recall that
prior to Booker, judges were generally not allowed to consider factors such as defendant age, education, physical or
mental problems, family, etc. in making sentencing decisions, except for within range sentences. The ﬁnding that
disparities increase after Booker even for the subset of within range sentences suggests that disparities are not solely
driven by the ability of judges to consider various unobservable factors in the aftermath of Booker.
Hispanic defendants face similar increases in disparities in departures from the Guidelines compared to similar
white defendants. After Booker, Hispanic defendants are about 0.7% more likely to be sentenced above range, 1.8%
19Although not presented here, the differential rates of below range departures are not driven by government sponsored departures, but at-
tributable to judicial departures.
25less likely to be sentenced within range, and conditional on being sentenced within range, receive a 0.3 month longer
sentence compared to white defendants. Thus, it appears that the increased racial disparities in sentencing between
defendants occurs in the differential application of upward and downward departures, as well as disparate sentence
lengths for within range sentences.20
TABLE 2.11. OTHER SENTENCING OUTCOMES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incarceration Probation Supervised Release Supervised
Length Receipt Release
Booker*Black 0.00525 -0.146 0.00154 -1.522***
(0.00392) (0.635) (0.00132) (0.316)
Booker*Hispanic 0.00806* 2.119* -0.00129 -1.433***
(0.00437) (1.109) (0.00283) (0.322)
Booker*Other 0.00260 -1.894* -0.00723* -2.529***
(0.00870) (0.998) (0.00376) (0.553)
Black 0.0172*** -0.269 -0.00249** 1.771***
(0.00319) (0.512) (0.00123) (0.224)
Hispanic 0.00776* -5.952*** -0.000426 0.124
(0.00447) (0.863) (0.00248) (0.246)
Other -0.00533 1.265 0.0145** 1.085**
(0.00865) (0.963) (0.00650) (0.441)
Booker -0.0212*** -2.400*** 0.00861* 0.932*
(0.00733) (0.855) (0.00499) (0.501)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 817,222 137,499 678,699 666,846
R-squared 0.468 0.356 0.139 0.454
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies
for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year,
and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race trends are
included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent
level.
2.6.3. Robustness Checks for Increasing Racial Disparities
The previous results identify growing racial disparities in sentence length and departures from the Guidelines after
Booker. One may be concerned that the increase in racial disparities after Booker is driven by harsher treatment of
other characteristics that are associated with black defendants. For instance, if black defendants disproportionately
have lower educational attainment, and judges take a harsher sentencing stance on less educated defendants post
Booker, racial disparities may mechanically increase. To account for possible disparities driven by other demographic
and crime characteristics, I include full interactions between the Booker indicator and a variety of relevant observables.
In column 1 of Table 2.12, I replicate column 1 from Table 2.6 to show the baseline results. In column 2, I account for
potential disparities post Booker based on defendant citizenship status, educational attainment, number of dependents,
gender and age. In column 3, I account for possible disparities attributable to ﬁnal offense level and criminal history
20An analysis of other sentence outcomes is presented in Table 2.11. Black offenders are generally more likely to be incarcerated compared to
white offenders, but the differential in incarceration rates does not change post Booker. Probation lengths by defendant race do not change signif-
icantly post Booker. However, length of supervised release (served after imprisonment), changes substantially. Black defendants generally receive
almost 2 months longer of supervised release, compared to similar white defendants. Post Booker, black and Hispanic defendants receive about
1.5 months less of supervised release compared to white defendants.The divergent changes in racial disparities in sentence length and supervised
release length after Booker may be a result of judges replacing actual sentences for supervised release time for black and Hispanic defendants.
26category. Finally, column 4 also accounts for disparities attributable to offense type.
TABLE 2.12. DISPARITIES IN SENTENCE LENGTH BY OTHER CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sentence Sentence Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 2.373*** 2.024*** 1.680*** 1.326***
(0.595) (0.562) (0.537) (0.499)
Booker*Hispanic 1.687*** 1.561*** 1.226*** 0.975**
(0.446) (0.452) (0.427) (0.430)
Booker*Other 2.711*** 2.699*** 2.840*** 2.431**
(0.986) (0.987) (0.964) (1.067)
Booker*Non US Citizen -0.650* -0.189 -0.341
(0.334) (0.310) (0.362)
Booker*HS Grad -0.461* -0.413 -0.254
(0.272) (0.263) (0.261)
Booker*Some College -0.940*** -0.699** -0.303
(0.357) (0.331) (0.312)
Booker*College Grad -2.544*** -1.902*** -1.639***
(0.548) (0.491) (0.489)
Booker*# Dependents -0.0530 -0.0983 -0.133**
(0.0594) (0.0612) (0.0613)
Booker*Female -0.734** -0.125 0.159
(0.362) (0.323) (0.311)
Booker*Age -0.0151 -0.00991 -0.00792
(0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0110)
Booker*Criminal History 2 1.816*** 1.444***
(0.343) (0.369)
Booker*Criminal History 3 2.218*** 1.684***
(0.401) (0.431)
Booker*Criminal History 4 1.664*** 0.855*
(0.458) (0.470)
Booker*Criminal History 5 2.528*** 1.528***
(0.611) (0.581)
Booker*Criminal History 6 -0.447 -1.092
(0.751) (0.735)
Observations 679,159 679,159 679,159 679,159
R-squared 0.741 0.741 0.742 0.742
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dum-
mies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Column 1 replicates column 1 from Table 2 to
show the baseline results. Column 2 includes interactions between defendant race and citizenship status, ed-
ucational attainment, number of dependents, gender and age. Column 3 adds interactions between defendant
race and ﬁnal offense level and criminal history category. Finally, column 4 adds interactions between race
and offense type. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects,
and standard errors are clustered at the district level. Race speciﬁc trends are excluded because of limited
variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level,
** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Note that the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on Booker interacted with defendant race remained unchanged in all
4 columns and but falls in magnitude. Racial differences in sentencing are not the only disparities that emerge after
Booker. The results from Table 4 reveal growing disparities among defendants of different educational attainments.
After Booker, defendants with some college and those with a college degree are sentenced to almost 2 months less,
compared to their less educated counterparts. Furthermore, defendants with additional dependents face a slightly lower
prison sentence compared to defendants with fewer dependents post Booker. In contrast, disparities do not increase by
gender, age or citizenship status.
Fully accounting for disparities due to defendant offense level and criminal history category reveals additional dis-
parities post Booker. The coefﬁcients on offense level interacted with the Booker indicator are omitted because none
27are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, suggesting that judges do not differentially sentence defendants with dif-
ferent offense severity post Booker. However, judges sentence defendants with higher levels of prior criminal activity
more harshly post Booker. After Booker, defendants in criminal history categories 2, 3, 4, and 5 face an approximately
1.5 month longer sentence, compared to ﬁrst time offenders in criminal history category 1. When column 4 includes
additional interactions with offense type, none of the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant and are thus excluded, suggesting that
judges are not sentencing differentially across offenses in the aftermath of Booker.
To further test the robustness of the results, I explore whether increasing racial disparities may be mechanically
driven by black defendants being less likely to show remorse for their crimes. I capture this through the court’s
decision to reduce a defendant’s offense level by either two or three points through the acceptance of responsibility
provision. I ﬁnd that lack of remorse as proxied by acceptance of responsibility cannot explain the growing racial
disparities in the aftermath of Booker (See Table 2.13). Overall, these results suggest that racial disparities are robust
todifferentialtreatmentofdefendantsbyothercharacteristicsintheaftermathofBooker. Despiteincreasingdisparities
by educational attainment, family structure, and criminal history, racial disparities persist.
TABLE 2.13. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY REDUCTION
(1) (2) (3)
2 Point Reduction 3 Point Reduction Any Reduction
Booker*Black 0.00556 -0.00299 -0.00445
(0.00550) (0.00475) (0.00368)
Booker*Hispanic 0.00433 0.000752 -0.00140
(0.00553) (0.00433) (0.00391)
Booker*Other 0.0200** 0.0178 0.0130*
(0.00908) (0.0111) (0.00658)
Black -0.0114*** -0.0314*** -0.0177***
(0.00397) (0.00349) (0.00270)
Hispanic 0.0174*** -0.00817* 0.00215
(0.00453) (0.00459) (0.00416)
Other -0.0206*** -0.000458 -0.00305
(0.00650) (0.0104) (0.00757)
Booker 0.000354 -0.00246 -0.000984
(0.0111) (0.00775) (0.00616)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 326,524 569,481 822,002
R-squared 0.596 0.399 0.272
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and
dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by
sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district
level. Race trends are included. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
* = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
2.6.4. How Constraining is Appellate Review? Evidence from Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough
Booker changed the legal landscape by invalidating the mandatory nature of the Guidelines, but the series of
Supreme Court decisions that followed also changed the standard of appellate review. In the ﬁrst two and half years
afterBooker, judgeswerenolongerboundtotheGuidelines, butstillfacedahighlevelofappellatescrutiny. Beginning
in late 2007, the Rita presumption of reasonableness for within range sentences provided judges with a safe harbor
28from appellate scrutiny. Gall and Kimbrough removed the presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the
Guidelines range, further reducing the probability of reversal.
These differential changes in the increase in judicial discretion yield insights into the mechanisms to which judges
respond. If judges are greatly bound by the rule-based nature of the Guidelines, one would expect to see large increases
in disparities immediately after Booker. If judges are constrained by appellate review, the advisory nature of the
Guidelines coupled with strict standards of review may still restrict judicial sentencing. Instead, judges constrained by
appellate review would be most free to deviate in the aftermath of Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.
To capture the dynamics in the aftermath of Booker, I replicate speciﬁcation (1) using leads and lags in six month
intervals for the ﬁve years prior and post Booker. These leads and lags are then interacted with defendant race to
capture the change in disparities in that speciﬁc time period compared to the base period (1994-1999).
Figure 2.2 presents the results from a dynamic differences-in-differences speciﬁcation where the dependent vari-
able is sentence length in months.21 Figure 2.2 graphs the coefﬁcients for the leads and lags interacted with a black
race dummy, along with corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals, and shows a clear increasing sentencing gap be-
tween black and white defendants. The lack of a signiﬁcant gap between black and white defendants in the ﬁve years
prior to Booker suggests that preexisting trends cannot explain growing racial disparities.
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FIGURE 2.2. DYNAMICS OF BLACK WHITE GAP,S ENTENCE LENGTH IN MONTHS
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. This ﬁgure shows coefﬁcients from a dynamic DD regression identical to speciﬁcation (1) in Table 2.6, but with leads
and lags for the ﬁve years before and ﬁve years after Booker, interacted with defendant race. The coefﬁcients represent the differential sentence lengths between black
and white defendants, compared to the pre-period (1994-1999). Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Race speciﬁc trends are excluded because of limited
variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included.
Starting about two and a half years after Booker, black defendants appear to face a 2.5 month longer sentence
compared to their white counterparts, and the sentencing disparity continues to rise over time. By four years after
21Although not presented here, results for Hispanic defendants compared to white defendants show a similar, but less pronounced trend.
29Booker, the sentencing gap increases to 4.4 months, almost a 10% increase in the average sentence length. (See
Table 2.14 for results in table format). The fact that racial disparities are not signiﬁcant in the immediate aftermath
of Booker suggests that de novo review may have still been a binding constraint on judicial sentencing, even though
the Guidelines were rendered advisory. The appearance of rising racial disparities approximately two and a half years
after Booker coincide with Rita, Gall and Kimbrough, indicating that more deferential appellate review greatly affects
judicial sentencing behavior.
30TABLE 2.14. DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION,B LACK WHITE GAP
(1) (2) (3)
Black White Gap Black White Gap Black White Gap
Sentence Above Range Below Range
55-60 Months Before 1.240 -0.000592 -0.00776
(0.908) (0.00497) (0.0111)
49-54 Months Before -0.0703 -0.00332 -0.00183
(1.071) (0.00549) (0.0103)
43-48 Months Before -0.393 -0.0109** -0.00248
(0.867) (0.00508) (0.00967)
37-42 Months Before 0.227 -0.00367 -0.0115
(0.847) (0.00519) (0.00797)
31-36 Months Before 1.225 -0.00616 -0.00888
(1.107) (0.00469) (0.00978)
25-30 Months Before -0.283 -0.00755 0.00738
(0.760) (0.00515) (0.0115)
19-24 Months Before 1.245 -0.00599 -0.00305
(0.814) (0.00468) (0.0101))
13-18 Months Before 0.898 -0.0103** -0.00122
(0.850) (0.00415) (0.00928)
7-12 Months Before 0.897 -0.00564 0.00753
(0.791) (0.00451) (0.0105)
1-6 Months Before 0.690 -0.00257 0.0103
(1.119) (0.00568) (0.00923)
1-6 Months After 1.060 -0.00973* -0.00192
(0.988) (0.00579) (0.0122)
7-12 Months After 1.530 -0.00363 0.00142
(1.287) (0.00713) (0.0114)
13-18 Months After 1.729 -0.00556 -6.17e-05
(1.101) (0.00535) (0.0105)
19-24 Months After 1.566 -0.000684 -0.0161
(1.279) (0.00636) (0.0115)
25-30 Months After 2.526** 0.00963 -0.00910
(1.057) (0.00608) (0.0109)
31-36 Months After 3.274*** 0.0140** -0.0204*
(1.229) (0.00596) (0.0104)
37-42 Months After 3.645*** 0.0207*** -0.0333***
(1.026) (0.00499) (0.0123)
43-48 Months After 4.408*** 0.0288*** -0.0516***
(1.106) (0.00639) (0.0112)
49-54 Months After 4.323*** 0.0259*** -0.0375***
(1.152) (0.00702) (0.0124)
55-58 Months After 2.887* 0.0348*** -0.0223
(1.578) (0.00913) (0.0147)
Observations 692,039 692,039 692,039
R-squared 0.741 0.169 0.193
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. Coefﬁcients are for the differential outcome for black vs.
white defendants from a dynamic DD regression identical to speciﬁcation (1) in Table 2, but with leads and
lags for the ﬁve years before and ﬁve years after Booker, interacted with defendant race. All regressions
contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination.
Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors
areclusteredatthedistrictlevel. Racetrendsareexcluded. ***=signiﬁcantat1percentlevel, **=signiﬁcant
at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Figure 2.3 captures the pattern in departures from the Guidelines, where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable for an above range departure or below range departure. The gap in above range sentencing for black and
white defendants appears starting around two and a half years after Booker, persists and grows larger. By ﬁve years
after the Booker decision, black defendants are over 3.5% more likely to be sentenced above range compared to their
white counterparts. Similarly, the gap in below range sentencing starts around three years after Booker and persists
throughout the rest of the period, with black defendants over 5% less likely to be sentenced below range compared to
31white defendants four years after Booker. Again, racial disparities in the rate of departures became more pronounced
after Rita, Gall and Kimbrough, suggesting that judges are particularly responsive to standards of appellate review. I
present evidence in the next section suggesting that the growing racial disparities are also attributable to the increasing
number of judges appointed post Booker.
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FIGURE 2.3. DYNAMICS OF BLACK WHITE DEPARTURE RATES
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. This ﬁgure shows coefﬁcients from a dynamic DD regression identical to speciﬁcation (1) in Table 2.6, but with leads
and lags for the ﬁve years before and ﬁve years after Booker, interacted with defendant race. The coefﬁcients represent the differential sentence lengths between black
and white defendants, compared to the pre-period (1994-1999). Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Race speciﬁc trends are excluded because of limited
variation, but magnitudes are unchanged when race trends are included.
2.6.5. Free at Last? Effects of Judicial Sentencing Philosophies and Experience
While disparities in sentencing outcomes increased in the wake of Booker, the response to increased judicial
discretion may differ by judge sentencing philosophies and experience. In particular, judges appointed before Booker
32may sentence differently compared to judges appointed after Booker. Judges with substantial experience sentencing
under the mandatory Guidelines regime may become acculturated to the Guidelines, and less likely to change their
sentencing practices in the aftermath of Booker.
Since Booker, there have been 190 conﬁrmed judicial appointments to US district courts, 93 new judges up to the
end of the ﬁscal sentencing year 2009.22 The judges appointed prior to 2009 were appointed by President George W.
Bush, and the remaining judges by President Barack Obama. However, all Obama appointees began active service
following the end of the ﬁscal year 2009, so this paper cannot identify the sentencing patterns of new Democratic
appointed judges. Within the matched data from 2000-2009, post Booker appointed judges have sentenced a growing
share of criminal defendants, to almost 10% of cases in ﬁscal year 2009.
Recall that random assignment of cases to judges is necessary in order to compare sentencing practices of judges
within a district court. According to the Administrative Ofﬁce of the United States Courts, “[t]he majority of courts
use some variation of a random drawing” as prescribed by local court orders. However, random assignment may be
violated in some instances. For example, senior status judges with reduced caseloads may select the type of cases they
hear during the year, and some courts assign certain types of cases to particular judges.
To exclude senior status judges who may not obtain cases through a random assignment process, I drop judges
who were formally retired prior to 2000, and judges and district courthouses with annual caseloads of less than 25
cases. To ensure that I only include courthouses with random assignment of cases, I then test for random assignment
by district courthouse using the matched USSC, TRAC, and Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009, for a set
of ﬁve predetermined defendant characteristics: gender, age, a black race indicator, number of dependents, and an
indicator for less than a high school degree. For each of the ﬁve defendant characteristics, I regress the characteristic
on district courthouse by sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing month ﬁxed effects and judge ﬁxed effects. I test
the hypothesis of no judge effects (the null hypothesis) using an F-test for whether the judge ﬁxed effects are equal to
zero using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) following Autor and Houseman (2010). P-values for these tests by
district courthouse are presented in Table 2.15. I drop all courthouses with F-test p-values less than 0.05, but results are
robust to other cutoffs. The subsample of district courts with random case assignment includes 72 courts representing
about 50% of the cases from 2000-2009.23
22Nine judges were commissioned in 2005, 26 commissioned in 2006, 32 in 2007, and 26 in 2008. Post Booker appointed judges are now active
in 53 district courts, some comprising up to 75% of the active bench within a court.
23Table 2.16 presents the results of the core speciﬁcation from Table 2 using the random sample and full matched sample.
33TABLE 2.15. RANDOMIZATION TESTS 2000-2009
District Court No. Obs. p-value
ME (0) 1,668 0.1438
MA (1) 4,042 0.1054
NH (2) 1,617 0.9844
PR (4) 6520 0.2674
CT** (5) 664 0.0000
NY North - Syracuse (6) 1,148 0.1074
NY East** (7) 12,447 0.0004
NY South - White Plains (8) 1,338 0.4336
NY West - Rochester (9) 1,166 0.6226
VT (10) 1,400 0.2379
DE (11) 641 0.3831
NJ -Trenton (12) 476 0.2983
PA East** (13) 6,411 0.0000
PA Middle - Scranton (14) 969 0.6837
PA Middle - Williamsport (14) 234 0.2071
PA West - Erie (15) 609 0.0521
PA West - Pittsburgh (15) 2,917 0.0645
MD (16) 5,569 0.0631
NC East - Southern (17) 608 0.3847
NC Middle (18) 3,205 0.08086
NC West**(19) 5,563 0.0000
SC** (20) 8,848 0.0000
VA East -Alexandria (22) 4,500 0.3178
VA East -Norfolk (22) 1,105 0.1658
VA East -Newport News (22) 743 0.0662
VA West (23) 3,123 0.3250
WV North - Martinsburg (24) 639 0.4091
WV South (25) 1,778 0.0932
AL North** (26) 1,430 0.0189
AL Middle (27) 904 0.3242
AL South (28) 3,132 0.0702
FL North (29) 2,718 0.5783
FL Middle - Ft. Myers (30) 923 0.3824
FL Middle - Ocala (30) 465 0.3128
FL South - Ft. Pierce (31) 3,299 0.0541
FL South - Ft. Lauderdale (31) 649 0.2485
GA North** (32) 5,823 0.0000
GA Middle (33) 2,064 0.1396
LA East (35) 3,117 0.0606
LA West (36) 1,686 .6360
MS North (37) 925 0.4247
MS South (38) 3,057 0.0564
TX North - Forth Worth (39) 2,027 0.2386
TX East (40) 6,563 0.5598
TX South - Brownsville (41) 10,112 0.3364
TX South - Corpus Christi (41) 6,679 0.2767
TX South - Laredo (41) 19,079 0.6244
TX South - McAllen (41) 12,739 0.1093
34TABLE 2.15. RANDOMIZATION TESTS 2000-2009 (CONTINUED)
TX West - Del Rio (42) 7,098 0.3500
TX West - Midland-Odessa (42) 3,567 0.4120
KY East - Covington (43) 717 0.5872
KY East - Pikeville (43) 139 0.0966
KY East - Lexington (43) 1,993 0.8694
KY West (44) 1,746 0.1114
MI East - Bay City (45) 458 0.4009
MI East - Flint (45) 673 0.3014
MI West (46) 3,313 0.0961
OH North - Toledo (47) 1,014 0.2105
OH South - Dayton (48) 1,300 0.9115
TN East (49) 5,200 0.0705
TN Middle** (50) 1,938 0.0126
TN West - Eastern (51) 831 0.3998
IL North - Rockford (52) 624 0.8929
IL Central (53) 2,618 0.1283
IL South (54) 2,736 0.1296
IN North - South Bend (55) 954 0.2764
IN North - Fort Wayne (55) 530 0.0741
IN South (56) 2,004 0.3266
WI East - Milwaukee (57) 2,206 0.4223
WI West (58) 1,571 0.1123
AR East (60) 2,739 0.1631
AR West**(61) 1,098 0.0001
IA North (62) 2,413 0.0561
IA South (63) 2,684 0.8265
MN** (64) 4,815 0.0001
MO East (65) 8,203 0.0785
MO West (66) 6,764 0.1191
NE - Omaha (67) 2,323 0.0532
ND (68) 1,888 0.2250
SD - Aberdeen (69) 309 0.1479
SD - Pierre (69) 1,010 0.8757
AZ - Tuscon (70) 23,677 0.0961
AZ - Yuma (70) 2,449 0.3392
CA North (71) 3,045 0.1970
CA East (72) 8,094 0.0646
CA Central - Riverside (73) 157 0.4520
CA South - El Centro (74) 8,664 0.3442
CA South - Yuma (74) 89 0.3502
HI** (75) 3,351 0.0012
ID (76) 1,526 0.0544
MT - Missoula (77) 516 0.1698
MT - Great Falls (77) 1,003 0.2206
NV (78) 4,867 0.6549
OR - Eugene (79) 954 0.2261
OR - Medford (79) 434 0.6618
WA East - Spokane (80) 1,401 0.3100
WA West** (81) 5,302 0.0001
35TABLE 2.15. RANDOMIZATION TESTS 2000-2009 (CONTINUED)
CO** (82) 4,582 0.0000
KS (83) 5,509 0.2031
NM (84) 24,019 0.2924
OK North (85) 1,279 0.3240
OK East (86) 736 0.9312
OK West** (87) 1,809 0.0001
UT (88) 5,276 0.9421
WY** (89) 1,565 0.0002
DC (90) 346 0.5720
AK (95) 1,218 0.1105
LA Middle** (96) 1,112 0.0263
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009. I drop judges who retired or were
terminated prior to 2000, and judges and district ofﬁces with an annual caseload of less than 25. For each district court, I control
for district ofﬁce by sentencing year, sentencing month, and judge ﬁxed effects. P-values reported test whether judge ﬁxed effects
differ signiﬁcantly from zero and are from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) on ﬁve defendant characteristics: defendant
gender, age, black race indicator, number of dependents, and less than high school indicator. ** indicates dropped courthouses.
36TABLE 2.16. MAIN RESULTS USING JUDGE MATCHED DATA
(1) (2)
Random Sample Full Matched Sample
Sentence Sentence
Booker*Black 1.994*** 2.486***
(0.691) (0.546)
Booker*Hispanic 0.732 1.076**
(0.563) (0.460)
Booker*Other 0.170 1.535
(0.880) (1.035)
Black 2.924*** 2.315***
(0.584) (0.404)
Hispanic 2.155*** 1.270***
(0.598) (0.467)
Other 3.070*** 1.932*
(0.713) (1.040)
Booker -2.897*** -2.811***
(1.073) (1.045)
Non US Citizen 0.433 1.283**
(0.496) (0.502)
HS Grad -0.701*** -0.555***
(0.215) (0.186)
Some College -1.434*** -1.762***
(0.310) (0.185)
College Grad -2.119*** -2.068***
(0.378) (0.247)
# Dependents -0.250*** -0.236***
(0.0713) (0.0477)
Female -4.996*** -5.035***
(0.515) (0.508)
Age 0.241*** 0.190***
(0.0606) (0.0446)
Age2 -0.00263*** -0.00208***
(0.000704) (0.000503)
Mandatory Min 22.13*** 21.41***
(2.086) (1.841)
Observations 214,136 478,834
R-squared 0.784 0.754
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009. Column
1 replicates column 1 from Table 2 using the sample of random courts. Column 2 replicates column 1 of
Table 2 using the full matched sample. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies
for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing
year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** =
signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Table 2.17 presents the results, using this subsample of district courts, of speciﬁcation (2) with an interaction
between defendant race, the Booker indicator, and an indicator variable equal to one for judges appointed post Booker,
in addition to the interaction between defendant race and the Booker indicator.24 The triple interaction terms measures
the different sentencing practices of post Booker appointed judges on disparities in sentencing, compared to pre Booker
judges in the aftermath of Booker. Column 1 presents results for sentence length. The coefﬁcients of the Booker
indicator interacted with defendant race indicate that racial disparities increase by 1.7 months between black and
white defendants after Booker, but particularly for post Booker appointed judges. These “new” judges sentence black
defendants to an additional 5.4 months in prison compared to similar white defendants, relative to their colleagues.
24Note that because all “new” judges were appointed after Booker, in this instance, the triple interaction is identical to an interaction between
defendant race and “new” judge.
37TABLE 2.17. SENTENCING PATTERNS FOR POST Booker JUDGES
SUBSAMPLE OF RANDOM DISTRICTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Post Booker Judge -1.145 -0.00554 -0.194 -0.00260 0.987 0.00814 -0.759**
(1.727) (0.0113) (7.906) (0.0166) (1.355) (0.0142) (0.293)
Post Booker*Black 5.440** 0.0200 6.293 -0.0101 -2.103 -0.00994 1.243**
(2.587) (0.0149) (6.918) (0.0246) (1.751) (0.0201) (0.501)
Post Booker*Hispanic -0.625 0.0146 -7.618 0.00725 -0.797 -0.0219 0.838**
(1.574) (0.0228) (7.826) (0.0289) (1.826) (0.0311) (0.365)
Post Booker*Other 0.218 0.0387 -12.89 0.0343 2.548 -0.0730 2.862
(2.625) (0.0306) (12.47) (0.0642) (2.407) (0.0607) (2.300)
Booker -2.835** -0.00253 3.104 0.0849*** -0.757 -0.0824*** -0.303
(1.074) (0.0108) (5.495) (0.0199) (1.137) (0.0211) (0.369)
Booker*Black 1.693** 0.0145*** 4.988 -0.0144* -1.061 -0.000126 0.616***
(0.696) (0.00443) (3.814) (0.00734) (0.689) (0.00715) (0.190)
Booker*Hispanic 0.744 0.000522 -0.830 -0.0123 0.0802 0.0118 0.357***
(0.547) (0.00420) (2.757) (0.0139) (0.466) (0.0129) (0.130)
Booker*Other 0.154 0.00403 5.574 -0.0118 0.415 0.00775 -0.545
(0.874) (0.00914) (6.971) (0.0223) (0.966) (0.0197) (0.358)
Observations 214,136 214,136 13,091 214,136 82,215 214,136 118,612
R-squared 0.784 0.194 0.367 0.244 0.736 0.202 0.985
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assignment, excluding
judges who formally retired prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal
history combination. Regressions also contain district ofﬁce by sentencing year, district court ﬁxed effects, sentencing month ﬁxed effects,
and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at
10 percent level.
Column 2 indicates that all judges are associated with greater rates of above range departures for black defendants
compared to white defendants. Column 4 also indicates different rates of below range departures for black and white
defendants after Booker for all judges. As shown in column 7, conditional on within range sentencing, all judges
sentence black defendants to about 0.6 months longer in prison and Hispanic defendants 0.3 months longer in prison
compared to white defendants. However, the black-white sentence gap for within range sentences is 1.2 months larger
for post Booker judges compared to pre Booker appointed judges. Similarly, the Hispanic-white sentence gap for
within range sentences is 0.8 months larger for post Booker judges compared to their pre Booker colleagues.
These results indicate that post Booker appointed judges exhibit greater racial disparities in their sentencing pat-
terns than their pre Booker colleagues, even within the same district courthouse.25
25Results are robust to using the full matched sample. See Table 2.18.
38TABLE 2.18. SENTENCING PATTERNS FOR POST Booker JUDGES
FULL MATCHED SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Below Range Within
Post Booker Judge 0.694 -0.00483 -3.645 -0.0295* -2.806 0.0343** -0.0298
(1.097) (0.00601) (4.444) (0.0164) (4.064) (0.0162) (0.258)
Post Booker Judge*Black 4.197** 0.0234* 2.973 -0.0109 -4.228 -0.0125 1.004**
(1.776) (0.0135) (4.455) (0.0167) (6.711) (0.0196) (0.442)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.147 0.0119 -2.594 0.0138 -1.786 -0.0257 0.305
(1.059) (0.0133) (4.246) (0.0226) (4.525) (0.0241) (0.290)
Post Booker Judge*Other -4.157** -0.00702 -9.901 0.0919*** -7.199 -0.0849** 0.627
(1.628) (0.0139) (6.364) (0.0318) (4.882) (0.0343) (0.845)
Booker -2.763** 0.00897 -1.482 0.101*** 0.770 -0.110*** -0.179
(1.051) (0.00697) (6.409) (0.0149) (4.228) (0.0147) (0.276)
Booker*Black 2.296*** 0.0141*** 4.203* -0.0170** 8.955** 0.00296 0.534***
(0.542) (0.00294) (2.278) (0.00647) (3.707) (0.00566) (0.187)
Booker*Hispanic 1.071** 0.000226 2.678 -0.00414 3.231 0.00391 0.328***
(0.454) (0.00383) (2.181) (0.00935) (2.743) (0.00834) (0.0911)
Booker*Other 1.717 0.00394 0.351 -0.00673 17.03* 0.00279 -0.000959
(1.035) (0.00461) (5.212) (0.0108) (10.24) (0.0106) (0.233)
Observations 478,834 478,834 27,743 478,834 184,986 478,834 266,102
R-squared 0.754 0.169 0.274 0.204 0.842 0.172 0.983
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and
dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects,
and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent
level.
Given that cases are randomly assigned within a district, it is unlikely that these post Booker judges were assigned
cases in which black defendants deserved longer sentences compared to their observably similar white counterparts.
Moreover, greater racial disparities among post Booker appointed judges cannot be explained by the fact that these
judges were appointed by George W. Bush. In Table 2.19, I include all interactions between defendant race, the Booker
dummy variable, and an indicator variable for pre Booker Bush appointees. These controls allow me to compare the
sentencing patterns of post Booker judges to their pre Booker appointed counterparts. The coefﬁcient on Pre Booker
Bush Judge indicates that pre Booker Bush appointees were generally 4% less likely to sentence below range for all
defendants compared to their colleagues, but with no changes in sentencing practices in the aftermath of Booker.
39TABLE 2.19. SENTENCING FOR POST Booker JUDGES -C OMPARISON TO PRE Booker BUSH APPOINTEES
SUBSAMPLE OF RANDOM DISTRICTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Above Range Within
Post Booker Judge -1.002 -0.00562 -0.424 -0.00969 -1.785 0.0153 -0.741**
(1.702) (0.0115) (7.811) (0.0163) (6.092) (0.0148) (0.297)
Post Booker Judge*Black 5.694** 0.0198 6.018 -0.0140 0.886 -0.00584 1.245**
(2.621) (0.0150) (6.666) (0.0246) (8.282) (0.0194) (0.496)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.712 0.0147 -7.757 0.0136 -3.067 -0.0283 0.812**
(1.568) (0.0230) (7.942) (0.0282) (5.560) (0.0309) (0.371)
Post Booker Judge*Other 0.503 0.0389 -11.31 0.0307 0.122 -0.0696 2.684
(2.743) (0.0311) (13.03) (0.0633) (6.237) (0.0595) (2.311)
Booker -2.513** -0.00116 0.534 0.0815*** -1.134 -0.0803*** -0.259
(1.087) (0.0106) (5.492) (0.0193) (3.183) (0.0203) (0.383)
Booker*Black 1.658** 0.0151*** 6.558* -0.0102 6.725 -0.00491 0.649***
(0.797) (0.00518) (3.860) (0.00798) (7.028) (0.00757) (0.197)
Booker*Hispanic 0.766 0.000747 -0.0243 -0.0118 3.987 0.0111 0.378***
(0.551) (0.00454) (3.160) (0.0147) (3.042) (0.0136) (0.131)
Booker*Other -0.231 0.00186 5.001 -0.00783 1.725 0.00597 -0.272
(0.963) (0.00911) (6.341) (0.0202) (4.334) (0.0186) (0.415)
Pre Booker Bush 1.219 0.00324 -10.94* -0.0446** -4.095 0.0414* 0.154
(1.161) (0.00614) (6.186) (0.0198) (2.861) (0.0219) (0.242)
Pre Booker Bush*Black 2.315 0.00512 9.985 -0.00139 6.167 -0.00373 0.318
(1.712) (0.00988) (8.224) (0.0176) (8.236) (0.0192) (0.263)
Pre Booker Bush*Hispanic 0.0911 0.00169 4.016 0.0361 2.602 -0.0378 -0.0322
(1.398) (0.00617) (6.225) (0.0238) (2.934) (0.0244) (0.215)
Pre Booker Bush*Other -0.567 -0.0100 6.193 0.0121 3.751 -0.00207 0.481
(2.259) (0.0104) (18.15) (0.0353) (5.223) (0.0361) (0.386)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush -0.725 -0.00357 9.820 0.0210 5.753 -0.0174 -0.109
(1.241) (0.00741) (7.513) (0.0189) (3.550) (0.0228) (0.318)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush*Black -1.375 -0.00575 -10.94 -0.0141 -6.872 0.0198 -0.305
(1.758) (0.0124) (10.18) (0.0193) (9.353) (0.0214) (0.453)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush*Hispanic -0.124 -0.00171 -5.195 -0.0226 -4.572 0.0244 -0.0529
(1.433) (0.00765) (6.764) (0.0200) (3.590) (0.0228) (0.297)
Booker*Pre Booker Bush*Other 1.375 0.0108 -0.555 -0.0206 -2.776 0.00984 -1.020
(1.626) (0.0135) (23.78) (0.0386) (7.305) (0.0423) (0.646)
Observations 214,136 214,136 13,091 214,136 82,432 214,136 118,612
R-squared 0.784 0.194 0.368 0.244 0.919 0.202 0.985
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assignment, excluding judges who formally
retired prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also
contain district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level,
** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
Table 2.19 also indicates that the coefﬁcients on Post Booker Judge and its interactions with defendant race re-
mained unchanged from those presented in Table 5, conﬁrming that the sentencing patterns of post Booker appointed
judges are not attributable to the fact that these judges are George W. Bush appointees. Although not presented here,
new judges in earlier cohorts also do not sentence differently from their more experienced colleagues, either before or
after Booker, indicating that judge experience alone cannot explain inter-judge differences in sentencing. Instead, the
results suggest that experience sentencing under a mandatory Guidelines regime may drive the differential sentencing
patterns between pre and post Booker appointed judges.
Different sentencing philosophies and practices between judges may not only be driven by experience under a
mandatory Guidelines regime, but other personal preferences. To proxy for sentencing philosophies, I replicate the
regressions in Table 5 with additional controls for judge gender, race, political afﬁliation, and an indicator for whether
the judge was appointed prior to the adoption of the Guidelines. Table 2.20 shows that post Booker appointed judges
are still the main source of increasing racial disparities. However, other judicial demographic characteristics are also
associated with certain sentencing patterns. Table 2.20 shows that female judges sentence all defendants to 2.4 months
less in prison after Booker compared to their male colleagues. Table A15 also suggests that black judges were about
6% less likely to sentence defendants of other races below range prior to Booker, but reversed this practice in the
40aftermath of Booker. Also striking are the different sentencing practices of Democratic and Republican appointed
judges. Democratic judges are 2.1% more likely than Republican judges to depart downwards from the Guidelines,
and even conditional on sentencing within range, issue a sentence to all defendants that is 0.4 months less compared
to their Republican colleagues.
41TABLE 2.20. SENTENCING PATTERNS BEFORE AND AFTER Booker,B Y JUDICIAL DEMOGRAPHICS
SUBSAMPLE OF RANDOM DISTRICTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sentence Above Months Below Months Within Months
Range Above Range Above Range Within
Post Booker Judge -1.441 -0.00562 -0.498 0.0136 -2.160 -0.00794 -0.754**
(1.759) (0.0114) (8.488) (0.0174) (5.945) (0.0148) (0.319)
Post Booker Judge*Black 4.382* 0.0202 4.746 -0.00394 1.433 -0.0162 0.983*
(2.530) (0.0144) (7.207) (0.0236) (8.284) (0.0198) (0.538)
Post Booker Judge*Hispanic -0.677 0.0157 -6.538 0.000139 -2.496 -0.0159 0.822**
(1.618) (0.0227) (8.008) (0.0306) (5.541) (0.0331) (0.366)
Post Booker Judge*Other 0.561 0.0451 -12.61 0.0253 -1.288 -0.0704 2.613
(2.654) (0.0310) (12.44) (0.0646) (6.763) (0.0615) (2.328)
Booker -2.555** -0.000691 1.446 0.0719*** 0.736 -0.0712*** -0.401
(1.254) (0.0118) (6.244) (0.0224) (4.371) (0.0231) (0.397)
Booker*Black 3.050*** 0.0117** 15.03** -0.0134 -3.143 0.00170 0.823**
(1.147) (0.00556) (6.023) (0.0109) (8.627) (0.0101) (0.389)
Booker*Hispanic 0.760 -0.00167 -0.227 -0.00486 2.081 0.00653 0.358*
(0.831) (0.00569) (4.147) (0.0173) (4.288) (0.0156) (0.204)
Booker*Other 0.0750 0.00327 8.481 -0.00508 0.0415 0.00182 -0.954
(1.103) (0.0116) (12.74) (0.0286) (5.458) (0.0245) (0.610)
Female Judge 1.418 0.00285 -3.574 -0.0110 3.612 0.00814 0.328
(1.027) (0.00642) (6.059) (0.0135) (4.705) (0.0161) (0.292)
Female Judge*Black 0.230 0.00242 7.303 0.0145 0.445 -0.0169 -0.176
(1.602) (0.00911) (6.260) (0.0180) (12.81) (0.0201) (0.368)
Female Judge*Hispanic -0.996 0.00206 3.262 0.000581 2.271 -0.00264 -0.333
(1.214) (0.00811) (6.608) (0.0190) (5.069) (0.0211) (0.245)
Female Judge*Other -2.031 -0.0124 2.331 0.00735 -10.92 0.00501 -0.875
(1.329) (0.00963) (9.701) (0.0264) (7.838) (0.0276) (0.566)
Female Judge*Booker -2.417** -0.00351 2.032 0.0208 3.671 -0.0173 -0.226
(0.951) (0.00879) (6.990) (0.0142) (4.586) (0.0181) (0.380)
Female Judge*Booker*Black -0.0853 -0.00367 -10.97 -0.0221 -7.574 0.0257 -0.333
(1.643) (0.0121) (7.743) (0.0214) (12.88) (0.0256) (0.452)
Female Judge*Booker*Hispanic 1.530 -0.000806 0.134 -0.00556 -9.481* 0.00637 0.372
(0.982) (0.0105) (7.266) (0.0161) (5.520) (0.0202) (0.349)
Female Judge*Booker*Other 1.599 0.0127 8.924 -0.0137 7.373 0.00104 0.325
(2.263) (0.0176) (15.01) (0.0316) (9.548) (0.0304) (0.734)
Black Judge -0.331 -0.00651 -5.803 -0.0142 -9.873 0.0207 0.0118
(0.793) (0.00758) (4.309) (0.0127) (11.31) (0.0158) (0.217)
Black Judge*Black 1.445 0.00771 13.53** 0.00716 -11.16 -0.0149 0.245
(1.322) (0.00815) (5.807) (0.0137) (21.36) (0.0164) (0.327)
Black Judge*Hispanic -0.405 -0.00252 1.355 0.0378 16.00 -0.0353 0.0286
(1.013) (0.00967) (5.835) (0.0241) (11.44) (0.0275) (0.296)
Black Judge*Other 1.587 -0.00655 23.21* -0.0576** 2.950 0.0641* -0.0150
(1.783) (0.0147) (11.89) (0.0269) (12.03) (0.0335) (0.594)
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Black Judge*Booker -0.615 0.00244 6.650 0.0269 10.27 -0.0294 -0.0790
(1.278) (0.0103) (4.678) (0.0168) (10.52) (0.0208) (0.317)
Black Judge*Booker*Black -1.916 -0.00161 -15.77** -0.00492 11.38 0.00653 -0.361
(1.669) (0.00974) (6.071) (0.0205) (21.02) (0.0226) (0.503)
Black Judge*Booker*Hispanic -0.543 0.00172 -4.824 -0.0388 -16.28 0.0371 -0.224
(1.256) (0.0112) (6.605) (0.0266) (10.63) (0.0284) (0.414)
Black Judge*Booker*Other -1.470 0.0198 -21.87* 0.107*** -8.142 -0.127*** 0.433
(1.890) (0.0188) (13.01) (0.0345) (12.33) (0.0401) (0.746)
Democratic Judge -0.969 0.00433 -0.903 0.0210* 4.061 -0.0254** -0.418*
(0.820) (0.00488) (4.072) (0.0109) (5.135) (0.0112) (0.218)
Democratic Judge*Black -0.658 -0.00890 6.518 0.0101 -6.783 -0.00123 -0.382
(1.055) (0.00559) (5.918) (0.00992) (9.201) (0.0111) (0.296)
Democratic Judge*Hispanic 0.526 -0.00411 1.370 -0.00607 -7.242 0.0102 0.218
(1.007) (0.00555) (4.969) (0.0125) (5.873) (0.0114) (0.184)
Democratic Judge*Other 0.632 0.00936 3.612 0.0129 -0.615 -0.0223 -0.799*
(1.218) (0.00895) (8.762) (0.0246) (6.925) (0.0239) (0.404)
Democratic Judge*Booker 0.176 -0.00773 0.180 0.0142 -3.031 -0.00642 0.447*
(1.101) (0.00694) (4.848) (0.0134) (5.629) (0.0146) (0.246)
Democratic Judge*Booker*Black -1.723 0.00920 -10.39 0.00429 8.125 -0.0135 -0.154
(1.410) (0.00748) (6.716) (0.0150) (8.599) (0.0157) (0.411)
Democratic Judge*Booker*Hispanic -0.421 0.00878 -0.857 -0.00946 6.917 0.000684 -0.261
(1.142) (0.00741) (5.687) (0.0140) (6.440) (0.0141) (0.239)
Democratic Judge*Booker*Other -0.647 0.000605 -2.612 -0.0285 0.319 0.0279 0.194
(1.785) (0.0113) (13.02) (0.0327) (10.31) (0.0338) (0.647)
Pre Guidelines Judge -0.546 -0.00326 -4.842 0.00841 3.989 -0.00515 0.206
(0.761) (0.00499) (4.541) (0.0125) (9.640) (0.0127) (0.203)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Black 1.575 -0.00139 12.08 -0.00217 -26.72 0.00356 0.0770
(1.260) (0.00632) (7.558) (0.0113) (20.37) (0.0124) (0.351)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Hispanic 0.138 0.00254 3.825 -0.0147 -5.434 0.0121 -0.210
(0.791) (0.00490) (5.218) (0.0166) (9.774) (0.0170) (0.191)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Other 0.421 0.0256* 4.107 -0.0133 -8.988 -0.0123 -1.301**
(1.349) (0.0140) (9.500) (0.0251) (13.36) (0.0267) (0.531)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker 0.645 0.0132 2.289 0.00772 -1.550 -0.0209 -0.277
(1.197) (0.00931) (5.505) (0.0157) (9.094) (0.0146) (0.292)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker*Black -2.228 -0.00519 -10.61 0.00535 22.34 -0.000152 -0.300
(1.741) (0.0114) (8.665) (0.0184) (18.68) (0.0171) (0.489)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker*Hispanic -0.0513 -0.0108 3.226 -0.00771 2.848 0.0185 0.346
(1.100) (0.00869) (7.071) (0.0179) (9.145) (0.0161) (0.286)
Pre Guidelines Judge*Booker*Other 2.699 -0.0129 -14.23 -0.0461 5.441 0.0591 1.052
(2.648) (0.0236) (15.35) (0.0351) (13.52) (0.0369) (0.984)
Observations 214,136 214,136 13,091 214,136 82,432 214,136 118,612
R-squared 0.784 0.194 0.369 0.245 0.919 0.203 0.985
Notes: Data is from the matched USSC, TRAC, Federal Judicial Center data from 2000-2009 for courts with random assignment, excluding judges who formally retired
prior to 2000. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district
by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5
percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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32.6.6. Response of Prosecutors to Increased Judicial Discretion
While the disparities estimated in this paper do not capture the compounded disparities that can result at each stage
of the criminal process, I conclude by exploring the impact of increased judicial discretion on changes in prosecutorial
decisions to charge mandatory minimums. Given that Booker left Congressionally-enacted statutory minimums intact,
one would not necessarily expect judicial treatment of mandatory minimums to change in the aftermath of Booker.
However, prosecutors may strategically respond to increased judicial discretion post Booker if they want to bind judges
from departing downwards. After Booker, prosecutors have commented that they are far less willing to forego charging
mandatory minimums because judges ultimately sentence defendants below the Guidelines minimum.
Table 2.21 presents results suggesting that prosecutorial discretion post Booker has not differentially affected black
and white defendants in terms of charging offenses that carry mandatory minimums, although black and Hispanic
defendants are far more likely to receive a mandatory minimum. However, black defendants are signiﬁcantly more
likely to face a binding mandatory minimum post Booker compared to white defendants.26 The greater prevalence of
binding mandatory minimums for black defendants in the aftermath of Booker suggests that more statutory minimums
are applied to black defendants which exceed the Guidelines recommended sentences compared to similar white
offenders. This ﬁnding suggests that black defendants may face statutory minimums that are harsher than the severity
of the crime dictates, potentially indicating prosecutorial disparities post Booker.27
26This ﬁnding is robust to looking only at drug statutory minimums (the majority of statutory minimums cases) and controlling for speciﬁc drug
type.
27Main results from Table 2.6 are robust to controlling for the length of mandatory minimums rather than just a binary indicator). While the
main results from Table 2.6 are robust to looking only at non mandatory minimum cases, point estimates are smaller in magnitude, suggesting that
prosecutorial charging plays a role in exacerbating racial disparities in sentencing outcomes.
44TABLE 2.21. TREATMENT OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mandatory Binding Safety Substantial
Minimum Minimum Valve Assistance
Booker*Black -0.00320 0.0240*** 0.0146 -0.0132
(0.00722) (0.00870) (0.00938) (0.0113)
Booker*Other -0.0174*** -0.00262 0.0207* -0.00440
(0.00569) (0.00703) (0.0116) (0.0122)
Booker*Hispanic -0.0231** -0.0162 0.0268 0.0507
(0.0112) (0.0192) (0.0322) (0.0308)
Black 0.0490*** 0.00678 -0.0193*** -0.0851***
(0.00745) (0.00673) (0.00601) (0.0107)
Hispanic 0.0477*** 0.0240*** 0.00275 -0.0858***
(0.00543) (0.00536) (0.00940) (0.0101)
Other -0.00959 0.00393 -0.0145 -0.0613**
(0.00800) (0.0130) (0.0192) (0.0292)
Booker 0.00158 -0.0349** -0.0119 0.0299
(0.00830) (0.0168) (0.0151) (0.0225)
Race Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 816,564 244,273 162,294 221,320
R-squared 0.649 0.638 0.668 0.171
Notes: Data is from the USSC from 1994-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type,
and dummies for each offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain
district by sentencing year, and sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered
at the district level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * =
signiﬁcant at 10 percent level. When the dependent variable is safety valve, data is from 1999-
2009.
However, conditional on being convicted of a charge that carries a mandatory minimum, decisions to reduce
sentences below the mandatory minimum do not differ signiﬁcantly by defendant race after Booker. A judge has some
leeway in reducing sentence length for certain drug trafﬁcking offenses under the “safety valve” provision under 18
U.S.C. §3553(f), which allows a judge to reduce the punishment for low level, ﬁrst time offenders. Prosecutors also
have the ability to reduce sentences below the mandatory minimum if the defendant offers “substantial assistance”
during another investigation or prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §3553(e).
Column 3 suggest that the application of the safety valve does not change differentially post Booker, although
black defendants are signiﬁcantly less likely to receive the safety valve compared to similar white offenders for drug
trafﬁcking crimes.28 Similarly, column 4 indicates that government sponsored substantial assistance motions for cases
with mandatory minimums do not change differentially between offenders post Booker, although non white defendants
are generally signiﬁcantly less likely to receive substantial assistance motions.
2.7. Conclusion
After almost two decades of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, the Supreme Court struck down the Guidelines in
United States v. Booker, greatly increasing the degree of judicial discretion. In subsequent decisions, the Court further
increased judicial discretion by reducing the degree of appellate review and granting judges explicit permission to
reject the policies of the Sentencing Commission.
Using comprehensive data on federal defendants sentenced from 1994-2009, I ﬁnd evidence that increased judicial
28This ﬁnding is also reported in the Sentencing Commission Report (2011) which states that in recent years, white defendants in drug cases are
more frequently granted the safety valve exception compared to other defendants.
45discretion via Booker has led to large and robust increases in racial disparities in sentencing, particularly after periods
of reduced appellate scrutiny. By four years after Booker, the racial sentencing gap increases to 4.4 months, almost a
10% increase in the average sentence length. I also ﬁnd that recent increases in racial disparities in sentencing appear
to be driven by judges appointed post Booker, consistent with a story in which judges experienced with sentencing
under rule-based sentencing continue to follow the Guidelines even when given more discretion. These ﬁndings
should, however, be interpreted cautiously as they only apply to new George W. Bush appointees. Barack Obama
appointed judges may exhibit different sentencing patterns. Finally, my results suggest that prosecutors charge black
defendants with higher rates of binding mandatory minimums compared to white defendants after Booker, consistent
with prosecutors attempting to bind judges to prevent them from departing downwards from the Guidelines in response
to increased judicial discretion.
Despite the increase in racial disparities in federal sentencing after Booker, 75% of federal district judges believe
that the current advisory regime better achieves the purposes of sentencing compared to the mandatory Guidelines
regime prior to Booker (3%) or the “free at last” regime before the implementation of the Guidelines (8%). Only
14% of judges believe that a new mandatory Guidelines regime that complies with the Sixth Amendment would best
achieve sentencing goals.
The ﬁndings in this paper suggest that while most federal district judges prefer the expanded judicial discretion
under the current advisory system to the mandatory Guidelines regime, discretion comes with potentially undesirable
consequences. An increase in disparities in the wake of increased judicial discretion can reﬂect unwarranted disparities
if judicial bias enters into decision-making. On the other hand, disparities may be warranted if expanded discretion
allows judges to tailor a sentence to the unique circumstances of an offender. For instance, disparities may emerge if
judges are sentencing according to defendant characteristics, both observed and unobserved, that are correlated with
actual recidivism risk.
In fact, recidivism rates are higher among nonwhite offenders, offenders with more extensive criminal histories
and lower educational attainment, and I ﬁnd that judges sentence these defendants to longer prison terms after Booker.
Unconditional on other characteristics, black offenders are more likely to recidivate (32.8%) than Hispanic offenders
(24.3%) and white offenders (16.0%) (United States Sentencing Commission 2004). Even controlling for basic demo-
graphics, criminal history and severity of offense, blacks are about 3.2 percentage points more likely to recidivate than
white offenders (Kuziemko 2011). Taken with the ﬁnding that an additional month of time served reduces three-year
recidivism by 1.3 percentage points, a judge would sentence black defendants to an additional 2.4 months in prison to
equalize the recidivism rate across observably similar black and white defendants. This magnitude is consistent with
the size of racial disparities I ﬁnd in the aftermath of Booker, suggesting that increased disparities may be somewhat
attributable to socially optimal sentencing aimed at reducing recidivism.
On the other hand, recidivism also varies greatly by gender and age after controlling for various observables, and
46judges are unresponsive to these variables in the aftermath of Booker, indicating that judges are not solely sentencing
based on actual recidivism risk. Future work could analyze the extent to which disparities in sentencing are warranted
by looking at rates of recidivism in the federal criminal justice system. More generally, the framework in this paper
can be applied to analyzing the impact of increased discretion on many other actors in the criminal justice system.
Further work on the interactions of actors at various stages in the criminal process is critical to a thorough exploration
of disparities in the federal criminal justice system.
473. HAVE INTER-JUDGE SENTENCING DISPARITIES INCREASED IN AN ADVISORY GUIDELINES
REGIME? EVIDENCE FROM BOOKER
3.1. Introduction
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were adopted to counter widespread disparities in federal sentencing. By
the 1970s, the federal system exhibited “an unjustiﬁably wide range of sentences to offenders convicted of similar
crimes” because each judge was “left to apply his own notions of the purposes of sentencing.”29 Disparities were so
pronounced that a defendant sentenced to three years by one judge would have been sentenced to twenty years had he
been assigned to another judge.30 Decrying these disparities and championing sentencing reform, federal district judge
Marvin Frankel claimed that “the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning
of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”31
In response, policymakers sought to limit the “unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and parole
authorities [that implement] the sentence.”32 Under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984, Congress created the
United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate the Guidelines,33 a new regime intended to reduce disparities
stemming from judicial preferences and biases rather than offense and offender characteristics.34 Congress directed
the Commission, an independent agency within the judicial branch,35 to fashion sentencing guidelines aimed at the
primary goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity.36
After the implementation of the Guidelines, researchers began to investigate the extent to which the Guidelines re-
duced disparities.37 Initial work by Anderson, Stith, and Kling revealed that the Guidelines was somewhat successful
29See S. REP.N O. 97-307 at 5 (1981).
30Anthony Partridge & William B. Eldridge, Federal Judicial Center, The Second Circuit Study: A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit 36
(1974).
31Marvin E. Frankel, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:L AW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973).
32SeeS.Rep. No. 98-225at38(1983)(SenateReportonprecursortofederalSentencingReformActof1984)(“[E]verydayFederaljudgesmete
out an unjustiﬁably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances.
. . . These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial sentencing or at the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion
the law confers on those judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence”); Id. at 49 (“[T]he present practices
of the federal courts and of the parole commission clearly indicate that sentencing in the federal courts is characterized by unwarranted disparity
and by uncertainty about the length of time offenders will service in prison.”).
33Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837, 1987 (1984) (codiﬁed as amended at 18 USC §3551 et seq., 28 USC §991 et seq.). For a discussion of the
efforts leading up the the promulgation of the SRA, see Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 230 (1993).
34U.S.S.G. §1A.1, intro to comment., pt. A, ¶2 (Congress “sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct”); S. REP.N O. 225 at 45 (1983) (“Sentencing disparities that are not justiﬁed by
differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public.”).
35See 28 U.S.C. §991(a). The Commission was placed in the Judicial Branch because Congress concluded that “sentencing should remain
primarily a judicial function,” and because sitting judges would serve on the Commission. The Commission is comprised of seven voting members.
The SRA provides that “[a]t least three of the [Commission] members shall be Federal judges selected after considering a list of six judges
recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States” and no more than four members of the Commission could be
members of the same political party. See id. The Commission later withstood separation-of-powers challenges, as the Court rejected several
constitutional challenges to the Commission and its delegated authority. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
36See, e.g. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3
(1988) (Congress sought to reduce "unjustiﬁably wide" sentencing disparity.); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress
and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L.REV. 291, 295 (1993) (“The ﬁrst and foremost goal of the sentencing reform
effort was to alleviate the perceived problem of federal criminal sentencing disparity.”).
37While the Guidelines were effectively mandatory, the Guidelines did provide a permissible range of sentence lengths. Thus, one should expect
that the Guidelines would ameliorate, but not completely eliminate, inter-judge disparities.
48in reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity.38 The authors estimate that the expected difference in sentence length be-
tween judges fell from 17% (4.9 months) in 1986-1987 to 11% (3.9 months) in 1988-93 in 25 cities where assignment
was found sufﬁciently random.39 Another study by Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback also found evidence of reduced
inter-judge sentencing disparities after the promulgation of the Guidelines.40 The study concludes that the Guidelines
achieved “modest success” in reducing inter-judge disparities, documenting that the sentencing judge accounted for
2.32% of the variation in sentences in 1984-1985, but only 1.24% under the Guidelines in 1994-1995.41 Convergence
in ﬁndings by outside researchers and the Commission led the Commission to conclude that “the federal sentencing
guidelines have made signiﬁcant progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion.”42
After almost two decades of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, the Guidelines were struck down in United States
v. Booker,43 dramatically altering the sentencing landscape. In Booker, the Supreme Court found that the Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury right and rendered the Guidelines advisory. Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions furthered weakened the effect of the Guidelines on criminal sentencing by reducing the degree of appellate
scrutiny for both within and outside Guidelines sentences. In Rita v. United States, the Court directed court of appeals
to apply a presumption of reasonableness to within Guidelines sentencing.44 Later in Gall v. United States, the Court
held that appellate courts could not presume that a sentence outside the Guidelines range was unreasonable, reducing
the degree of appellate review to a more deferential abuse of discretion standard.45 Concurrent with the Gall decision,
the Court in Kimbrough held that federal district court judges have the discretion to impose sentences outside the
recommended Guidelines range due to policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission.46
Following Booker and its progeny, Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, the legal community expressed concerns on the impact
of such decisions on inter-judge sentencing disparities. Congressman Tom Feeney wrote that “the Supreme’s Court
decision [in Booker] to place this extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the hands of a single federal
judge - who is accountable to no one - ﬂies in the face of the clear will of Congress.”47 U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois, Patrick Fitzgerald, stated that Booker has “re-introduced into federal sentencing both substantial
district-to-district variations and substantial judge-to-judge variations.”48 Similarly, scholars commented on the huge
38James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
271, 303 (1999) (“The Guidelines have reduced the net variation in sentence attributable to the happenstance of the identity of the sentencing
judge.”).
39Id. at 294.
40Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity,
90 J. CRIM.L .&C RIMINOLOGY 239 (1999). See id. at 284-86 for a discussion of the statistical techniques employed in the study.
41Id. at 241, 287 (“Together with the other research reviewed below, [our] ﬁndings suggest that the sentencing guidelines have had modest but
meaningful success at reducing unwarranted disparity among judges in the sentences imposed on similar crimes and offenders.”)
42United States Sentencing Commission, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:A N ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM (Nov. 2004) at 99.
43543 U.S. 220 (2005).
44551 U.S. 338, 347-50 (2007).
45552 U.S. 38, 52-53 (2007).
46Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
47Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight Over Controlling Punishments Is Widely Seen,N . Y .T IMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29.
48Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Testimony before the U.S. Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing in Chicago, Illinois, at 3 (Sept. 10, 2009).
49increase in the degree of judicial discretion afforded to judges,49 and predicted an increase in unwarranted sentencing
disparities.50
Due to suggestive evidence of increasing disparities post Booker, the United States Sentencing Commission and
policymakers have commented on possible ways to constrain judicial discretion. Then Attorney General Alberto Gon-
zales claimed that in light of “increasing disparity in sentences” since Booker, the Guidelines needed to be ﬁxed.51 As
a potential “ﬁx,” former Chair of the Sentencing Commission, Judge William K. Sessions III, has suggested “resur-
recting” the mandatory Guidelines in order to give them greater weight during sentencing.52
On the other side of the debate, some scholars have suggested that Booker improved the “quality, transparency,
and rationality” in federal sentencing, and thus Booker is the “ﬁx.”53 Indeed, the vast majority of federal district court
judges also indicate that they prefer the current advisory guidelines system to alternative regimes. In a 2010 Sentencing
Commission survey of district court judges, 75% indicated that the current advisory guidelines system “best achieves
the purposes of sentencing,” while only 3% preferred the mandatory guidelines regime in place before Booker.54
This Article asks the question: What has been the result of reintroduction of greater judicial discretion after
Booker on inter-judge disparities? The primary empirical work on the impact of Booker on sentencing disparities is
suggestive of increases in inter-judge sentencing disparity. Using sentencing data from the District of Massachusetts,
Scott observes an increase in judge differences.55 While a ﬁrst step, the study is limited to ten judges in the Boston
courthouse.
49See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM.L .&C RIMINOLOGY
691, 706 (2010) (“It is clear that Booker has enhanced the position of the judge, whose sentencing expertise has been formally acknowledged again,
at the cost of diminishing the position of the Sentencing Commission.”); Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering
Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM.L .&C RIMINOLOGY653, 676 (2005) (“Booker devised a new system of federal sentencing which granted
judges more sentencing power than they had ever previously wielded”); Luiza Ch. Savage, Chaos Ahead After Sentencing Guidelines Decision,
N.Y. SUN, Jan. 13, 2005, at 1 (quoting Frank Bowman) (arguing that Booker resulted in “the most amount of judicial discretion ever afforded to
sentencing judges”).
50See Bowman, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI.L .
REV. X, X (2010) (“Kimbrough, Gall ... have so thoroughly denatured appellate review that the federal system’s ability to control regional and
judge-to-judge sentencing disparity has been effectively eliminated”).
51Federal Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005), 17 FED.S ENTENCING REP. 324, 325-26 (2005).
52William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform
in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 346-50 (2011).
53See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA.L .R EV. 1631, 1633 (2012).
54U.S. Sentencing Commission, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010
(June 2010) (Question 19, Table 19).
55See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN.L . R EV. 1, 4-5 (2010). Scott ﬁnds almost a
doubling of the effect of judge on sentence length post Booker, resulting in an average difference of over two years between lenient and harsh
judges for cases not subject to a mandatory minimum. Id. at 40-41. Scott also ﬁnds signiﬁcant variation in the rate of below-range sentencing
among judges. Some judges sentenced below-range at the same rate prior to Booker (around 16%), while others increased their rate of sentencing
below-range to as high as 53%. Id. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) recently compiled a dataset of the sentencing records
of over 800 federal judges from ﬁscal year 2007 to 2011. See Susan B. Long & David Burnham, TRAC Report: Examining Current Federal
Sentencing Practices: A National Study of Differences Among Judges, 25 FED.S ENTENCING REP. 6, 7 (2012); see also Big Sentencing Disparity
Seen for Judges,N . Y .T IMES, March 5, 2012, at A23. Relying on the random assignment of cases to judges within district courthouses, the TRAC
study found statistically signiﬁcant, unexplained differences in the typical sentences of judges in over half of the courthouses studied. Id. at 15. The
most recent Commission report (2012) also ﬁnds suggestive evidence that variation among judges within the same district, in particular the rates
of non-government sponsored below range sentences, has increased after Booker and Gall. United States Sentencing Commission, REPORT ON
THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.B OOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2012). The Commission concludes that “sentencing
outcomes increasingly depend upon the judge to whom the case is assigned.” Id. at X. However, the Commission does not account for caseload
composition differences across judges within the same district, and analyzes all 94 districts, despite evidence by previous researchers that random
assignment of cases is not universal. Thus, the Commission’s ﬁndings are only suggestive.
50Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of disparities post Booker is essential to informing these policy debates.56
ThisArticleﬁllsthisgapbyundertakingtheﬁrstlarge-scale, multi-districtanalysisofinter-judgesentencingdisparities
in federal sentencing after Booker by utilizing a new and comprehensive dataset constructed for this study. The Article
proceeds in ﬁve parts. Part 3.2 provides a brief background of the legal landscape. Part 3.3 describes the dataset and
empirical methods. Matching three data sources, I construct a dataset of over 600,000 criminal defendants linked to
sentencing judge from 2000-2009.
Part 3.4 presents empirical results. Relying on the random assignment of cases to judges in district courthouses,
I ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant increases in inter-judge disparities. A defendant who is randomly assigned a “harsher”
judge in the district court received a 2.6 month longer prison sentence before Booker, but received a 5.3 month longer
sentence following Kimbrough/Gall. Similarly, a defendant randomly assigned to a more “lenient” judge faced a 4.8%
chance of receiving a below range departure before Booker, but over 6.6% chance after Kimbrough/Gall.
Part 3.4.4 undertakes an analysis of the sources of increases in inter-judge disparities. Many scholars have sug-
gested that judges have different sentencing philosophies,57 which may be affected by the standard of appellate re-
view.58 Sentencing practices are correlated with judge demographic characteristics such as race,59 gender,60 and polit-
ical afﬁliation.61 In particular, the inevitable shift in the composition of the federal district courts may have profound
56Another strand of empirical research analyzes the impact of Booker on racial disparities in sentencing. The United States Sentencing Commis-
sion has found evidence of large racial disparities in sentencing outcomes after Booker. See United States Sentencing Commission, DEMOGRAPHIC
DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES:A N UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
(2010) (providing evidence demographic differences were signiﬁcantly less when the guidelines were binding, particularly during the PROTECT
Act when appellate review of departures involved de novo review); United States Sentencing Commission, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES V.B OOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, at 105-108 (2006). However, other scholars have no signiﬁcant change in racial dispar-
ities, at least in sentence length. See J.T. Ulmer et. al, Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the
USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIM.&P UB.P OL’Y 1077 (2011). Some scholars argue that judicial discretion may actually mitigate recent increases
in racial disparities. See Joshua Fischman & Max Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial
Discretion and Mandatory Minimums,J .E MPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (arguing that recent increases in racial disparities are mainly
due to the increased relevance of mandatory minimums).
57See John S. Carroll et al., Sentencing Goals, Casual Attributions, Ideology, and Personality, 52 J. PERSONALITY &S OC.P SYCHOL. 107
(1987) (arguing that judicial ideology is reﬂected in how a judge thinks about the causes of crime and the goals of sentencing); Shari S. Diamond &
Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI.L .R EV. 109, 114 (1975) (“it is reasonable to infer
that the judges’ differing sentencing philosophies are a primary cause of the disparity"); see also, Paul Hofer, Kevin Blackwell, & R. Barry Ruback,
The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM.L .&C RIMINOLOGY 239 (1999) (claiming that
there are differences between how liberals and conservatives view the goals of sentencing which can drive different sentencing practices).
58Joshua Fischman & Max Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEG.S TUD.
405 (2011). The authors ﬁnd that Democratic appointees are more lenient than Republican appointees and differences in sentencing practices
increase when appellate review is more deferential, suggesting that judges are constrained by the fear of reversal. The authors also ﬁnd evidence
that pre-Guidelines appointed judges are more likely to depart from the Guidelines.
59See Thomas Uhlman, RACIAL JUSTICE:B LACK JUDGES AND DEFENDANTS IN AN URBAN TRIAL COURT (1979) (claiming that black and
white judges sentenced black defendants more harshly compared to white defendants); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32
AM.J .P OL.S CI. 126 (1988) (ﬁnding that black judges do not differ much in their incarceration decisions from white judges based on one city’s
criminal cases).
60See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policy Makers: Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal
Defendants?, 77 SOCIAL FORCES 1163 (1999) (female judges sentence defendants for longer terms, are more likely to incarcerate minorities, and
less likely to incarcerate women, in Pennsylvania criminal cases); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Sentencing: The Effect of
District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEG.S TUD. 57 (2005) (some evidence that minority and female judges sentence differently using
district level variation in judicial characteristics).
61For instance, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Theory
and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON.&O RG. 24 (2007) explore the impact of ideology on federal criminal sentencing decisions from 1992 through 2001.
They ﬁnd that sentences for serious crimes in districts comprised of more Democrat appointed judges are lower than sentences in districts with more
Republican appointed judges. The alignment of the ideology of the reviewing court also increased departures from the Guidelines. More recent
work in Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform,
75 U. CHI.L .R EV. 715 (2008) reveals that Republican appointed judges give longer sentences for the same crime compared to their Democrat
51consequences on unwarranted disparities as judges who have no experience sentencing under a presumptive guidelines
regime take the federal bench.62 Federal defense lawyer James Felman predicted that following advisory guidelines,
“unwarranted disparity in the near term would be considerably less than that which existed prior to 1987,” but “there
will be a minority of judges who will generate unwarranted disparity, and this number seems likely to increase as the
years go by and the bench is ﬁlled with individuals who have no history with binding guidelines.”63
I ﬁnd that female judges and Democratic appointed judges issue shorter sentences and are more likely to depart
downwards then their male and Republican appointed peers, respectively. Also striking is the differential tendencies of
post Booker and pre Booker judicial appointees. Judges who have no prior experience sentencing under the mandatory
guidelinesregimearemorelikelytodepartfromtheguidelinesrecommendedrangethantheirpre-Booker counterparts,
potentially suggesting that newer judges are less anchored to the Guidelines.
In additional to analyzing the impact of philosophy on sentencing practices of individual judges, this paper also
contributes to the literature on geographical variations in sentencing patterns, which has found that court cultures can
affect sentencing through both exercise of judicial discretion and also differences in policies among prosecutors in
certain regions.64 In Part 3.4.5, I present evidence of substantial inter-district differences in sentence length, below
range departures, average rates of mandatory minimums, and average rates of substantial assistance motions.
In Part 3.4.6, I present some evidence on the contribution of prosecutorial decisions on inter-judge disparities.
Undoubtedly, a defendant’s sentence is determined by the discretionary actions of multiple actors in the criminal
justice process, culminating in sentencing. Therefore, any study of inter-judge sentencing disparities is only a partial
portrayal of the disparities that can arise in the criminal justice system. Previous scholars rightly suggested that arrest,
charge, and plea bargaining decisions made earlier in the process are all ripe avenues for unwarranted bias.65
I ﬁnd evidence that the application of a mandatory minimum is a large contributor of inter-judge and inter-district
appointed counterparts. Moreover, Democrat-appointed judges are more likely to depart downwards from the Guidelines when the reviewing circuit
court is majority Democrat appointed.
62Until now, prior studies have been unable to identify the impact of post Booker appointed judges on inter-judge sentencing disparities.
The Scott study, which only looks at the Boston courthouse, is unable to take into account changes in judicial composition because the Boston
courthouse did not experience turnover during the years in his study. Recent work suggest that racial disparities in sentencing are greater among
judges appointed after Booker. See Crystal Yang, Free At Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, Olin Fellows’
Discussion Paper No. 47 (2012).
63See James Felman, How Should Congress Respond if the Supreme Court Strikes Down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 17 FED.S EN-
TENCING REP. 97, 98-99 (2004).
64See, e.g., Paul L. Sutton, Department of Justice, Federal Sentencing Patterns: A Study of Geographical Variations (1978); William M. Rhodes
& Catherine Conly, Department of Justice Federal Justice Research Program, Analysis of Federal Sentencing (1981); Charles D. Weisselberg
&Terrence Dunworth, Inter-District Variation under the Guidelines: The Trees May Be More Signiﬁcant Than the Forest,6F ED.S ENTENCING
REP. 25, 26-27 (1993) (ﬁnding that the guidelines do not impact all cases and all districts equally and that the guidelines mean different things in
different contexts).
65See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,6H ASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 13-14 (1976) (arguing that there is
“multiple discretion” in the criminal justice system from the legislature, prosecutor, judge and parole board); Ilene H. Nagel & Steven J. Schulhofer,
A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.L .R EV. 501, 502
(1992) (noting that “both Congress and the U.S. Sentencing Commission were well aware that plea bargaining posed a potential threat to the success
of guidelines sentencing”). As a result, the Guidelines system has been attacked by many for its rigidity and for shifting power to prosecutors in
their charge and plea bargaining decisions. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1719-20, 1725-27 (1992); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1430 (2008); See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA.L .R EV. 550 (1978); Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 1998.
52disparities, such that measures of variation are reduced by almost a factor of two when I exclude cases in which
mandatory minimums are charged. The results suggest substantial unequal application of mandatory minimums to
similar cases within a district courthouses, and different mandatory minimum policies by prosecutors across district
courts. There are also substantial differences in the rates of substantial assistance motions ﬁled by prosecutors across
judges and district courts.
In Part 3.5, I describe recent proposals to reform federal sentencing and apply the empirical ﬁndings in this paper
to shed light on the soundness of the proposals. Given the ﬁnding that a substantial portion of inter-judge dispari-
ties and regional disparity is attributable to the application of mandatory minimums, any proposal that contemplates
shifting power to prosecutors will likely exacerbate the presence of disparities. Indeed, many judges and scholars
have suggested that mandatory minimums are “fundamentally inconsistent with the sentencing guidelines system.”66
Instead, I argue that strengthened appellate review and elimination of mandatory minimums are potential steps in the
direction of reducing unwarranted disparities in sentencing. Part 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Brief Legal Background of Federal Sentencing
3.2.1. Adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In the early twentieth century, criminal justice was premised on the notion of rehabilitation.67 This goal of reha-
bilitation manifested itself in the form of indeterminate sentencing, which allowed prison sentences and probation to
be tailored to each offender’s progress toward rehabilitation. As a result, judges and parole boards possessed substan-
tial discretion in their sentencing determinations.68 In this regime of “free at last” sentencing,69 federal judges had
essentially unlimited authority in imposing sentences, limited only by statutorily prescribed minimum and maximum
sentences.70 Lack of appellate review of sentences meant that judges faced no meaningful check to ensure uniformity
66See Sessions, supra note X, at 329 (citing Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Sentencing Reform-An Evolutionary Process,3F ED.S ENTENCING
REP.. 271, 272 (1991) (“Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have . . . hampered the guideline system and are becoming an increasingly
serious obstacle to its success. . . . Mandatory minimums inevitably lead to sentencing disparity because defendants with different degrees of guilt
and different criminal records receive the same sentence.”)); Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED.S ENTENCING REP.
180, 184-85 (1999) (“. . . . Congress, in simultaneously requiring Guideline sentencing and mandatory minimum sentences, is riding two different
horses. And those two horses, in terms of coherence, fairness, and effectiveness, are traveling in opposite directions. . . . . [Congress needs to]
abolish mandatory minimums altogether.”).
67See David Rothman, Sentencing Reform in Historical Perspective, 29 CRIME &D ELINQUENCY 631, 637-41 (1983) (reformers “pursue[d]
rehabilitation, which meant treating the criminal not the crime, calculating the sentence to ﬁt the individual needs and characteristics of the of-
fender”); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 1996 WIS.L .R EV. 679, 680-89 (describing the rehabilitative sentencing model).
68See Rothman, supra note X at 638 (“the judge would make his decision (probation or such a minimum-maximum term); eventually the prison
classiﬁcation committee experts would make their decision (this program or that program), and the parole board experts would make theirs (release
at the minimum, or later)”).
69A term coined by Judge Nancy Gertner to describe the state of indeterminate sentencing prior to 1984. See United States v. Mueffelman, 400
F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (D. Mass 2005); United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2005).
70See United States Sentencing Commission, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:AR EPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDE-
LINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING,U SE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
AND PLEA BARGAINING, Vol. I (December 1991) at 9 (judges “decided the various goals of sentencing, the relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and the way in which these factors would be combined in determining a speciﬁc sentence”); see Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on
appeal.”)
53and consistency in sentencing.71
By the 1970s, faith in the rehabilitative model of sentencing declined due to a conﬂuence of changing social
norms, escalating public anxiety over rising crime rates, and public skepticism of the ability to rehabilitate criminal
offenders.72 The legal community and public expressed alarm at the widespread disparities in criminal sentencing.
Some argued that judges and parole boards endangered public safety with lenient sentencing of criminals.73 Others
were distressed by inequitable and arbitrary treatment within the criminal justice system as studies showed that similar
offenders were often punished very differently. A 1977 study of 47 Virginia state district court judges revealed that
while judges generally agreed on the verdict in legal cases, they applied radically different sentences.74 A Federal
Judicial Center Second Circuit Study found large inter-judge differences in the sentences imposed based on identical
presentence reports of defendants.75 The same defendant was sentenced to three years by one judge, and twenty
years by another.76 Some concluded that this disparate treatment of defendants by judges produced racial inequities
in sentencing. The American Friends Service Committee claimed that decreasing discretion among judges and parole
boards was the only way to eliminate racial discrimination and sentencing disparities in the criminal justice system.77
Other studies identiﬁed large inter-court differences. A 1988 study of federal courts found that white collar of-
fenders who committed similar offenses received very different sentences depending on the court in which they were
sentenced,78 with one study observing that “ a defendant sentenced by a Southern judge was likely to serve six months
more than average, while a defendant sentenced in Central California was likely to serve twelve months less.”79
These large disparities in sentencing prompted calls for sentencing reform. Championing the call for reform,
federal district judge Marvin Frankel expressed grave concern over the indeterminate and individualized sentencing
regime of the period, claiming that “the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the
fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law.”80 Judge
Frankel called for the creation of an independent sentencing commission that would replace judicial and parole board
71See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (stating the general proposition that appellate review ends if a sentence is
within the limitations set forth in the statute).
72See, e.g. Francis A. Allen, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:P ENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE, 25-30 (1981); see
also Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U.
CHI.L .R EV. X (forthcoming 2010) (attributing demand for social controls to rising crime rates and social upheaval).
73Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.L .R EV. 1233, 1247 (2005) (conservatives criticized
indeterminate sentencing for being uncertain and lenient and increasing crime rates).
74William Austin & Thomas A. Williams, III, A Survey of Judges’ Responses to Simulated Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity,
69 J. CRIM.L .&C RIMINOLOGY 306 (1977).
75Anthony Partridge & William B. Eldridge, Federal Judicial Center, The Second Circuit Study: A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit 36
(1974).
76Id.
77See Am. Friends Serv. Comm., Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime and Punishment in America 130 (1971) (claiming that discretion
allowedjudgesandparoleboardstocontrolminoritygroups); seealsoBowman, QualityofMercy, supranoteX,at686-88(criticsarguingdiscretion
produced unjustiﬁable disparities open to conscious or unconscious racial and other biases, demanding “truth in sentencing”).
78Wheeler et al., SITTING IN JUDGMENT:T HE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 1988.
79See Justice Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED.S ENTENCING REP. 180 (1988).
80Marvin E. Frankel, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:L AW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973) (Frankel also argued that individualized sentencing was “out
of hand,” and criticized the state of indeterminate sentencing, at 10, 26-49.); see also Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN.L .
REV. 1 (1972).
54discretion.81
In response, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to adopt and administer the Sentencing
Guidelines, aimed at eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities “among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.”82 Part of the SRA of 1984, the Guidelines were applied to all federal
offenses committed after November 1, 1987. The SRA has been viewed by some as creating a regime that preserves
some judicial discretion,83 while others have viewed the SRA has substantially increasing the severity of punishment
and dramatically reducing the discretion afforded to judges to consider the particular circumstances of each offender.84
Notwithstanding disagreement about the degree to which sentencing reform changed the legal landscape, the new
SRA introduced a shift from a regime of virtually unfettered judicial discretion to more restricted discretion within
a system of determinate sentencing.85 By requiring judges to to sentence within the recommended Guidelines range
unless the court found aggravating or mitigating circumstances,86 the Guidelines were treated as presumptively manda-
tory, although the particular standards for departure were ambiguous.87 Later in Koon v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that a district court judge’s decision to depart from the Guidelines range would be subject to an abuse of
discretion standard of appellate review.88
Under the Guidelines, federal district court judges assign each federal crime to one of 43 offense levels, and assign
each federal defendant to one of 6 criminal history categories. The more serious the offense and the greater the harm
associated with the offense, the higher the base offense level assigned under Chapter Two of the Guidelines.89 For
example, trespass offenses are assigned a base offense level of 4,90 while kidnapping is assigned a base offense level of
32.91 From a base offense level, the ﬁnal offense level is calculated by adjusting for applicable offense characteristics
81Frankel, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:L AW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
8228 U.S.C. §991(b)(1)(B).
83Marc L. Miller. & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice,2B UFF.C RIM.L .
REV. 723 (1999).
84SeeStith&Koh, supranoteX,at284-85(“Itshouldcomeasasurprisetonoonethatin those areaswherethestatuteisambiguousorotherwise
deliberately leaves important policy issues to the Commission, the Commission has generally chosen to increase the rigidity and complexity of its
guidelines. It is no accident that judges have found it difﬁcult to depart from the guidelines; this is precisely what Congress intended.” ).
85In addition to creating the Guidelines, the SRA also abolished federal parole and instituted supervised release in its place. Supervised release
is meant “to assist individuals in their transition to community life,” and “fulﬁlls rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). The term of supervised release is imposed along with a prison term at the time of sentencing.
Under USSG §5D1.1(a), a sentencing court “shall order a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment when a sentence of imprisonment
of more than one year is imposed . . . .” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §5D1.1(a). Subsequent provisions provide
for the minimum term of supervised release for defendants convicted of different classes of felonies with no statutory minimum. Id. §5D1.2(a).
Certain types of felony offenses, such as drug trafﬁcking offenses and sex offenses, are associated with mandatory terms of supervised release. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. §841, 846, 960 and 963 for mandatory terms of supervised release for drug trafﬁcking, 18 U.S.C. §3583(k) for mandatory terms
of supervise release for sex offenses involving minors, and 18 U.S.C. §3583(a) for mandatory terms of supervised release for domestic violence
offenses. During supervised release, defendants must regularly report to their probation ofﬁcer, submit to drug testing, and remain within speciﬁed
areas. If a defendant violates the terms of his/her supervised release, he/she faces revocation of supervised release which can lead to additional
imprisonment. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §7B1.4.
86H.R. REP. NO. 1017, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, at 93-94 (1984).
87See Miller & Wright, supra note X, at 730 (The Commission allowed judges to depart from the guideline when the case fell within the
“heartland” but the concept was left highly general.)
88518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996). The Court in Koon stated that Congress “did not intend, by establishing limited appellate review, to vest in appellate
courts wide-ranging authority over district court sentencing decisions.” Id. at 97.
89United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Chapter Two.
90Id. §2B2.3.
91Id. §2A4.1.
55and adjustments. Relevant adjustments include the amount of loss involved in the offense, use of a ﬁrearm, the age or
condition of the victim, etc.92 Chapter Three of the Guidelines allows for further adjustments based on aggravating or
mitigating factors, such as a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.93
The criminal history category reﬂects the frequency and severity of a defendant’s prior criminal convictions. To
determine a defendant’s criminal history category, a judge adds points for prior sentences in the federal system, ﬁfty
statesystems, allterritoriesandforeignormilitarycourts.94 Forexample, threepointsareaddedforeachpriorsentence
of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, and two points are added for each prior sentence of imprisonment
of at least 60 days and less than one year and one month.95 Two points are also added if the defendant committed the
instant offense under any criminal justice sentence.96
The intersection of the ﬁnal offense level and criminal history category yields a fairly narrow Guidelines recom-
mended sentencing range, where the top of the range exceeds the bottom by the greater of either 6 months or 25%. If a
judge determines that there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances that warrant a departure from the Guidelines,
he/she would have to justify his/her reasons for departure to the appellate court,97 but in general the Guidelines were
treated as sufﬁciently mandatory prior to Booker.98 After the imposition of a sentence, the government is permitted
to appeal any sentence resulting in a departure below the Guidelines range, and the defendant can appeal an upward
departure.99
There are numerous other ways in which Congress has attempted to limit unwarranted disparities in sentencing.
Beginning in 1984, and subsequently 1986 and 1988, Congress enacted a series of mandatory minimum statutes
directed at drug and ﬁrearms offenses.100 Mandatory minimums were also applied to recidivist offenders, through the
Armed Career Criminal Act,101 enhancements for career offenders,102 and enhancements for repeat and dangerous sex
offenders.103
92Id.
93For instance, the Guidelines allow for a decrease in base offense level for a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility under §3E1.1 or for
minimal participation in the offense under §3B1.2. Base offense level is increased for defendants who obstruct or impede the administration of
justice under §3C1.1.
94United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §4.1 (“A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than
a ﬁrst offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. Greater deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to society that
repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public from further crimes of the particular
defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and the future criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited
likelihood of successful rehabilitation.”).
95Id. §4.1.
96Id. §4.1.
9718 U.S.C. §3553(b) (“the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court
ﬁnds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described").
98The Court in Booker noted that “[t]he Guidelines as written ... are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges” and therefore
“have the force and effect of laws.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
9918 U.S.C. §3742 (a)-(b).
100Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207); Pub. L. No. 98-473, §1005(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2138-39 (1986).
101Guidelines Manual §4B1.2; 18 U.S.C. §924(e). The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a minimum 15-year term of imprisonment
for defendants convicted of unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), with three prior state or federal convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses.
102§4B1.1; 28 U.S.C. §944(h) (mandating that the Commission impose imprisonment “at or near the maximum term authorized” for deﬁned
“career” offenders).
103§4B1.5; 18 U.S.C. §§2247, 2426.
56In 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act to curtail judicial departures due to a concern that the standard
for appellate review of departures had led to undesirably high rates of downward departures for child sex offenses.104
UndertheFeeneyAmendmenttothePROTECTAct, judicialdepartureswereonlyallowedforcertainreasonsoutlined
in the Guidelines Manual.105 Additionally, the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act replaced the prior abuse of
discretion standard of review for downward departures with de novo review by overturning the Supreme Court’s
holding in Koon.
3.2.2. Challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines Regime
The initial challenge to the federal sentencing began with the “watershed” ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey.106 In
Apprendi, the Supreme Court found a New Jersey hate crime statute unconstitutional because it authorized judges to
impose higher sentences based on facts other than those submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.107
These principles were subsequently applied to the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines, ﬁrst ques-
tioned in reference to the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from increasing a defendant’s sentence beyond the
statutory maximum based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.108 As a result,
Washington’s mandatory sentencing guidelines were struck down. While the majority opinion in Blakely empha-
sized that the decision was not passing judgment on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,109 the
parallels were apparent and shortly after, the reasoning of Blakely was applied to the Guidelines.
In United States v. Booker, the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were also found to be unconstitutional
under the Sixth Amendment by mandating judicial fact-ﬁnding for determining sentencing ranges.110 The Booker
ruling, however, did not apply to Congressionally-enacted mandatory minimum sentences.111 Rather than invalidate
the Guidelines wholly, or prescribe an enhanced role for jury fact-ﬁnding, the Court held in a separate remedial
decision led by Justice Breyer, that the remedy for the Sixth Amendment violation was to declare the Guidelines no
longer mandatory but “effectively advisory.”112 The Court explained that “district courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”113
104Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, S. 151, 2003.
105For certain offenses, such as child abduction and child sex offenses, the PROTECT Act amended 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) to only allow the
sentencing court to depart downwards if there are mitigating circumstances of a kind or to a agree that has been “afﬁrmatively and speciﬁcally
identiﬁed” as permissible grounds for downward departure. The PROTECT Act also amended the Guidelines Manual §5K2.0 to state that the “the
grounds enumerated in this Part K of Chapter Five are the sole grounds that have been afﬁrmatively and speciﬁcally identiﬁed as a permissible
ground of departure.”
106530 U.S. 466, 425 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (calling the Apprendi decision a“watershed change in constitutional law”).
107Id. at 468-69, 490.
108542 U.S. 296 (2004).
109Id. at 305, n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them”).
110543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 243-44 (2005) (Stevens, J., writing for the Court).
111CITE.
112Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., writing for the Court). Similarly, the provisions on supervised release also became advisory, although the
USSC states that the majority of courts continue to impose at least the minimum terms in §5D1.2.
113Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
57In the immediate aftermath of Booker, district courts took varied approaches in applying Booker.114 Some courts
sentenced with minimal consideration of the applicable Guidelines range, while others treated the Guidelines as a
dominant factor.115 Circuit courts later reached a consensus that sentencing must begin with the calculation of the
applicable Guidelines range.116 Today, after a sentencing judge has calculated the applicable Guidelines range, he
or she must consider 7 factors before imposition of punishment: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need for the sentence imposed, (3) the kinds of sentences
available, (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established, (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by
the Sentencing Commission, (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.117 After consideration of all the factors, the sentencing judge is instructed to “impose a sentence sufﬁcient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the basic goals of sentencing.118
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions furthered weakened the effect of the Guidelines on criminal sentencing. In
Rita v. United States, the Court held that a sentence within the Guidelines recommended range could be presumed
“reasonable” because a “judge who imposes a sentence within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus makes
a decision that is fully consistent with the Commission’s judgment in general.”119 In Gall v. United States, the
Court further held that federal appeals courts could not presume that a sentence outside the range recommended by
the Guidelines was unreasonable, reducing the degree of appellate review.120 The Court in Gall concluded that in
reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, an appellate court could consider the extent of deviation from the
Guidelines, but must give “due deference to the district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify
the extent of the variance.”121 In the aftermath of Gall, appellate courts could only review sentencing decisions under
the more deferential abuse of discretion standard. Concurrent with the Gall decision, the Supreme Court conﬁrmed
the holding in Booker as applied to cases involving possession, distribution and manufacture of crack cocaine.122
The Court in Kimbrough held that federal district court judges have the discretion to impose sentences outside the
114See Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1521-22 (2006) (arguing
that Booker left open how much sentencing judges could deviate from the Guidelines).
115See id. at 1522-32 (claiming that district courts have taken two approaches in applying Booker, the “substantial-weight” approach and the
“consultative” approach). For an example of the two type of approaches taken by district courts, see, e.g. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d
984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (noting that “Booker is not ... an invitation to do business as usual,” but that courts should consider all the factors in
§3553(a)); cf. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005) (suggesting courts give “heavy weight” to Guidelines after Booker).
116See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 454 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2006) (court noting that after Booker, “the district court must ﬁrst calculate
the proper Guidelines range and then, by reference to the factors speciﬁed in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), select an appropriate sentence”); United States v.
Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113-114 (2d Cir. 2005) (“consideration of the Guidelines will normally require determination of the applicable Guidelines
range, or at least identiﬁcation of the arguably applicable ranges ... it would be a mistake to think that, after Booker/Fanfan, district judges may
return to the sentencing regime that existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered discretion to select any sentence within the applicable statutory
maximum and minimum”).
11718 U.S.C. §3553(a).
118Id.
119551 U.S. 338, 347-50 (2007) (holding that “a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that
reﬂects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines”).
120552 U.S. 38 (2007).
121Id. at 51 (arguing the an appellate court’s disagreement with the appropriateness of a sentence is “insufﬁcient to justify reversal”).
122Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
58recommended Guidelines range due to policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission.123
3.3. Framework, Data, and Methods
3.3.1. Judicial Behavior in Criminal Sentencing
A prominent consideration underlying judicial behavior is an obligation to “follow the law.”124 However, judges
haveadditionalmotivationsthataffecttheirdecision-making.125 Scholarshavesuggestedthatjudgescareaboutvariety
of factors such as public recognition, leisure, and reputation.126 In addition, judges have preferences for sentencing
according to their personal tastes, but may face costs associated with exercising discretion.127 In the context of criminal
sentencing, a judge may prefer to sentence a defendant based on personal, political or ideological goals, rather than
the mandated Guidelines sentence.128
How does the sentencing regime affect judicial behavior? Given individual judge-speciﬁc preferences for sen-
tencing, if judges were left unconstrained in the exercise of discretion, one would likely observe large inter-judge
disparities. Consistent with this prediction, scholars have suggested that the large variances in federal sentences prior
to the adoption of the Guidelines were likely due to differing judicial attitudes regarding rehabilitation and deter-
rence.129 At the other end of the spectrum, judges who are restricted in the exercise of discretion would be unable
to sentence fully according to their preferences. Thus, the adoption of determinate sentencing under the Guidelines
introduced a mechanism by which to constrain judges, likely explaining studies ﬁnding reduced inter-judge sentencing
disparity after the promulgation of the Guidelines.130
In addition to a restraint on free sentencing imposed by the sentencing regime, another constraint comes from the
prospect of appellate review. Judges who depart from the Guidelines incur economic and social costs from deviating.
123Id. (granting sentencing judges explicit permission to deviate from the Guidelines based on disagreement with the disparate treatment of crack
and powder cocaine offenses - the so called “100-to-1 ratio”).
124See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Judicial Organization and Administration, 7 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 27 (2000).
125The economic analysis of judicial behavior builds on work by Judge Richard A. Posner. See, e.g. Hon. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior
and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA.S T.U .L .R EV. 1259 (2005); see also Hon. Richard A. Posner, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008);
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES:AT HEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013). See Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. LEG.S TUD. 1 (2008) for a theoretical
economic model of judicial discretion in fact determination.
126Federal district judges occupy a unique position because most district judge appointments are terminal, thus “insulat[ing[ the judges from the
normal incentives and constraints that determine the behavior of rational actors, except for the relative handful of judges who are ambitious for
promotion to the court of appeals.” Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra note X, at 1260, 1269 (noting that
a judge likely care more about leisure and public recognition relative to income, compared to average practicing attorneys).
127Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra note X, at 1269-70 (“deciding a particular case in a particular
way might increase the judge’s utility just by the satisfaction that doing a good job produces ... [or] by advancing a political or ideological goal”).
128Indeed, federal district court judges have expressed a great degree of dissatisfaction with the Guidelines. In a 2010 survey of federal district
judges, 65% of judges indicated that they thought the departure policy statements in the Guidelines Manual were too restrictive, suggesting that
many judges would prefer to deviate from the Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Commission, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (June 2010), (Question 14, Table 14).
129See Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra note X, at 1270 (inferring from the “extraordinary variance” in
federal sentences prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines that differences in sentence lengths were due to judicial attitudes on responsibility and
deterrence); see also Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, Punishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines Empirically From Principles
of Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 801-804 (1981) (documenting disagreement between judges regarding ﬁve goals of sentencing: general
deterrence, special deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and just deserts).
130See supra notes 7-10.
59A high reversal rate is not only administratively burdensome, but also potentially harms a trial judge’s prospects for
promotion to the appeals court.131 Indeed, under the mandatory sentencing regime, departures from the Guidelines
were relatively rare.132 After the Feeney Amendment of PROTECT Act, which subjected district court judges to de
novo review for departures from the Guidelines, suggesting that inter-judge sentencing disparity during this period
may have been particularly reduced.133
Given the countervailing forces of judge sentencing preferences against costs of exercising discretion, what is
the theoretical prediction of the impact of Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough on inter-judge disparities? Following
Booker, the total cost of exercising discretion fell substantially for judges who wanted to depart from the Guidelines
sentence as the Guidelines were rendered advisory. This major shift in sentencing may be accompanied with increases
in inter-judge disparity. However, to the extent the the relative cost associated with de novo appellate review was still
binding, judges may have been hesitant to alter their practices. Indeed, not until Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough did the
Court reduce the level of appellate review from de novo to substantial abuse of discretion, intuitively lowering the
probability of appellate reversal.134 Thus, one might expect larger increases in inter-judge disparities following Rita,
Gall, and Kimbrough. Nevertheless, given the Rita presumption of reasonableness attached to within range sentences,
the Guidelines provide a safe harbor from appellate scrutiny.
There are other reasons why judicial behavior and inter-judge disparities may not change much after Booker and its
progeny. First, judges may become acculturated to the Guidelines if they have had substantial experience sentencing
under the previous Guidelines regime.135 Acculturation would suggest that judges with greater exposure to Guidelines
sentencing would be less likely to depart from the Guidelines in the aftermath of Booker.
Another potential mechanism is anchoring, a type of cognitive bias in which decision-makers rely heavily on one
piece of information and fail to make rational adjustments.136 Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts
131See Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, supra note X, at 1270-71; see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati,
& Eric A. Posner, What do Federal District Judges Want?: An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, University of Chicago John M.
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper Series Paper No. 508, at 3-4 (2009) (judges care about minimizing workload and maximizing reputation
by avoiding appellate reversal); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking,
73 TEX.L . R EV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (describing anecdotal evidence that lower court judges dislike being reversed on appeal due to professional
reputation, advancement, judicial power); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion,9J .L EGAL STUD. 129, 130 (1980).
132The rate of departure from the Guidelines was less than 15% in the early 1990s.
133Recall that the Commission found that demographic differences under the mandatory guidelines regime were lower during the PROTECT Act.
See supra note X [United States Sentencing Commission, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES:A N UPDATE
OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS (2010)].
134The probability of reversal on sentencing matters fell from 36% in 2006 (under de novo review), to 26% in 2008 (under abuse of discretion
review). I calculate rate of appellate reversals using yearly data on the universe of criminal appeals from the USSC. Reversal is deﬁned as all
reversals and remands on appeals arising out of Booker sentencing issues.
135See Judge Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines,3H ARV.L . P OL’Y REV. 261, 262 (2009) (“[A]fter twenty years of strict
enforcement, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have a gravitational pull on sentencing and are likely to shape the way judges view sentencing,
even if they are now only advisory. Indeed, the greatest danger is not that judges will exercise their new discretion, but that they will not.”); Stith, The
Arc of the Pendulum, supra note X, at 1496-97 (“incumbent sentencing decision makers may be reluctant to regard as unreasonable the sentences
they were obliged to seek and impose for two decades”); Frank O. Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconﬁguring Federal Sentencing
After Booker, 2005 CHI.L EGAL F. 149, X (2005) (arguing that advisory guidelines might still constrain judicial discretion “if for no other reason
than that the federal bench has become acculturated to the Guidelines over the last seventeen years”).
136See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1130-31 (1974);
see also Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Inﬂuence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32
PERSONALITY &S OC.P SYCHOL.B ULL. 188, 188 (2006) (experimental results showing that criminal sentences were higher if participants were
confronted with a randomly high rather than a low anchor).
60predicted that the Guidelines would still play a predominant role for all judges post Booker because “appellate courts
have insisted that district court judges begin with - effectively, ‘anchor’ their decisions - in the Guidelines before
considering anything else.”137 Thus, to the extent that federal district judges are effectively anchored to the Guidelines,
one may not observe much deviation in sentencing practices after Booker. Indeed, because district courts continued
to calculate the applicable Guidelines range in the aftermath of Booker, scholars commented in the year following
Booker that the federal sentencing system remained virtually unchanged.138
3.3.2. Sentencing Data
This Article provides the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical evidence on the impact of Booker and its progeny on inter-
judge sentencing disparities. As noted previously, the Scott study is the only empirical study thus far, but is limited
to the 2,262 cases sentenced by judges who served continuously from 2001 to 2008 in the Boston courthouse of the
District of Massachusetts.139 While the study is a ﬁrst step in characterizing the extent to which inter-judge sentencing
practices have changed in the aftermath of Booker, the Boston courthouse is likely unrepresentative of sentencing
patterns in other courthouses across the United States. The presence of growing inter-judge sentencing disparities
after Booker in the Boston courthouse may be the result of the particular caseload and judicial composition of that
court, making conclusions that Booker has increased inter-judge sentencing disparities likely not generalizable across
other courts.
Prior empirical research on inter-judge disparity and the impact of judicial demographics on sentencing practices
has been hampered by the lack of judge identiﬁers.140 Because cases are generally randomly assigned to judges within
a district courthouse, judge identiﬁers allow one to compare judges within the same court and in the same time period,
capturing judge differences in sentencing rather than different caseloads.141 However, the Sentencing Commission
data does not identify the sentencing judge,142 In response, most researchers have resorted to using aggregate district-
level variation in judicial demographics to control for judge sentencing preferences,143 but this methodology could be
ﬂawed if districts with different judicial compositions differ in ways in that affect all judges within the district.144 A
137See Judge Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART (2006) 137, 138-40
(describing the Guideline Manual as a “ready-made anchor”).
138See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 HOUSTON L. REV 341, at 349 (2006) (“a culture
of guideline compliance has persisted after Booker”). Berman also suggests that Commission data in the year after Booker indicates that “federal
sentencing judges are exercising their new discretion relatively sparingly.” Id. at 351.
139Scott, supra note X, at 17.
140The Anderson et al. study is the only empirical work with comprehensive sentencing data with judge identiﬁers in the past 25 years. See
Anderson et. al, supra note X, at 287.
141According to the Administrative Ofﬁce of the United States Courts, “The majority of courts use some variation of a random drawing.”
142United States Sentencing Commission, GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS &R ESOURCES 2007-2008 45 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Cat2005.pdf (“Pursuant to the policy on public access to Sentencing Commission documents and data, all
case and defendant identiﬁers have been removed from the data.” (internal citation omitted)).
143Fischman & Schanzenbach, Strategic Judging, supra note X, at X (relying only on district-level variation in observable characteristics of
judges).
144For instance, a district with a greater percentage of Democrat judges could be different from other districts. It may be that both Democrat
and Republican judges within the district sentence differently from judges in other districts, so any effect cannot be solely attributable to Democrat
judges.
61few researchers have resorted to hand matching sentencing data from the Sentencing Commission with Public Access
to Court Electronic Records (PACER), but due to the lengthy matching process, sample sizes have been severely
limited.145
This paper is the ﬁrst in over 25 years to match sentencing data from ﬁscal years 2000-2009 to judge identiﬁers
in all 94 district courts, allowing for a comprehensive look at inter-judge sentencing disparities after Booker. In order
to overcome the lack of judge identiﬁers in sentencing data, I utilize datasets from three sources: The United States
Sentencing Commission, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, and the Federal Judicial Center. I describe
each dataset in turn.
United States Sentencing Commission - I use data from the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) on
records of all federal offenders sentenced pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements of the SRA
of 1984 in ﬁscal years 2000-2009 (October 1, 1993 - September 30, 2009). The USSC provides detailed sentencing
data on federal defendants, but defendant and judge identiﬁers are redacted.146 The dataset contains information from
numerous documents on every offender: Indictment, Presentence Report, Report on the Sentencing Hearing, Written
Plea Agreement (if applicable), and Judgment of Conviction.
Court characteristics include the district court and circuit in which sentencing occurred, in addition to the sentenc-
ing month and year.147 Demographic variables include defendant’s race, gender, age, citizenship status, educational
attainment, and number of dependents. The primary offense variable is the primary offense type for the case generated
from the count of conviction with the highest statutory maximum.148 Data is also available on whether the offense
carries a mandatory minimum sentence under various statutes, and whether departures from the statutory minimum are
granted, either under a substantial assistance motion or application of the safety valve. Offense level variables include
the base offense level, the base offense level after Chapter Two adjustments and the ﬁnal offense level after Chapter
Three adjustments. Criminal history variables include whether the defendant has a prior criminal record (ﬁrst time
offender or prior offender), and whether armed career criminal status, career offender status, or repeat and dangerous
sex offender status is applied.149
For each offender, there is a computed Guidelines range, and a Guidelines range adjusted for applicable manda-
tory minimums. Sentencing outcomes include imprisonment or probation, sentence length, and length of supervised
release. From these variables, I construct indicator variables for above range and below range departures from the
145See, e.g., Schanzenbach & Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI.L .
REV. 715 (2008); Scott, supra note X, at 15-16 (describing the PACER method used to match records to sentencing data).
146Over 90% of felony defendants in the federal criminal justice system are sentenced pursuant to the SRA of 1984 and all cases are assessed to
be constitutional.
147USSC data prior to 2004 actually includes information on the exact sentencing day, but this variable is not available in later years. Information
is also collected on the Guidelines amendment year used in calculations. All results are robust to controlling for amendment year, although the
results presented in this paper do not include this control.
148There are a total of 35 offense categories in the dataset. The most common offense is drug trafﬁcking, followed by immigration, fraud,
ﬁrearms, and larceny.
149Data is also collected on the total number of criminal history points applied and the ﬁnal criminal history category.
62Guidelines.150
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse - The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) pro-
vides less comprehensive sentencing records obtained from detailed federal records and information from the Justice
Department and the Ofﬁce of Personnel Management. Defendant, offense characteristics and Guidelines application
information is not included, but defendants are linked with sentencing judge.151
FederalJudicial Center -Finally, Iobtaindemographicinformation onfederaldistrictcourt judges. Federaldistrict
judges are Article III judges who serve life term tenures. New appointments are generally made when a judge retires
or dies.152 As of the current day, there are a total of 677 authorized Article III district judgeships.153 The number
of federal district judgeships in each district court varies. The largest district court is the Southern District of New
York with 28 authorized judgeships. The majority of other district courts have between 2-7 district court judgeships. I
collect information on judge race, gender, afﬁliation of appointing president, tenure, whether the judge was appointed
prior to the adoption of the Guidelines in 1987, and whether the judge was appointed after Booker.
3.3.3. Matching
First, I match sentencing records from the USSC to TRAC data. By district court, matching is conducted on
several key variables that can uniquely identify each record: sentencing year, sentencing month, offense type,154
sentence length in months, probation length in months, amount of monetary ﬁne, whether the case ended by trial or
plea agreement, and whether the case resulted in a life sentence.155
Finally, I match the USSC and TRAC combined data to judge biographical data from the Federal Judicial Center. I
successfully match over 90% of all USSC cases from ﬁscal years 2000-2009, resulting in a matched dataset of 636,063
cases representing 91 district courts (hereinafter “full sample”).156
3.3.4. Testing for Random Assignment
In an ideal experiment to test the impact of Booker, one would randomly allocate the treatment - sentencing under
an advisory Guidelines - to certain groups of judges. In this hypothetical, a group of judges within each district court
would be randomly selected into the treatment group, while the others would comprise the control group. Because
150An above range departure is deﬁned as 1 for a defendant who received a sentence above the maximum Guidelines recommended range.
Similarly, a below range departure is deﬁned as 1 for a defendant who received a sentence below the minimum Guidelines recommended range.
151TRAC has compiled records on the criminal cases and the civil matters handled by federal district court judges in each of the 94 federal
judicial districts through over 20 years of FOIA requests.
152On a few occasions, Congress has also increased the number of judgeships within a district in response to changing population or caseload,
the last additions for certain district courts taking place in 2002.
15367 positions are currently vacant. Authorized judgeships only refer to full-time non-senior status judges.
154Data from USSC are coded to correspond with the offense categories in the TRAC data.
155These match variables are to those used by previous scholars under the PACER method. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 72, 729
(matching USSC data with PACER records on date and length of the sentence, and when necessary, the amount of any ﬁne, the offense type, and
the Hispanic ethnicity of the defendant).
156The Federal Judicial Center does not collect demographic information on judges in 3 districts: Guam, Virgin Islands, and Northern Mariana
Islands.
63of the random assignment of the “Booker” treatment, any differences in caseload composition or judge characteristics
would be on average the same across both treatment and control groups. As a result, a straightforward comparison of
the sentencing practices between judges in the treatment group (those who sentence under an advisory Guidelines),
and the judges in the control group (those who sentence under a mandatory Guidelines), would capture the causal
effect of greater judicial discretion via Booker on inter-judge differences in sentencing.
Unfortunately, this hypothetical experiment does not exist because the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker applied
to all judges. However, one can utilize the quasi-experiment created by the timing of the Booker decision. Assuming
that judges within the same district courthouse are randomly assigned cases from the same underlying caseload, one
can compare inter-judge disparities before Booker to inter-judge disparities after Booker. If there are no other contem-
poraneous changes that affect inter-judge sentencing, an increase in inter-judge disparities is attributable to changes in
judicial behavior, rather than underlying differences in case composition. Moreover, random assignment of cases can
also lead to estimates of the relationships between judicial demographics such as gender and experience on sentencing
practices.
The crucial assumption underlying the validity of the quasi-experiment is the random assignment of cases to
judges.157 According to the Administrative Ofﬁce of the United States Courts, “[t]he majority of courts use some
variation of a random drawing” as prescribed by local court orders and while courts use different procedures for
assigning cases to judges, “[m]ost district and bankruptcy courts use random assignment, which helps to ensure a fair
distribution of cases and also prevents ‘judge shopping,’ or parties’ attempts to have their cases heard by the judge
who they believe will act most favorably.”158 Each district court is authorized to specify its own methods of case
assignment.159
However, random assignment may be violated in some instances. For example, senior status judges with reduced
caseloads may select the type of cases they hear during the year,160 and some courts assign certain types of cases to
particular judges.161 Moreover, even if a court has local rules and orders that specify the use of random assignment,
empirically testing for random assignment is important because random assignment can be violated if individuals seek
157As mentioned previously, the Anderson et. al, Hofer, Scott, and TRAC studies all rely on random case assignment. See supra notes X.
158For a description of judge assignment methods, see the Federal Judicial Center FAQS, available at http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/.
159Under 28 U.S.C. §137, “[t]he business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and
orders of the court. The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for the observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business
and assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not otherwise prescribe.” For example, in the Arizona district court, “the Clerk must assign
criminal cases to District Judges within each division by automated random selection and in a manner so that neither the Clerk nor any parties or
their attorneys will be able to make a deliberate choice of a particular Judge.” AZ. L. R. Crim. 5.1(a). In the Northern District of California, “[c]ases
shall be assigned blindly and at random by the clerk by means of a manual, automated or combination system approved by the judges of the court.”
CA General Order No. 44. In Colorado,“[t]he clerk shall maintain a computerized program to assure random and public assignment of new cases
on an equal basis among the judicial ofﬁcers.” D.C. Colo. L Civ R 40.1.
16028 U.S.C. §294 governs the assignment of cases to senior status judges. See, e.g., MA General Order 10-04 §4.2 (“A senior judge may limit
the category of cases assigned to him or her or may select a special category of cases for assignment. For example, a senior judge may elect not to
be assigned criminal cases or may elect to be assigned only patent cases.”)
161For instance, the Southern District of New York assigns civil and criminal cases such that all judges, “except the chief judge, shall be assigned
substantially an equal share of the categories of cases of the court over a period of time. There shall be assigned or transferred to the chief judge
such matters as the chief judge is willing and able to undertake, consistent with the chief judge’s administrative duties.” Thus, assignment is based
on equal caseload, rather than pure random assignment, and the chief judge is exempted from the rules. See Rules for the Division of Business
Among District Judges, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules.php.
64to game the system.162 For instance, some courts have decried situations in which high proﬁle cases are given to judges
viewed as favorably disposed to one side.163
In order to dispose of potential violations to random case assignment, I empirically test for random assignment.
To begin, I employ several sample restrictions. First, I drop judges who were formally retired prior to the beginning
of the dataset in 2000 to remove the possibility of non random assignment to senior status judges who continued to
hear cases during the sample period. Second, I drop judges and district courthouses with annual caseloads of less
than 25 cases in order to obtain a sufﬁcient number of cases per judge for statistical power.164 Finally, I drop district
courthouses with only one active judge.
With this restricted sample, I test for randomly assignment using the matched USSC, TRAC, and Federal Judicial
Center data from 2000-2009.165 If cases are randomly assigned to judges, then judges should see on average, cases
with the same distribution of predetermined defendant characteristics. To test for random assignment, I regress the
ﬁve defendant characteristics on district courthouse by sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing month ﬁxed effects
and judge ﬁxed effects. The ﬁve defendant characteristics include: gender, age, a black race indicator,number of
dependents, and an indicator for less than a high school degree. Intuitively, there should be no signiﬁcant correlation
between a particular judge and defendant characteristics if cases are randomly assigned.
However, in testing the random assignment of defendants across these ﬁve characteristics, I encounter the prob-
lem that defendant characteristics are not fully independent. For instance, black defendants are also likely to have
completed less than a high school degree. To address the confounding nature of these characteristics, I use seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) to test for random assignment. SUR allows me to test random assignment simultaneously
for all the ﬁve defendant characteristics, addressing correlations.166
SUR can be formally described as the regression model:
Ydtmj = ↵0 +  d +  t +  d ⇤  t +  m + j + ✏dtmj (3)
162See J. Robert Brown Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 Texas L. Rev 1037 (2000) (describing
nonrandom assignment in federal courts of appeals).
163See United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1264 (10th Cir. 2000) (“If a judge receives case assignments not through some
neutral system, but rather because of prosecutors’ opinion that he or she is more favorably disposed to the government’s arguments
than another judge in the same district, then a judge’s caseload might be based in part on prosecutors; evaluations of judicial perfor-
mance.”). For recent allegations of “gaming” the random assignment system, see William Saﬁre, Essay; Norma The Plumber,N . Y .
TIMES, July 31, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/31/opinion/essay-norma-the-plumber.html (allegations that Chief Fed-
eral Judge of the U.S. District Court (U.S.D.C.) went “off the wheel” to assign a politically sensitive case in a non-random fash-
ion); see also Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank of America Manages to Avoid Judge Rakoff,W ALL ST. J., May 17, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699804575247132437874588.html (nonrandom assignment of Bank of America case in the
S.D.N.Y.).
164Results are robust to choice of caseload minimums, but follow the convention in prior literature. The Scott study excludes judges who imposed
less than 25 sentences in a two year period. See Scott, supra note X, at 17. Similarly, Anderson et. al exclude judges who sentence less than 30
cases during a two year period. Anderson et al., supra note X, at 287.
165See Appendix A for details.
166Testing each characteristic individually would result in incorrect standard errors if the demographic characteristics are correlated. For a
discussion of the SUR technique, see David H. Autor & Susan N. Houseman, Do Temporary-Help Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes for
Low-Skilled Workers? Evidence from “Work First”, 2 AEJ: Applied Economics 96, 106-107 (2010).
65where Ydtmj is a characteristic of defendant i, sentenced in district court d in year t and month m, by judge j. The
speciﬁcation includes district court ﬁxed effects ( d), sentencing year ﬁxed effects ( t), sentencing month ﬁxed effects
( m), and sentencing judge ﬁxed effects( j) to accurately compare cases assigned to judges in the same courthouse,
and in the same year and month.
To formally test for random assignment, I test the null hypothesis of no judge effects -  - using an F-test. The
p-value for this F-test tests whether the defendant characteristics do not differ signiﬁcantly among the cases that are
assigned to district court judges in the same district courthouse, sentencing year, and sentencing month. A large p-
value would signify the acceptance of the null hypothesis, and lead to the conclusion that random assignment was
present. I drop all courthouses with F-test p-values less than 0.05, but results are robust to other cutoffs. I drop
all courthouses that violate random assignment, resulting in a subsample of 163 courthouses from 73 district courts
representing about 50% of the cases from 2000-2009, for a total of 270,334 cases (hereinafter “random sample”).
3.3.5. Trends in Sentencing
I ﬁrst present graphical evidence of trends in sentence lengths and rates of below range departures using this
matched dataset over the time period 2000-2009. Graphical analyses conﬁrm that Booker did signiﬁcantly alter the
sentencing practices of judges. Figure 3.1 indicates that overall sentence lengths increased slightly prior to Booker but
began to decrease afterwards, particularly for cases in which a mandatory minimum was not charged.167
167Cases deﬁned as excluding mandatory minimums are those in which a statutory mandatory minimum was not charged.
663
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
5
5
6
0
6
5
S
e
n
t
e
n
c
e
 
L
e
n
g
t
h
 
i
n
 
M
o
n
t
h
s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sentencing Year
All Sentences
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
S
e
n
t
e
n
c
e
 
L
e
n
g
t
h
 
i
n
 
M
o
n
t
h
s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sentencing Year
Excluding Mandatory Minimums
FIGURE 3.1. SENTENCE LENGTHS IN MONTHS
Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009. Data points are quarterly averages.
Figure 3.2 reveals a trend of decreasing rates of below range departures prior to Booker, characterized by very low
relative rates of departures in the PROTECT Act era. The decreasing trend in below range departures was signiﬁcantly
changed following Booker, which induced a sudden jump in the rate of departure, as well as increasing departure rates
throughout Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, back to pre-PROTECT era levels.
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FIGURE 3.2. BELOW RANGE DEPARTURE RATES
Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009. Data points are quarterly averages.
Figure 3.3 indicates a similar trend with respect to rates of non government sponsored below range departures,
suggesting that judicial behavior has changed following the shift to an advisory guidelines regime.168 However, while
overall trends in sentencing have changed in the aftermath of Booker, and its progeny Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough,
aggregate trends mask whether inter-judge variation has increased.
168I deﬁne a nongovernment sponsored below range departure as a departure not resulting from a government substantial assistance motion.
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FIGURE 3.3. NON GOVERNMENT SPONSORED BELOW RANGE DEPARTURES
Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009. Data points are quarterly averages.
3.3.6. Measuring Inter-Judge Disparity - Analysis of Variance
I employ an analysis of variance methodology to identify changes in inter-judge disparity. Variants of this method-
ology has been used in the federal sentencing literature,169 as well as in the economics literature on teacher value
added.170 The analysis of variance technique measures inter-judge dispersion in sentencing outcomes based on the
variance of a judge-speciﬁc random variable.171
169Studies using a similar methodology include Anderson et al., supra note 7, Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Sentencing:
Evidence from Three Districts,4F ED.S ENTENCING REP. 151 (1991); Abigail Payne, Does Inter-judge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of
the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three Federal District Courts, 17 INT’L J. LAW &E CON. 337 (1997).
170See, e.g. Raj Chetty et. al, How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence from Project Star, 126 Q. J. ECON.
1593 (2011).
171This paper does not employ the statistical technique used by Scott. Scott regresses sentencing outcomes on dummy indicators for each sen-
tencing judge, such that the corresponding R-squared measures the percentage of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by sentencing
judge identity. Scott, supra note X, at 58. The author interprets an increase in the R-squared in time periods following Booker as indicative of
growing inter-disparities. For instance, with regards to sentence lengths for cases excluding mandatory minimums, the author ﬁnds an increase in
R-squared from 0.014 pre-Booker to 0.080 post Kimbrough/Gall. Id. at Table 2, at 34. However, the R-squared measure is problematic for two
main reasons. First, the measure of R-squared does not have a straightforward interpretation in terms of actual inter-judge variation, in contrast
69I implement an analysis of variance using a defendant-level random effects speciﬁcation of the form:
Yijk = Xijk ⇤   + ↵k + vijk,where vijk = µjk + ✏ijk (4)
The dependent variable Yijk is the sentence length in months for defendant i assigned to judge j in district ofﬁce k.
The control variables Xijk included defendant and crime characteristics and ↵k are indicator variables for the district
ofﬁce in which sentencing occurred. The residual vijk is composed of a judge effect or value added that is constant for
a judge over time, and an idiosyncratic defendant effect. I estimate the coefﬁcients   and the judge effects µ by OLS.
OLS estimation yields consistent estimate of   if the judge random effects are uncorrelated with the control variables
X.
I estimate the magnitude of the judge effects under a mixed random effects speciﬁcation, assuming that µjk is
distributed N(0,  2
µ). Intuitively, within judge variance in vijk is used to estimate the defendant variance:
ˆ  2
✏ = Va r(vijk   ¯ vjk) (5)
The variance in the judge effect is the remainder:
ˆ  2
µ = Va r(vijk)   ˆ  2
✏ (6)
The estimated standard deviation of judge effects on sentence length is  µ = X, implying that a one standard
deviation increase in judicial harshness raises a defendants sentence by X months. Because the regression speciﬁcation
includes district ofﬁce ﬁxed effects, this measure represents the impact of being assigned a judge one SD higher in
harshness of the within district ofﬁce distribution.
The analysis of variance technique assumes that the impact of a judge on sentencing outcomes is randomly and
normally distributed within each district courthouse such that the judge effect has mean = 0 and variance =  2.172
For instance, suppose that there are 10 judges in a district courthouse. If the judges were identical in their sentencing
preferences, and cases are randomly assigned to judges, there would be no impact of a particular judge on sentencing
outcomes. Each judge would sentence in the exact same way and variation in the judge effect, as measured by  2,
would equal 0. To the extent that judges do differ in their sentencing practices based on personal ideologies or goals,
to a measure of the variance in a judge-speciﬁc random variable. Second, the magnitude of an R-squared cannot be taken literally without some
discussion of its statistical signiﬁcance, which is proxied by the linear regression model’s signiﬁcance. Scott’s linear regression models are often
statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that judge ﬁxed effects are a poor predictor of sentencing outcomes, but he does not qualify the magnitudes
of the R-squared measures. For instance, the model is statistically insigniﬁcant in two out of three of the studied periods in Table 2, and four out
of ﬁve of the studied periods in Table 3, at 34-40. In contrast, measures of inter-judge variance in an analysis of variance can be rigorously tested
for statistical signiﬁcance. Scott acknowledges this issue, noting that “[t]he fact that the model for the Kimbrough/Gall period is not signiﬁcant
reinforces the need for caution in interpreting the results for cases not governed by a mandatory minimum.... Although the relationship in the
Kimbrough/Gall period is strongly positive, the model falls well short of statistical signiﬁcance.” Scott, supra note X, at 34-35 FN 177.
172See Appendix B for details on the empirical methodology.
70one would observe a distribution of judge effects, as measured by the variance or standard deviation in judge effects,
 . The greater the inter-judge variation in outcomes, the larger the  .
Analysis of variance allows one to estimate the standard deviation of judge effects on sentence length,  , after
controlling for case and defendant characteristics. A ﬁnding that   = 5 implies a defendant who is assigned to a
judge that is one standard deviation “harsher” than the average judge receives a 5 month longer sentence. In order
to capture changes in inter-judge disparity, this paper measures   in periods before Booker and after Booker. An
increase in   after Booker implies an increase in inter-judge sentencing disparity. In particular, I separate the sample
timeframe of 2000-2009 into four main periods: (1) Koon (October 2000-April 2003), (2) PROTECT Act (May 2003 -
January 2005),173 (3) Booker (January 2005 - November 2007), and (4) Kimbrough/Gall (December 2007 - September
2009).174
3.4. Results on Inter-judge and Regional Disparities
3.4.1. Sentence Length
The following graphs present boxplots of judge average sentence length relative to the average sentence length
of the district courthouse in which the judge sits.175 The box plot captures the spread between the 75 percentile
and 25 percentile mean judge departure, as well as outliers. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 4 indicates that over 50% of
judges are sentencing within a few months of the average courthouse mean, with some outliers in both directions.
However, the spread of the distributions over the four time periods indicates an increase in the distribution of judge
average sentence lengths relative to the court mean following Kimbrough/Gall. The spread between the 25th and 75th
percentile expands modestly but noticeably across the time periods, as well as the inter-quartile range represented by
the box plot whiskers. Following Kimbrough/Gall, the number of outliers also increases.
Note, however, that some of the inter-judge disparities may be attributable to uneven applications of mandatory
minimums by prosecutors. The second panel of Figure 3.4 presents distributions of average judge sentences for those
cases in which a mandatory minimum was not charged, approximately two-thirds of all cases. These cases better
represent disparities more likely attributable to judicial behavior. As the ﬁgure shows, following Kimbrough and Gall,
judge sentence lengths begin to depart more radically from court averages, with substantially more outlier sentence
lengths on both sides of the distribution.
173The PROTECT Act became effective as of April 30, 2003.
174Booker was decided on January 12, 2005, and Kimbrough/Gall were decided on December 10, 2007. Although the USSC data only contains
information on sentencing month and year, rather than date after 2004, the data is coded to denote which January 2005 cases were pre and post
Booker and which December 2007 cases were pre and post Kimbrough/Gall.
175case composition likely varies across district courts. Thus, I use a measure of judge sentence length that is comparable across all districts,
which can be accomplished by calculating average sentence length by judge relative to the mean district courthouse sentence.
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FIGURE 3.4. AVERAGE JUDGE SENTENCE LENGTHS IN MONTHS
Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009.
Statistical analysis of variance conﬁrms the graphical patterns. Table 3.1 presents a measure of   for sentence
lengths, the causal impact of being randomly assigned a 1 standard deviation “harsher” judge in the sentencing district
courthouse.176 Each measure of   is also accompanied by a 95% conﬁdence interval, which indicates the statistical
probability that the true measure of   lies within the interval range. During the Koon period in which the Guidelines
were binding and judges were governed by an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review, a defendant assigned
to a “harsher” judge received a 2.6 month longer sentence than similar defendants sentenced by an average judge
in the courthouse. By the time of the PROTECT Act, a defendant randomly assigned to a harsher judge received
almost a 4 month longer sentence. Inter-disparities increased further following Booker. Booker and Kimbrough/Gall
induce almost a doubling of inter-judge disparity compared to the Koon period. A harsher judge sentenced a defendant
4.6 months longer than the court average in the immediate aftermath of Booker and over 5.2 months longer after
176Table 1 analysis includes all defendants that received a prison sentence, excluding those who received probation.
72Kimbrough and Gall.
The second panel of Table 3.1 excludes from the analysis those cases in which a mandatory minimum was charged.
During Koon, a 1 standard deviation “harsher” judge sentenced a defendant to 1.6 months more than the court average,
and 3.2 months longer during the PROTECT Act. Interestingly, inter-judge disparity for non-mandatory minimum
cases falls to 2.4 months during Booker, rising back up to 3.3 months after Kimbrough and Gall. Changes in   are
not signiﬁcant from the PROTECT Act to Kimbrough and Gall, suggesting that on average, inter-judge disparities
in sentence lengths of non-mandatory minimum cases have not changed starkly during this period. However, inter-
judge disparities are signiﬁcantly larger following Gall/Kimbrough compared to the Koon period, more than doubling.
This evidence suggests that even in cases in which mandatory minimums are not charged, inter-judge disparities have
increased signiﬁcantly.
Interestingly, the estimates of   in the bottom panel are almost halved compared to those presented in the top panel
where all sentences are included. This ﬁnding suggests that a large proportion of inter-judge disparities is driven by
the disparate application of mandatory minimums by prosecutors.
TABLE 3.1. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN SENTENCE LENGTHS
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon 2.616 1.951 3.509 45407
PROTECT Act 3.975 3.118 5.068 38316
Booker 4.651 3.923 5.513 68129
Kimbrough/Gall 5.282 4.519 6.175 48605
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon 1.599 1.115 2.293 30193
PROTECT Act 3.217 2.633 3.931 27571
Booker 2.392 1.903 3.008 46160
Kimbrough/Gall 3.296 2.783 3.902 33732
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls
for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing
month ﬁxed effects, and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
Table 3.2 presents evidence of inter-judge variation in the decision to incarcerate, disentangling the decision to
incarcerate from the sentence length decision.177 Given that Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, a judge could
potentially impose no prison sentence on a defendant, even if the Guidelines recommended minimum was non-zero.
Indeed, Table 3.2 reveals that inter-judge disparity has increased throughout the four time periods, and most signiﬁ-
cantly following Kimbrough and Gall. During Koon, a 1 standard deviation “harsher” judge was 2.9% more likely to
incarcerate than the courthouse average. The effect increased to 3.3% during the PROTECT Act, 3.5% during Booker
and almost 5% following Kimbrough/Gall.
177I deﬁne incarceration as a binary indicator, where 1 indicates that the defendant has received a sentence, and 0 indicates no sentence imposed.
Defendants who do not received a prison sentence often pay ﬁnes and serve probationary periods.
73TABLE 3.2. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN INCARCERATION RATE
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0291 .0239 .0353 51122
PROTECT Act .0335 .0271 .0414 41713
Booker .0349 .0297 .0412 73782
Kimbrough/Gall .0499 .0433 .0575 52586
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls
for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing
month ﬁxed effects, and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
3.4.2. Below Range Departures
Figure 3.5 shows the boxplots of average rates of below range departures by judge, relative to the district court-
house mean, for all incarcerated defendants. While the rate of below range departures in the aggregate was lower
during the PROTECT Act period (Figure 3.2), the distribution of judge below range departure rates does not appear
to be signiﬁcantly different between Koon and the PROTECT Act. In fact, there are far fewer outliers during the ﬁrst
two years following Booker. However, inter-judge deviations from the court mean expand visibly following Kim-
brough/Gall. Figure 3.5 suggests that increasing inter-judge disparities in sentence length as described in Part IV.A
are partly attributable to growing inter-judge disparities in the rate of below range departures.
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FIGURE 3.5. AVERAGE JUDGE RATES OF BELOW RANGE DEPARTURES
Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009.
Table 3.3 conﬁrms these graphical trends. The top panel of Table 3.3 presents results including all sentences.
During the Koon period, a defendant who was assigned to a judge 1 standard deviation more “lenient” than the average
judge was 4.8% more likely to be sentenced below the Guidelines recommended minimum.178 During the PROTECT
Act, a similar judge was 4.2% more likely to sentence below range. Following Booker, the “lenient” judge’s practices
deviated more greatly from the courthouse average, with a 5.4% rate immediately following Booker and 6.7% rate
after Kimbrough/Gall. The increased likelihood of below range departures following Kimbrough/Gall is statistically
signiﬁcant from the Koon-era rate, revealing markedly higher inter-judge disparities.
Excluding cases with mandatory minimums reveals a very similar trend, with the 1 standard deviation more “le-
nient” judge 5.1% more likely to sentence below range during Koon, rising to 7.1% following Kimbrough/Gall. Note
that the magnitudes of   when all sentences are included (top panel), and when mandatory minimums are excluded
178Here, I deﬁne a judge who sentences defendants as greater rates below range as more “lenient.” Leniency is used solely to connote lower
sentence length.
75(bottom panel), are very similar. This ﬁnding suggests that inter-judge disparities in below range departures are real
and substantial, and not the mere product of mandatory minimums. If anything, measures of inter-judge disparity
are lower in most periods when mandatory minimums are included. Recall that a mandatory minimum that exceeds
the Guidelines recommended minimum trumps the Guidelines minimum, becoming the statutorily binding minimum,
thus potentially reducing inter-judge disparity. The ﬁndings suggest that the application of mandatory minimums may
actually increase the appearance of inter-judge consistency.179
TABLE 3.3. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN BELOW RANGE DEPARTURES
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0477 .0396 .0576 44338
PROTECT Act .0427 .0337 .0542 36613
Booker .0538 .0459 .0632 64781
Kimbrough/Gall .0668 .0576 .0774 45267
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0511 .0415 .0629 29369
PROTECT Act .0522 .0411 .0662 26080
Booker .0500 .0405 .0618 43390
Kimbrough/Gall .0712 .0599 .0845 30793
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls for offense
type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing month ﬁxed effects,
and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
Not only do mandatory minimums confound the accurate determination of inter-judge disparities, so do below
range departures that are government sponsored. Table 4 analyzes inter-judge variation in only those below range
departures that are judicially initiated, rather than the result of a government substantial assistance motion. Table 3.4
indicates that the increasing inter-judge disparities in below range departures evidenced in Table 3.3 is consistent in
this subset of departures. Inter-judge disparities increased from 4.3% during Koon to 5.9% after Booker and over
7.4% after Kimbrough/Gall, with the lowest inter-judge disparities during the PROTECT Act. Inter-judge disparities
similarly increased throughout the period for the subset of cases not subject to a mandatory minimum, from 4.3%
during Koon to over 7.4% after Kimbrough/Gall. These results indicate that in the subset of departures that are most
likely attributable to judicial behavior, the PROTECT Act was not only associated with the lowest aggregate rates of
downward departures, but also the lowest inter-judge disparities.
179See Scott, supra note X at 26 (“mandatory minimums may interfere with accurate assessment of inter-judge sentencing disparity by creating
the illusion of inter-judge consistency.”).
76TABLE 3.4. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN BELOW RANGE DEPARTURES
NON-GOVERNMENT SPONSORED DEPARTURES
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0426 .0349 .0519 37449
PROTECT Act .0321 .0247 .0416 33432
Booker .0588 .0507 .0682 59386
Kimbrough/Gall .0743 .0645 .0856 42701
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0434 .0345 .0547 27051
PROTECT Act .0369 .0274 .0496 25505
Booker .0553 .0457 .0669 43230
Kimbrough/Gall .0742 .0628 .0878 31796
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls
for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing
month ﬁxed effects, and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
3.4.3. Above Range Departures
Inter-judge disparities have increased not only in the rate of below range departures, but also the rate of above
range departures, which comprise approximately 5% of cases. Figure 3.6 presents the distribution of average rates
of above range departures by judge, relative to their district courthouse mean, for all incarcerated defendants. The
graphs reveal an expansion the distribution of above range departure rates within district courts, particularly between
the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution. Increased inter-judge deviations are also reﬂected in the rate of above
range departures for cases with no mandatory minimums charged. Although there appear to be fewer extreme outliers
following Kimbrough/Gall, the spread between the 25th and 75th percentile is visibly larger compared to pre-Booker
spreads.
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FIGURE 3.6. AVERAGE JUDGE RATES OF ABOVE RANGE DEPARTURES
Notes: Data is from the random sample 2000-2009.
Table 3.5 presents measures of inter-judge variation from the empirical analysis and reveals signiﬁcant and sub-
stantial increases in inter-judge disparities in above range departures. In the top panel where all sentences are analyzed,
a 1 standard deviation “harsher” judge was 1.6% more likely to sentence a defendant above range compared to the
average judge in the courthouse during Koon. While inter-judge variation did not change substantially from Koon to
the PROTECT Act period, to the ﬁrst few years after Booker, this harsher judge was over 2.7% more likely to sentence
a defendant above range after Kimbrough/Gall. Inter-judge disparities in above range departures increased by over
70% from the beginning to the end of the time period.
Of course, mandatory minimums explain a sizable fraction of defendants that are sentenced above range when
the mandatory minimum trumps the maximum Guidelines recommended sentence. When cases with mandatory min-
imums are excluded, inter-judge disparities are approximately halved. During Koon, inter-judge disparities in above
range departures were minimal, with a 1 standard deviation “harsher” judge being only .07% more likely to sentence
78above range. However, inter-judge disparities doubled by the end of the time period, to 1.3% after Kimbrough/Gall.
TABLE 3.5. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN ABOVE RANGE DEPARTURES
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0161 .0129 .0202 45184
PROTECT Act .0182 .0134 .0247 38322
Booker .0173 .0135 .0222 68120
Kimbrough/Gall .0276 .0227 .0335 48596
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0067 .0038 .0117 30002
PROTECT Act .0102 .0072 .0144 27571
Booker .0139 .0106 .0181 46144
Kimbrough/Gall .0130 .0093 .0183 33734
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls for offense
type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing month ﬁxed effects,
and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
3.4.4. Sentencing Practices by Judge Demographics
The previous section ﬁnds that inter-judge disparities in sentence length, below range departures, and above range
departures have increased signiﬁcantly following Booker, in particular after Kimbrough/Gall. In this section, I analyze
whether increases in inter-judge disparities are idiosyncratic, resulting from all judges changing their behavior in
similar ways, or if judges are systematically differing from their colleagues based on observable traits.180 Recall
that due to the random assignment of cases to judges within a district courthouse, any difference in judge sentencing
practices can be solely attributable to a judge effect.
To analyze the differential sentencing practices of certain types of judges, I use ordinary least squares regression.
The methodology captures how judges differ in their treatment of similar defendants in response to increased judicial
discretion, compared to other judges within the same district courthouse. Because cases are randomly assigned to
judges within a district court, judge identiﬁers allow one to compare judges within the same court, capturing judge
differences in sentencing rather than different caseloads.
I identify the sources of increasing inter-disparities post Booker and post Kimbrough/Gall using a speciﬁcation of
the form:
Yijkdtm =  0 + ↵1 ⇤ Judgei ⇤ Booker+  0 ⇤ Booker+ ↵2 ⇤ Judgei ⇤ Kimbrough
+ 0 ⇤ Kimbrough +  1 ⇤ Racei +  3 ⇤ Xi + Guideijk + Offtypei
+ d +  t +  d ⇤  t +  m + ✏ijkdtm (7)
180See Appendix C.
79Yijkdtm is a sentencing outcome for defendant i, with criminal history category j and offense level k, sentenced in
district court d in year t and month m. Main outcomes include sentence length measured in months, and a binary
indicator for below range sentencing (sentence length less than the prescribed Guidelines minimum).
Judgei includes judicial demographics such as race, gender, political afﬁliation, an indicator for pre vs. post
Guidelines appointment, tenure under the Guidelines, and an indicator for pre vs. post Booker appointment. The
main coefﬁcients ↵1 and ↵2 capture the impact of particular judicial characteristics on sentencing outcomes in the
wake of Booker. Booker is an indicator variable for defendants sentenced after the Booker decision but before
Kimbrough/Gall. Kimbrough is an indicator variable for defendants sentenced after the Kimbrough/Gall.
Racei is a dummy variable for defendant i’s race: white, black, Hispanic, or other. Xi comprises a vector of
demographic characteristics of the defendant including gender, age, age squared, educational attainment (less than
high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate), number of dependents, and citizenship status.
Guideijk includes dummy variables for criminal history category j and offense level k, and each unique combina-
tion of criminal history category and offense level. The interaction captures differential sentencing tendencies at each
unique cell of the Guidelines grid (258 total). To proxy for underlying offense seriousness and all aggravating and
mitigating factors, I control for ﬁnal offense level. I also control for ﬁnal criminal history category. Offtypei is a
dummy variable for offense type.
The speciﬁcation also includes district court ﬁxed effects ( d), sentencing year ﬁxed effects ( t), and sentenc-
ing month ﬁxed effects ( m). All standard errors are clustered at the district courthouse level to account for serial
correlation.
Consistent with previous research, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant and systematic differences in the sentencing practices of both
Democratic judicial appointees compared to their Republican appointed peers, and female judges compared to male
judges.181 These differences magniﬁed in the aftermath of Booker and Kimbrough/Gall, suggesting that they are
some of the sources of the growing inter-judge disparities identiﬁed earlier. The coefﬁcients presented in Table 3.6
represent the sentencing tendency of a particular type judge compared to his or her colleagues within the same district
courthouse, for an identical defendant and case, sentenced in the same month-year.
181See supra notes 28-32.
80TABLE 3.6. SENTENCING PRACTICES BY JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS
ALL SENTENCES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sentence Below Range Below Range Above Range
Non-Govt
Post Booker 1.010 0.0211 0.0462** 0.0242***
(1.439) (0.0240) (0.0207) (0.00911)
Tenure -0.0556 0.000529 0.000291 -0.000543*
(0.0446) (0.000909) (0.000887) (0.000276)
Tenure*Booker 0.0461 -0.000567 0.000213 0.00102**
(0.0614) (0.00110) (0.000947) (0.000432)
Tenure*Kimbrough 0.0126 0.00112 0.00233 0.000968*
(0.0672) (0.00189) (0.00196) (0.000503)
Democratic -0.522 0.0109 0.00658 0.00159
(0.438) (0.00930) (0.00822) (0.00270)
Democratic*Booker -0.609 0.00842 0.00856 0.00191
(0.571) (0.00825) (0.00806) (0.00371)
Democratic*Kimbrough -0.756 0.0223* 0.0269** -0.00269
(0.731) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.00509)
Female 0.537 -0.00247 -0.00731 0.00513
(0.468) (0.0126) (0.0132) (0.00420)
Female*Booker -1.692*** 0.0155 0.0164 -0.0100*
(0.503) (0.0121) (0.0138) (0.00538)
Female*Kimbrough -0.401 0.0110 0.0145 0.00118
(0.576) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.00553)
Black -0.873 0.0192 0.0266 -0.00818*
(0.581) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.00438)
Black*Booker -0.624 -0.0106 -0.0104 0.00657
(0.951) (0.0176) (0.0206) (0.00706)
Black*Kimbrough 0.459 -0.0334 -0.0367 0.0137
(1.405) (0.0262) (0.0315) (0.00946)
Pre Guide 0.561 -0.0266** -0.0218 0.00444
(0.831) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.00533)
Pre Guide*Booker -0.765 0.0254 0.00914 -0.0137**
(0.952) (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.00690)
Pre Guide*Kimbrough -0.418 0.0129 -0.00272 -0.000320
(1.224) (0.0308) (0.0313) (0.00995)
Booker 0.276 0.00399 -0.00635 -0.00567
(0.735) (0.0139) (0.0132) (0.00503)
Kimbrough -0.443 0.00376 -0.00757 -0.00170
(1.193) (0.0191) (0.0182) (0.0124)
Observations 206,292 205,160 178,150 205,160
R-squared 0.785 0.217 0.281 0.083
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each
offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district courthouse ﬁxed effects, sentencing year and
sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district courthouse level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent
level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
81Column 1 presents results for sentence length. Female judges signiﬁcantly altered their practices from their male
counterparts within the same courthouse. Immediately after Booker, female judges sentenced observably similar
defendants to approximately 1.7 months less than their male colleagues. 182 Columns 2 presents results for the rate
of below range departures. Inter-disparities in rates of below range departures appear to be somewhat attributable to
disparities by judge political afﬁliation. Following Kimbrough/Gall, Democratic judicial appointees are signiﬁcantly
more likely to depart downwards from the Guidelines recommended range, compared to their Republican appointed
colleagues. For a similar defendant and crime, Democratic judges were 2.2% more likely to depart downwards.
Interestingly, pre-Guidelines (1987) appointees are signiﬁcantly less likely to depart downwards from the Guidelines
throughout the entire 2000-2009 period. Inter-judge differences by demographics are also prominent for the subset of
below range departures not sponsored by the government, as seen in column 3. Democratic judicial appointees are
2.7% more likely to depart downwards compared to their Republican colleagues. Judges appointed post Booker are
almost 5% more likely to depart downwards compared to pre-Booker appointees.
Finally, columns 4 presents results above range departures. Following Booker, female judges are 1% less likely to
sentence above range compared to their male colleagues. Inter-judge differences also appear by judge tenure, deﬁned
as number of years of experience sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime for those judges appointed under
the mandatory regime. In general, a judge with greater years of experience under the mandatory regime is signiﬁcantly
less likely to sentence above range, but this pattern reverses in the aftermath of Booker and Kimbrough/Gall, where
judges with greater experience are more likely to sentence above range. Black judges are in general .08% less likely to
sentence above range compared to white judges, and pre-Guidelines appointees are 1.4% less likely to depart upwards
after Booker. Also striking are the inter-judge differences generated between judges appointed pre-Booker and judges
appointed post Booker. In general, post Booker judicial appointees are 2.4% more likely to sentence above range their
their pre-Booker appointed peers.
Table 3.7 presents the results excluding cases with mandatory minimums. Judge differences by political afﬁliation
of appointing present and gender persist. Following Kimbrough/Gall, Democratic appointees issue sentences 0.8
months shorter than their Republican colleagues for observably similar defendants, are 3.1% more likely to depart
downwards, and 3.1% more likely to depart downwards in cases without government substantial assistance motions.
Similarly, female judges issue 0.8 month shorter sentences than their male colleagues following Booker. Differences
between pre-Booker and post Booker appointees also remain. Post Booker are approximately 5% more likely to depart
downwards in all cases, and over 7% more likely when there is no substantial assistance motion.
182The Booker indicator here represents only the period 2005-2007 prior to Kimbrough.
82TABLE 3.7. SENTENCING PRACTICES BY JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sentence Below Range Below Range Above Range
Non-Govt
Post Booker -1.010 0.0496** 0.0713*** 0.00334
(0.683) (0.0242) (0.0228) (0.00610)
Tenure -0.0278 2.90e-05 -4.93e-05 -0.000105
(0.0272) (0.000791) (0.000825) (0.000216)
Tenure*Booker 0.0260 -0.000331 -0.000152 0.000196
(0.0343) (0.00103) (0.000976) (0.000287)
Tenure*Kimbrough -0.0130 0.00217 0.00294 0.000580
(0.0454) (0.00194) (0.00213) (0.000496)
Democratic -0.382 0.00770 0.00403 0.00106
(0.267) (0.00880) (0.00859) (0.00217)
Democratic*Booker -0.291 0.00472 0.00695 -0.00233
(0.290) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.00281)
Democratic*Kimbrough -0.830* 0.0310** 0.0307** -0.00300
(0.456) (0.0141) (0.0152) (0.00436)
Female 0.242 -0.00189 -0.00771 0.00187
(0.324) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.00231)
Female*Booker -0.811** 0.0145 0.0168 -0.00334
(0.407) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.00325)
Female*Kimbrough -0.217 0.00493 0.0123 0.00155
(0.501) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.00472)
Black -0.501 0.0297* 0.0309* -0.00315
(0.425) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.00215)
Black*Booker 0.220 -0.0258 -0.0227 0.00791*
(0.637) (0.0200) (0.0223) (0.00446)
Black*Kimbrough 0.587 -0.0533* -0.0473 0.000907
(0.811) (0.0318) (0.0380) (0.00454)
Pre Guide 0.256 -0.0233 -0.0229 0.00367
(0.400) (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.00330)
Pre Guide*Booker -0.312 0.0166 0.0145 -0.00194
(0.566) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.00495)
Pre Guide*Kimbrough 0.364 -0.00734 -0.0137 -0.00167
(0.949) (0.0331) (0.0370) (0.00907)
Booker 0.492 -0.00622 -0.0174 0.00414
(0.372) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.00351)
Kimbrough 0.184 -0.0201 -0.0277 -0.00302
(0.670) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.00690)
Observations 141,647 141,386 131,417 141,386
R-squared 0.819 0.244 0.283 0.037
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain controls for offense type, and dummies for each
offense level and criminal history combination. Regressions also contain district courthouse ﬁxed effects, sentencing year and
sentencing month ﬁxed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the district courthouse level. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent
level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
83Overall, these results suggest that sentencing differences associated with judge gender and political afﬁliation
are magniﬁed after Booker and/or Kimbrough/Gall. Such inter-judge differences are likely sources of growing inter-
judge disparities. Given these large changes in inter-judge disparities following Booker, judges do not appear to be
completely “anchored” to the Guidelines.183
However, the ﬁnding that post Booker judicial appointees are more likely to depart downwards from the Guidelines
than pre Booker appointees is consistent with a story in which judges with no prior experience sentencing under the
Guidelines regime are less anchored.184 The “anchor” of the Guidelines sentence may be more prominent to pre-
Booker appointees because these judges are more acculturated and experienced under the Guidelines. In contrast,
the “anchor” is less prominent for post Booker appointees. These potential anchoring differences between pre and
post Booker appointees suggests that defense lawyer James Felman’s predictions may be true - that disparities may
“increase as the years go by and the bench is ﬁlled with individuals who have no history with binding guidelines.”185
Yet, inter-judge disparities that are due to the entrance of new judges to the federal bench might only reﬂect a short-
term surge in disparity. As time goes on and all judges have no history with binding Guidelines, inter-judge disparities
attributable to this source may fall.
3.4.5. Regional Disparity: Inter-District Variation
Commentators have suggested that different political climates across districts and circuits can affect sentencing
practices,186 yielding empirical ﬁndings that jurisdictional effects are prominent in federal sentencing.187 The recent
2012 Commission report ﬁnds that rates of non-government sponsored below range sentences increasingly depend
upon the district court in which the defendant is sentenced and the inﬂuence of the Guidelines on sentence length
varies signiﬁcant by circuit court.188 However, some researchers have found that between-district variation in the
183Of course, a degree of anchoring may be occurring, which indicates that these results are only lower bound estimates on increases in inter-judge
disparities in a system in which sentencing does not begin with the Guidelines calculation.
184In robustness checks, I ﬁnd that the behavior of post Booker appointees in my data is not due to the fact that they were George W. Bush
appointees based on comparisons with pre-Booker George W. Bush appointees. Rather, sentencing behavior seems to be associated with lack of
experience under the binding Guidelines.
185See Felman, supra note X, at 98-99.
186See, e.g, Nora Demlietner, The Nonuniform Developments of Guideline Law in the Courts,6F ED.S ENT.R EP. 239 (1994) (describing
district and circuit speciﬁc “personas” in sentencing case law); Jeffrey T. Ulmer & John Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines:
Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity. 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 402-403 (1996) (Based on an analysis of three county courts
in Pennsylvania, the authors argue that local courts operate under formal sentencing standards articulated by a guidelines regime and substantive,
extralegal factors relevant to local courts, such as “perceptions of the defendant’s characteristics, local concerns, and court actors’ organizational
and individual interests.”); Jeffrey T. Ulmer, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING:C OURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES
(1977).
187See Celesta Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and De-
partures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-1992, 31 LAW &S OC’Y REV. 789, 815-16 (1997) (ﬁnding signiﬁcant circuit-speciﬁc
sentencing practices for black and white defendants); Ronald Everett & Roger Wojtkiewicz, Difference, Disparity, and Race/Ethnic Bias in Federal
Sentencing, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIM. 189 (2002) (ﬁnding harsher sentencing in the southern circuits compared to other circuits); Paula Kautt,
Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Inter circuit Variation in Sentencing Outcomes for Federal Drug-Trafﬁcking Offenses, 19 JUS-
TICE QUARTERLY 633, 659 (2002) (“despite the federal system’s congressionally mandated return to determinate sentencing, extra-legal factors
(speciﬁcally jurisdictional effects) continue to inﬂuence the federal sentencing system and its outcomes directly and indirectly”).
188United States Sentencing Commission, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.B OOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING (2012).
84effects of extralegal factors on sentencing have not increased following Booker.189
Recall that the identiﬁcation of the impact of Booker on inter-judge disparity within a district courthouse relies
on the random assignment of cases to judges. Such random assignment does not exist between districts, such that
differencesindistrictsentencingpracticesaremostlikelyalsoduetodifferingcaseloads. Forinstance, theCommission
has noted that simple comparisons of regional variations might be attributable to different types of crimes within the
general offense categories, such that frauds sentenced in the Southern District of New York are substantially different
from frauds sentenced in the District of North Dakota.190
While I cannot control for unobservable differences across districts, the empirical methodology in this Article does
control comprehensively for observable offender and case characteristics.191 For the inter-district results, I utilize the
full sample described in Section 3 as random assignment is no longer a prerequisite. In the context of inter-district
disparities, analysis of variation now yields an estimate of the standard deviation of district effects on sentence length,
 , after controlling for case and defendant characteristics. Thus, a ﬁnding of   = 5 now suggests that a defendant
sentenced in a 1 standard deviation “harsher” district is sentenced to 5 more months in prison, than if he/her were
sentenced in an average district court.
Figure 3.7 presents raw distributions of sentence lengths by circuit court, excluding life sentences.192 While
uncontrolled differences cannot be treated as regional effects because districts have very different case compositions,
the raw data reveals substantial differences in sentence length, both in the distribution between the 25th percentile and
75th percentile, and presence of outliers.
189See Jeffery T. Ulmer et. al, The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion In the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is there Increased
Disparity and Divergence Between Courts?, 28 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 799 (2011).
190United States Sentencing Commission, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:A N ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM (Nov. 2004) at 99-100 (“Similarly, variations in the rates
of a particular type of departure among different districts must be evaluated within a larger context of each district’s distinctive adaptation to the
guidelines system. Inferring unwarranted disparity from uncontrolled comparisons of average sentences or rates of departure may be erroneous.”).
191Nevertheless, the results on inter-district variation should be interpreted with some caution to the extent that there are unobserved differences
across district courts that cannot be captured.
192Life sentences are top coded as 470 months in the dataset.
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FIGURE 3.7. DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCE LENGTHS, BY CIRCUIT COURT
Notes: Data is from the full sample 2000-2009.
Table 3.8 shows that after controlling for case and defendant characteristics, there is substantial variation in the
sentence that a defendant would receive depending on which district court he is sentenced in. During the Koon
period, a defendant sentenced in a 1 standard deviation “harsher” district court received a 7.8 month longer prison
sentenced. This inter-district disparity increased to 8.4 months during the PROTECT Act, to 10.4 months immediately
following Booker, reaching an 11.3 month difference after Kimbrough/Gall. By late 2007, inter-district disparities
were signiﬁcant larger than existed under Koon.
Analyzing the subset of cases in which a mandatory minimum was not charged more than halves the magnitude of
 , the measure of inter-district variation. The lower panel of Table 3.8 indicates that a 1 standard deviation “harsher”
district court sentenced a defendant to 3.6 months longer than the average district court, 4.4 months longer after the
PROTECT Act, 4.9 months longer after Booker and 5.2 months longer after Kimbrough/Gall. Once again, inter-district
variation is statistically greater after Kimbrough/Gall compared to Koon. Nevertheless, the ﬁnding the the magnitude
86of inter-district variation is reduced by over half when a statutory minimum is not charged indicates that the application
of mandatory minimums is a large contributor to inter-district disparities, particularly in light of the fact that mandatory
minimums represent only approximately one-third of the cases.
TABLE 3.8. INTER-DISTRICT VARIATION IN SENTENCE LENGTHS
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon 7.799 6.701 9.077 159163
PROTECT Act 8.439 7.232 9.849 83829
Booker 10.397 8.961 12.063 148560
Kimbrough/Gall 11.262 9.692 13.087 106033
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon 3.578 3.057 4.188 104917
PROTECT Act 4.403 3.758 5.159 58104
Booker 4.920 4.229 5.724 97628
Kimbrough/Gall 5.157 4.419 6.018 72036
Notes: Data is from the full sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls for
offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing
month ﬁxed effects.
Table 3.9 reveals that district courts also signiﬁcantly differ in their rates of below range departures. A defendant
sentenced in a 1 standard deviation more “lenient” district is 12.1% more likely to be sentenced below the guidelines
range, compared to the average district court, during Koon. This measure of inter-district variation for below range
departures remains relatively constant throughout the entire sample, both including and excluding mandatory mini-
mums. Booker and Kimbrough/Gall do not appear to have dramatically increased inter-district disparity with regards
to downward departures.
87TABLE 3.9. INTER-DISTRICT VARIATION IN BELOW RANGE DEPARTURES
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .1208 .1041 .1402 157103
PROTECT Act .1198 .1031 .1392 83453
Booker .1341 .1156 .1555 147774
Kimbrough/Gall .1289 .1109 .1497 105535
EXCLUDING MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .1125 .0969 .1308 103720
PROTECT Act .1113 .0956 .1296 58066
Booker .1251 .1078 .1453 97568
Kimbrough/Gall .1256 .1073 .1463 71994
Notes: Data is from the full sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls for offense type, offense level
and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing month ﬁxed effects.
3.4.6. Prosecutorial Contributions to Disparities
Prosecutors likely contribute to observed inter-judge disparities through their charging behavior. One area of
great prosecutorial discretion is the decision to charge an offense that carries a mandatory minimum. Justice Breyer
has stated that mandatory minimum statutes “transfer sentencing power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences
through the charges they decide to bring.”193 Strategic charging of mandatory minimums are likely more prominent
after Booker as some prosecutors charge mandatory minimums in order to narrow a judge’s discretion.194
In a 2011 Congressional report on mandatory minimum penalties, the Sentencing Commission found signiﬁcant
variation in the extent which prosecutors applied enhancements for mandatory minimum penalties under drug trafﬁck-
ing offenses.195 The report documented over 75% of eligible defendants receiving the statutory mandatory minimum
penalty in some districts, but none of eligible defendants in other districts receiving the enhancement.196 Furthermore,
recent work by researchers shows evidence of signiﬁcant racial disparities in prosecutorial charging.197
Prosecutors are also in charge of the decision to reduce sentences below the mandatory minimum if the defen-
dant offers “substantial assistance” during another investigation or prosecution.198 If the government ﬁles a motion
for substantial assistance for a case involving a mandatory minimum sentence, the court has the power to impose a
193Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 571 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
194See Testimony of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, to the United States Sentencing Commission, at 252 (Sept.
2009) (“[A] prosecutor is far less willing to forego charging a mandatory minimum sentence when prior experience shows that the defendant will
ultimately be sentenced to a mere fraction of what the guidelines range is.”).
195United States Sentencing Commission, REPORT TO CONGRESS:M ANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM, at 252-261 (Oct. 2011).
196Id. at 111-113 (prosecutors reported wide variations in the district practices on seeking statutory minimum penalties).
197See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences, University of
Michigan Law & Economics Working Paper 2012. Using data on 58,000 federal criminal cases from 2007-2009, the authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant racial
disparities in severity of initial charges. In particular, they ﬁnd that black offenders are on average more than two times as likely to be subjected to
a mandatory minimum sentence compared to similar white offenders, and that a major part of the racial gap in sentence length can be attributed to
the prosecutorial bias in initial charge.
19818 U.S.C. §3553(e). A judge has some leeway in reducing sentence length for certain drug trafﬁcking offenses under the “safety valve”
provision, which allows a judge to reduce the punishment for low level, ﬁrst time offenders. See 18 U.S.C. §3553(f). The Report to Congress:
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, supra note X, states that in recent years, white defendants in drug cases are
more frequently granted the safety valve exception compared to other defendants.
88sentence as low as probation.199 Scholars have commented that the substantial assistance departure provision affords
prosecutors immense discretion over both plea bargaining and sentencing outcomes under the Guidelines.200
I ﬁnd that the application of mandatory minimums appears to be a large contributor to inter-judge disparities.
Given the random assignment of cases to judges within a district courthouse, equal application of mandatory min-
imums among eligible cases would result in no signiﬁcant judge differences in the rate of mandatory minimums
applied. However, empirical results in Table 3.10 reveal small, but signiﬁcant differences in the percentage of cases
with applicable mandatory minimums across judges. A judge 1 standard deviation out in the distribution was 2.3%
more likely to see a case with a mandatory minimum during Koon, but 3.5% more likely after Kimbrough/Gall. The
increase in the differential rates of mandatory minimums after Kimbrough/Gall coincide with substantial increases in
inter-judge disparities in below range departures. These results are consistent with a story in which prosecutors are
attempting to rein in judicially induced downward departures through the use of mandatory minimums.
TABLE 3.10. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN MANDATORY MINIMUMS
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0230 .0180 .0293 51077
PROTECT Act .0188 .0130 .0272 41697
Booker .0242 .0196 .0298 73706
Kimbrough/Gall .0345 .0289 .0411 52551
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls
for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing
month ﬁxed effects, and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
TABLE 3.11. INTER-JUDGE VARIATION IN SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
ALL SENTENCES
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0372 .0307 .0450 49812
PROTECT Act .0314 .0248 .0399 41298
Booker .0286 .0233 .0351 73592
Kimbrough/Gall .0362 .0301 .0434 52408
Notes: Data is from the random sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and controls
for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects, sentencing
month ﬁxed effects, and district courthouse ﬁxed effects.
Table 3.12 and 3.13 conﬁrm that a large portion of inter-district differences in the sentencing of observably similar
defendants arises from district variation in both the charging of mandatory minimums and the application of a sub-
stantial assistance motion. Appendix Table 1 reveals that a defendant sentenced in a 1 standard deviation “harsher”
district is approximately 6% more likely to be charged with a mandatory minimum. Appendix Table 2 also presents
199According to the Sentencing Commission, substantial assistance motions reduce the average defendant’s sentence length by 50%.
200See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note X at 550 (“The use of the section 5K1.1 substantial-assistance motion varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion....There is no limit on the amount of reduction once the motion is submitted. The section 5K1.1 motion is also used to avoid guideline ranges
or mandatory minimum sentences for sympathetic defendants – even when there has been no genuine substantial assistance.”); Michael H. Tonry,
SENTENCING MATTERS (1996); Jeffrey Standen Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 1471 (1993).
89evidence of large inter-district differences in the rates of substantial assistance motions, with a defendant being ap-
proximately 9% more likely to be granted this form of downward departure in more “lenient” districts. As previously
noted, the application of a substantial assistance motion is often applied “to avoid guideline ranges or mandatory mini-
mum sentences for sympathetic defendants - even when there has been no genuine substantial assistance.”201 However,
inter-district differences in average rates of mandatory minimums and rates of substantial assistance motions do not
appear to have increased signiﬁcantly following Booker and Kimbrough/Gall.
TABLE 3.12. INTER-DISTRICT VARIATION
APPLICATION OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0571 .0491 .0663 183732
PROTECT Act .0652 .0559 .0760 94434
Booker .0584 .0502 .0680 165139
Kimbrough/Gall .0662 .0568 .0771 117536
Notes: Data is from the full sample sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and
controls for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects,
and sentencing month ﬁxed effects.
TABLE 3.13. INTER-DISTRICT VARIATION
APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
Period   Lower bound Upper bound No. Obs.
Koon .0868 .0747 .1009 176736
PROTECT Act .0909 .0782 .1058 92736
Booker .0904 .0779 .1049 163978
Kimbrough/Gall .0789 .0679 .0918 117328
Notes: Data is from the full sample sample from 2000-2009. All regressions contain demographic controls, and
controls for offense type, offense level and criminal history. Regressions also contain sentencing year ﬁxed effects,
and sentencing month ﬁxed effects.
3.5. Policy Recommendations
This section describes three of the major proposals for reform of federal sentencing after Booker. I describe each
in turn, and then apply the empirical ﬁndings in this paper to shed light on the various proposals.
3.5.1. “Topless” Guidelines System
Within a few months after Booker, the Department of Justice recommended a new “topless” guidelines system, in
which judges would be bound by the Guidelines minimum, but not the maximum.202 Echoing the topless guidelines
regime ﬁrst proposed by Professor Frank Bowman, this construction would still allow judicial fact-ﬁnding to facts that
raised the minimum applicable sentence, remaining constitutional under the principles espoused in Blakely.203 Recall
201Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note X, at 550.
202See Gonzales, supra note X, at 326 (favoring “the construction of a minimum guideline system”).
203See Memorandum from Frank Bowman to U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (June 27, 2004), 16 FED.S ENTENCING REP. 364, 367 (2004).
90that Blakely applied the Sixth Amendment to challenge judicial fact-ﬁnding which raised a defendant’s maximum sen-
tence.204 As a result, a “topless” guidelines system would comport with both Blakely and the Court’s holding in Harris
v. United States that facts triggering a mandatory minimum sentence could be found by a judge.205 However, while
a topless regime addresses potential Sixth Amendment raised in Blakely and Booker, it does not limit judicial discre-
tion to sentence above the applicable guidelines maximum. Moreover, the topless regime takes the prior mandatory
guidelines as the baseline, which some argue “would constitute a step backwards in the development and evolution of
the federal sentencing system by exacerbating some of the worst features of the pre-Booker federal sentencing.”206 By
binding judges to the applicable minimum sentence, the topless “ﬁx” would likely re-introduce concerns of prosecu-
torial power in their charging and plea bargaining decisions.207
The empirical evidence from Part IV reveals that a “topless" guidelines proposal, while comporting with the Six
Amendment, would plausibly aggravate disparities that are attributable to prosecutor charging decisions. Table 1 and
Table 5, which present evidence of inter-judge disparities and inter-district disparities, are reduced by almost a factor
of two when mandatory minimums are excluded from analyses. These results suggest that the decision to charge a
mandatory minimum contributes substantially to inter-judge differences in sentence length, such that these decisions
are not made equally across all eligible cases. The results also indicate that mandatory minimum practices may differ
largely across U.S. district courts. As a result, any proposal that binds judges to the applicable minimum sentence
would ascribe greater power to prosecutors, likely resulting in inequitable disparities. Moreover, results in Table 6
suggest that there have been substantial increases in inter-judge disparities in above range departures even when a
mandatory minimum is not charged. As a result, to the extent that a “topless” regime seeks to limit judicial discretion,
it does so in an asymmetric manner.
3.5.2. “Blakely-ized” Guidelines
Justice Breyer’s ultimate remedy for the Sixth Amendment issues facing the federal sentencing guidelines was
to declare the guidelines “effectively advisory.” But one could have imagined another approach to “Blakely-ize"
the Guidelines. Indeed, the Justices dissenting from the Breyer remedial opinion in Booker suggested leaving the
mandatory guidelines intact, but requiring that aggravating facts triggering longer maximums be proven by a jury
204Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.
205536 U.S. 545, 567-69 (2002). However, some commentators have suggested that the Court’s holding in Harris may not survive after Booker.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of Apprendi and its Progeny, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 531, 541 (2006); Frank O. Bowman III, Mr.
Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN.L .R EV. 235, 261 (2005). The Court has recently
granted review in a case presenting this exact question of whether the Court’s decision in Harris should be overruled. Alleyne v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 420 (2012).
206See Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note X, at 363. Berman also discusses potential constitutional challenges to a “topless” guidelines
system.
207Id. at 364 (“Consequently, the most problematic facets and the most disconcerting consequences in terms of prosecutorial power, disparity,
and evasion experienced in the pre-Booker federal sentencing system would likely be aggravated by the enactment of any sort of topless guideline
Booker ﬁx.”).
91beyond reasonable doubt, or admitted by the defendant.208
However, introducing jury fact-ﬁnding into a mandatory guidelines system is likely particularly complex. Justice
Breyer in his Booker remedial opinion mused over how jury fact-ﬁnding might work, asking “[w]ould the indictment
have to allege, in addition the elements of robbery, whether the defendant possessed a ﬁrearm, whether he brandished
or discharged it, whether he threatened death...?”209 Additionally, to the extent that the mandatory guidelines regime
contributed to prosecutorial discretion and disparity, jury fact-ﬁnding in the face of extensive plea bargaining “would
move the system backwards in respect to both tried and plea-bargained cases” by effectively “prohibit[ing] the judge
from basing a sentence upon any conduct other than the conduct the prosecutor chose to charge.”210 Other scholars
have echoed the concern that Blakely-izing the current version of the Guidelines would be procedurally unworkable
and overwhelm juries required to make ﬁndings of fact.211 Addressing some of Justice Breyer’s concerns, a 2005
American Bar Association Report suggested a version of the Blakely-ized system espoused by Justice Stevens in his
Booker dissent, accompanied with “simplifying the guidelines by reducing both the number of offense levels and the
number of adjustments and presenting the remaining, more essential, culpability factors to the jury.”212
This Article cannot comment on the relative abilities of judges and juries to determine the applicability of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors. Even supposing that juries are capable of fact determinations of aggravating and mitigating
factors, under the “Blakely-ized” guidelines, once a jury has made factual determinations as to conduct based on what
a prosecutor chose to charge, a judge is bound by these determinations. For instance, if a jury did not make a factual
determination with respect to a potential mitigating factor, such as acceptance of responsibility by the defendant, a
judge would not be allowed to consider this factor, even if it were applicable. This Article provides evidence suggest-
ing that a large component of disparities stem from prosecutorial charging decisions. To the extent that the disparities
introduced by the prosecutorial charging behavior are increased by jury fact-ﬁnding in a mandatory guidelines system,
disparities may become exacerbated.
3.5.3. Sessions Proposal
Former Sentencing Commission Chair Judge Sessions has recommended a simpliﬁcation of the Guidelines to
provide for fewer and broader sentencing ranges within a presumptive regime, with enhancing facts to be charged in
208Booker, 543 U.S. at 284-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Rather than engage in a wholesale rewriting of the SRA, I would simply allow the
Government to continue doing what it has done since this Court handed down Blakely–prove any fact that is required to increase a defendant’s
sentence under the Guidelines to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” ).
209Booker, 543 U.S. at 254.
210Booker, 543 U.S. at 256 (“plea bargaining would likely lead to sentences that gave greater weight, not to real conduct, but rather to the skill
of counsel, the policies of the prosecutor, the caseload, and other factors that vary from place to place, defendant to defendant, and crime to crime.
...plea bargaining of this kind would necessary move federal sentencing in the direction of diminished, not increased, uniformity in sentencing”).
For a more thorough discussion of the potential problems with this particular recommendation, see Berman, Tweaking Booker, supra note X, at
365-71.
211See Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note X, at 191 ( “the consensus view is that the Guidelines as now written are simply too complex
and confusing to operate through juries”).
212ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report and Recommendation on Booker (Jan. 2005), reprinted in 17 FED.S ENT.R EP. 335, 339 (2005).
92an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.213
Sessions argues in favor of a new sentencing regime that balances two goals: (1) the need to reduce unwarranted
sentencing disparities curbing the ability of judges to use subjective notions of justice to mete out punishment, and (2)
giving judges discretion to tailor sentencing to the unique circumstances of offenders and offenses.214 Thus, Sessions
proposes a return to a more simpliﬁed presumptive guidelines that affords judges discretion within broader sentencing
ranging, subject to fewer mandatory minimum statutes.215 Sessions recommends a reduction in the number of possible
sentencing ranges, but broader sentencing ranges associated with offense levels and criminal history category combi-
nations, to afford judges greater discretion.216 In order to comply with the constitutional requirements identiﬁed in
Blakely, Sessions suggests that any facts that would increase the base offense level to increase the applicable maximum
sentence would have to be proven by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless admitted to by the defendant.217
Sessions also proposes simplifying the Guidelines by reducing the number of aggravating or mitigating factors that
increase or decrease the base offense level under Chapter Two and Chapter Three of the Guidelines Manual, which
many have argued are overly complex.218 In deciding which aggravating factors to keep within the sentencing guide-
lines, Sessions argues in favor of the strategy suggested by Justice Breyer - empirically reviewing which enhancements
in Chapter Two are commonly used.219
Finally, Sessions suggests a new form of appellate scrutiny because “[t]he threat of reversal [on appeal] is a key
component of [effective] guidelines,” with within range sentences “essentially unreviewable on appeal ... [unless] a
district court refused to consider all relevant factors or instead considered a prohibited factor, such as a defendant’s
race or gender.”220 In contrast, Sessions proposes “relatively strict scrutiny by the appellate court” for downward
departures.221
Critiques of the Sessions proposal argue that the proposal would eliminate “judicial feedback to the Commission
and constructive evolution of the guidelines would virtually cease” as judges would have limited authority in setting
the applicable sentence range, and sentencing outside the range.222 As a result, both scholars and district court judges
have expressed that the current advisory guidelines best achieves the goals of sentencing. Commentators have sug-
213William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform
in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 346-50 (2011).
214Sessions, supra note X, at 339.
215Id. at 340.
216Id. at 340-45 (describing recommended changes to the current Guidelines sentencing chart).
217Id. at 346.
218Id. at 347-48; see also Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 COLUM.L .R EV. 1315, 1341 (2005);
Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED.S ENTENCING REP. 180 (1999) (“[T]he Guidelines are simply too long and too
complicated.”).
219Sessions, supra note X, at 349; Stephen Breyer, supra note X, at 11 ("... I believe the Commission should review the present Guidelines,
acting forcefully to diminish signiﬁcantly the number of offense characteristics attached to individual crimes. The characteristics that remain should
be justiﬁed for the most part by data that shows their use by practicing judges to change sentences ... .").
220Sessions, supra note X, at 353-54.
221Id. at 353-54 (“District courts’ choices of sentences within the applicable cells on the grid would be essentially unreviewable on appeal so
long as the courts considered all of the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors identiﬁed in the application notes and all other relevant factors in
the Guidelines Manual before imposing a particular sentence.”).
222Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note X, at 1716.
93gested that the current advisory guidelines system should be retained because it reﬂects the right balance between
various actors in federal sentencing,223 and approximately 70% of surveyed district judges believe that the guidelines
reduced unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly situated defendants, and increased certainty and fairness
in sentencing.224 Of these district judges surveyed in 2010, over 75% prefer the current advisory guidelines system
to other alternatives.225 In contrast, 14% of judges favored a version of the Blakely-ized proposal - “[a] system of
mandatory guidelines that comply with the Sixth Amendment and have broader sentencing ranges than currently ex-
ist, coupled with fewer statutory mandatory minimums.”226 Only 3% of judges preferred a return to the pre-Booker
guidelines system, suggesting that the overwhelming majority of judges are opposed to a return to presumptive guide-
lines, as proposed by Judge Sessions.227 Undoubtedly, Booker has given judges the freedom to consider the particular
circumstances of the offense and traits of the defendant. To the extent that growing inter-judge disparities are reﬂected
of these considerations, disparities are warranted and judicial discretion is desirable. On the other hand, some have
suggested that the advisory guidelines have been accompanied by increases in unwarranted disparities.228
The empirical ﬁndings in this Article suggest that inter-judge disparities have increased from the period of manda-
tory or “presumptive” regime to post Booker sentencing. Indeed, a return to “presumptive” guidelines would me-
chanically reduce inter-judge disparities by greatly limiting judicial discretion. However, the empirical evidence from
Part IV seeks to ascertain the effect of sentencing regime on inter-judge disparities in outcomes that are most likely
attributable to judge behavior. Differences in sentence lengths can be attributable to both judge disparities as well as
differences in charging of mandatory minimums. The ﬁndings in this Article suggest that a return to a presumptive
regime, without any changes in mandatory minimums, would only go partway in reducing disparities, and curtail
potentially desirable judicial discretion.
While this Article does not provide evidence supporting a return to “presumptive” guidelines, it does suggest
that strictness of appellate review is a potentially important constraint on judicial discretion in sentencing. Inter-
judge disparities in below range departures were generally lowest during the PROTECT Act. Furthermore, empirical
evidence suggests that Booker alone did not contribute to recent increases in inter-judge disparities. In the ﬁrst two
years after Booker, inter-judge disparities are not statistically different from that during Koon. Rather, it is the impact
of Booker plus reduced appellate scrutiny following Rita, Gall and Kimbrough that are responsible for any increases
in inter-judge disparities.
223Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note X, at 1681. See also Michael Tonry, The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Best Response to Booker is to Do
Nothing, 24 FED.S ENT.R EP. 387 (2012); Sara Sun Beale, Is Now the Time for Major Sentencing Reform?, 24 FED.S ENT.R EP. 382 (2012).
224See U.S. Sentencing Commission, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010
(June 2010), at 23 (Question 17, Table 17).
225See U.S. Sentencing Commission, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010
(June 2010), at 23 (Question 19, Table 19).
226Id.
227Id.
228Sessions, At the Crossroads, supra note X; Bowman, Nothing is Not Enough, 24 FED.S ENT.R EP. 356 (June 2012) (“[T]he post-Booker
advisory system retains most of the ﬂaws of the system it replaced, while adding new ones, and its sole relative advantage - that of conferring
additional (and effectively unreviewable) discretion on sentencing judges - is insufﬁcient to justify its retention as a permanent system.”).
94Thus, reforms to strengthen the degree of appellate review could possibly reduce inter-judge sentencing disparities.
In Gall, the Court did not require appellate courts to insist upon “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence
outside the Guidelines recommended range, speciﬁcally rejecting stronger justiﬁcations for sentences that departed
more greatly from the Guidelines.229 In order to constrain inter-judge disparities, the Commission could require
district court judges to provide a heightened justiﬁcation for more severe departures from the prescribed sentence,
without coming too close to an “ impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines
range.....[which] would not be consistent with Booker.”230
3.6. Conclusion
Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges in district courthouses representing 73 U.S. district courts,
this Article ﬁnds a signiﬁcant increase in inter-judge disparities from the Koon period to after Kimbrough/Gall. Inter-
judge disparities increased in a variety of outcomes: the decision to incarcerate, sentence lengths conditional on
incarceration, below range departures, and above range departures. Increased inter-judge disparities persisted even
excluding cases in which mandatory minimums were charged, suggesting that judges are not fully anchored to the
Guidelines.
Increases in between-judge differences following Booker and Kimbrough/Gall appear to be linked to observable
judicial demographics such as gender, political afﬁliation of appointing president, and whether a judge has ever sen-
tenced under the mandatory regime. I also ﬁnd modest evidence of increases in inter-district differences following
Kimbrough/Gall, with large inter-district differences in sentence length, below range departures, and rates of manda-
tory minimums. However, the magnitudes of the both inter-judge and inter-district disparities are drastically smaller
when mandatory minimums are excluded, suggesting that prosecutorial charging decisions are a major contributor to
sentencing disparities.
Overall, these results suggest that the shift to an advisory guidelines regime under Booker, coupled with lowered
standards of appellate scrutiny, have led to somewhat greater inter-judge variation. Prosecutorial charging decisions,
at least in the case of mandatory minimums, appear to play a substantial role in explaining disparities. While a ﬁrst
step in disentangling the sources of disparities ascribable to various actors, a primary limitation of this Article is its
inability to thoroughly analyze all the disparities that can arise in earlier stages of the criminal justice systems, such as
through charging and plea bargaining. Nevertheless, the results of this Article caution against proposals to move back
towards a sentencing system in which judges are bound by the decisions of prosecutors. Instead, the Article suggests
that it may be wise to modify standards of appellate review, as well as revisit the desirability of mandatory minimums.
229Gall, 552 U.S. at 47 (“In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take the
degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines. We reject, however, an appellate rule that requires
"extraordinary" circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range. We also reject the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses
the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justiﬁcations required for a speciﬁc sentence.”).
230Id. at 47.
954. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL AND STATE OSHA PROGRAMS ON WORKPLACE SAFETY, WAGES AND
EMPLOYMENT
4.1. Introduction
In response to increasing concern about workplace safety and the decentralized and often inefﬁcient state worker’s
compensation programs, the federal government passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in 1970.
Existing state statutory remedies and common law actions were viewed as inadequate to protect workers from unsafe
working conditions. The OSHA Act mandated that private sector employers create safe working environments to
prevent work-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths, in compliance with health and safety standards set by the Secretary
of Labor. Since 1971, when OSHA was implemented, occupational deaths have been reduced by 62% and workplace
injuries lowered by 42%. However, workplace injuries are still a major public policy concern. OSHA estimates that
each year there are over 6,000 workplace fatalities and 50,000 deaths from workplace related illnesses, in addition to
over 5 million nonfatal work related injuries.
While the statute was promulgated at the federal level, Section 18 of the act permits states to create and enforce
their own OSHA programs, as long as the state programs are “at least as effective" as the federal one. States must set
job safety and health standards that are comparable to federal standards. In fact, the majority of states adopt standards
identical to the federal ones. However, since the state programs must be at least as stringent as the federal OSHA, many
states have implemented innovations above and beyond federal OSHA regulation. State regulation of OSHA programs
may also be more efﬁcient than federal regulation since state regulators are more aware of the business environment
within certain industries in a state.
Additionally, any state plan must cover public sector (state and local government) employees, whereas states that
remain under federal mandate cover only private sector employees. The beneﬁt of providing coverage to public sector
employees is large, since many hazardous occupations, such as ﬁreﬁghting, corrections, law enforcement, and forms
of transportation are in the public sector. State approved OSHA plans cover over 57 million workers, over 40% of the
private sector and over 10 million public sector employees (Grassroots, Worker Protection, 2008 OSHSPA Report).
A state must undergo an extensive procedure in order to receive federal OSHA approval for its own plan. First,
OSHA must approve its developmental plan, which includes the regulation, enforcement and other logistics of the
state program, which must be implemented within three years. Upon completion of the developmental plan, states
are eligible for certiﬁcation. To formally suspend federal enforcement of activities covered by the state plan, the
state and OSHA may choose to enter into an “operational status agreement.” Another route taken by most states
after certiﬁcation is the ﬁnal approval, which also ends federal authority over the state’s workplace health and safety
matters. Although there is no federal enforcement in approved states, the federal OSHA can continue to monitor the
96state plans and funds up to 50% of the state’s operational costs.
Twenty-two states and jurisdictions currently operate their own state plans, which cover both private and public
sector employees. Four other states/territories cover only public employees, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York
and the US Virgin Islands. The remaining states are covered by the Federal OSHA, which applies only to private
sector employees. Table 4.1 lists the state OSHA programs and dates of initial approval, certiﬁcation, and ﬁnal
approval/operational status agreement, as well as whether the state program has different standards than the federal
program.
The effectiveness of OSHA programs remains a controversial issue to this day. Many state regulated OSHA
programs have implemented voluntary programs that provide incentives for workplaces to maintain excellent safety
records. However, critics argue that these voluntary programs are inefﬁcient because they target workplaces with
strong safety records, providing no incentives for less safe employers to improve the workplace.
A recent New York Times article on OSHA programs claims that OSHA’s ultimate enforcement tool is the prose-
cution of cases. There are been many efforts to make worker deaths caused by the workplace a felony, but politicians
from both parties have rejected these efforts. The maximum criminal ﬁne was increased once in 1984 and all civil ﬁnes
were increased in 1991. However, an analysis done by the Times suggests that these changes have had only modest
effects on workplace safety.
Labor groups, journalists, and even OSHA ofﬁcials believethat federal regulation of OSHAhas fallen behind a vast
number of state regulated OSHA programs, which have either required notiﬁcation to a prosecutor upon workplace
safety related deaths, or increased criminal penalties. As of today, California is the only state that actively prosecutes
employers who kill workers by violating safety laws. Conviction can result up to three years in prison, along with
a $1.5 million penalty. The Times found that California had more safety violation prosecutions than all other states
combined, potentially contributing to its low workplace fatality rate, compared to the rest of the country.
97Table 4.1. State Statutes
State Initial Approval Certiﬁed Final Approval Operational Status Different Standards
Alaska 7/31/73 9/9/77 9/28/84
Arizona 10/29/74 9/18/81 6/20/85
California 4/24/73 8/12/77 Yes Yes
Connecticut 10/2/73 8/19/86
Hawaii 12/28/73 4/26/78 4/30/84
Indiana 2/25/74 9/24/81 9/26/86
Iowa 7/20/73 9/14/76 7/2/85
Kentucky 7/23/73 2/8/80 6/13/85
Maryland 6/28/73 2/15/80 7/18/85
Michigan 9/24/73 1/16/81 Yes Yes
Minnesota 5/29/73 9/28/76 7/30/85
Nevada 12/4/73 8/13/81 4/18/00
New Jersey 1/11/01
New Mexico 12/4/75 12/4/84 Yes
New York 6/1/84 8/18/06
North Carolina 1/26/73 9/29/76 12/10/96
Oregon 12/22/72 9/15/82 5/12/05 Yes Yes
Puerto Rico 8/15/77 9/7/82 Yes
South Carolina 11/30/72 7/28/76 12/15/87
Tennessee 6/28/73 5/3/78 7/22/85
Utah 1/4/73 11/11/76 7/16/85
Vermont 10/1/73 3/4/77 Yes
Virgin Islands 8/31/73 9/22/81 4/17/84
Virginia 9/23/76 8/15/84 11/30/88
Washington 1/19/73 1/26/82 Yes Yes
Wyoming 4/25/74 12/18/80 6/27/85
Note: Data from OSHA.
98Using a differences in differences methodology, I explore the impact of state OSHA regulation on traditional
enforcement tools, nonfatal and fatal injury rates, as well as wages and employment.
I ﬁnd that state regulation of OSHA programs leads to an increased use of inspections per capita and citation of
violations per capita. Despite the increased use in these enforcement tools, however, in the more recent period from
1996-, state regulated OSHA programs have no signiﬁcantly different rate of nonfatal injuries, compared to federally
regulated programs. This might reﬂect laxer enforcement by states today or possibly inefﬁciencies at the state level.
When I compare state programs with standards more stringent than the federal program, evidence suggests that
state regulation is associated with lower fatalities. This suggests that state regulation may be more efﬁcient than federal
regulation, and/or that voluntary programs and other state OSHA innovations are effective at promoting workplace
safety. A case study on the California civil penalty increase and increase in criminal sanctions reveals that this reform
led to a signiﬁcant fall in the number of fatalities, indicating that greater magnitude of sanctions and prosecution are
potentially effective enforcement tools in promoting greater workplace safety.
Finally, I analyze the impact of state regulation of OSHA on wages and employment. The increased use of
inspections and issuance of violations following state regulations may have also increased costs for employers of hiring
workers. I ﬁnd that there is a compensating differential for workplace safety, as wages fall signiﬁcantly following
certiﬁcation of a state regulated OSHA program, particularly in the more dangerous industries. While demand for
workers may have fallen, the supply of workers also seems to have shifted out, as workers valued the beneﬁt of greater
workplace safety, leading to no change in employment, or an increase in the more dangerous industries. This ﬁnding
is suggestive that workers valued workplace safety at cost to employers, leading to full shifting of the cost onto wages,
with no efﬁciency loss in hours worked.
4.2. Literature Review
Early empirical studies of the federal OSHA found that enforcement between 1972 and 1975 did not lead to
measurable improvements in workplace safety, due to high costs of compliance and ineffective enforcement (Viscusi
1979). Bartel and Thomas (1985) also tracked OSHA compliance and ﬁnd a low correlation between workplace
compliance and injury rates in the same time period. These scholars attribute the failure of OSHA regulation in
improving workplace safety to the low penalty associated with violation and the low chance of inspection. Smith
(1976) argues that in the initial years of OSHA implementation, there were very reduced incentives for compliance,
and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor were often not highly related to the major causes of
workplace injuries.
However, OSHA adopted a new records inspection system in 1981 that sought to better target and keep track of
high hazard workplaces, allowing regulators to inspect high risk violators more effectively. In a study that takes into
account these changes in record keeping, Ruser and Smith (1988) ﬁnd that ﬁrms subject to records check inspections
99had 5-14% reductions in workplace injuries, suggesting that the policy change increased the effectiveness of OSHA.
Viscusi (1986) conﬁrms these ﬁndings in a study of the incidence of lost workdays due to illness or injury in the
manufacturing sector after the implementation of the records check inspection system.
Analyses of OSHA in the 1980s and 1990s also conﬁrmed that OSHA enforcement, in the form of inspections and
penalties, was associated with a lower prevalence of workplace injuries, but many have found that these effects, while
strong initially, declined over time (Gray and Jones 1991a,b, Gray and Scholz 1994, Gray and Mendeloff 2002). Weil
ﬁnds that the decline in injury in the construction industry from 1987-1993 was not due to the direct impact of OSHA
enforcement (2001). The ﬁnding that federal OSHA programs have had, at most, short term impacts on reducing
workplace injuries, is surprising given the evidence that despite low expected penalties, workplaces have high rates of
compliance (Weil 1996).
More recently, researchers have begun to exploit the different state and federal OSHA programs, although research
has treated these programs as homogeneous in all aspects besides enforcement. Using the variation in state and federal
enforcement of the construction industry from in the 1980s and 1990s, Morantz (2009) ﬁnds that state inspectors
use traditional enforcement tools less frequently. She also ﬁnds that state enforcement is associated with a lower
rate of occupational fatalities, but interestingly, a higher rate of nonfatal injuries, which she suggests may be due
to underreporting of nonfatal injuries in federally regulated states, or the differential responses of nonfatal and fatal
injuries to different enforcement tools. Similarly, Bradbury (2006) uses data from 1981-1995 and ﬁnds that state
regulated OSHA programs have lower workplace fatalities than federally regulated programs.
Additionally, perhaps due to the minimal effects of OSHA on injury rates, there has been no study of the impacts
of the OSHA health and safety mandates on wages or employment levels, which I explore. Given the low expected
penalty associated with violation of OSHA, employers may not comply with the mandate, thus having no effect on
wages and employment.
Ultimately, the existing empirical work has shown minimal effects of OSHA on injury rates, and very little work
on exploiting variation across state programs. Thus, there has been no consensus on whether OSHA programs have
actually increased efﬁciency and employee welfare.
4.3. Theory
Given the critiques of OSHA as being highly intrusive, bureaucratic, yet altogether ineffective, it is of great interest
to explore the actual impacts of OSHA on workplace safety. Many scholars point to minimal staff and resources within
OSHA as key to its ineffectiveness, but given limited resources, state innovations such as increases in penalties and
voluntary cooperative programs with employers may be more effective at reducing workplace injury than traditional
federal enforcement measures. Some legal scholars even argue that OSHA should be abolished, claiming that the
ﬁnancial costs from worker’s compensation are enough to provide economic incentives to increase workplace safety
100(Kniesner and Leeth 1995, Maukestad and Helm 1989). Ultimately, I explore which types of governance strategies,
whether at the federal or state OSHA level, are most effective in reducing workplace injury and illness.
4.3.1. Regulation
Workplace safety regulation falls within a broader regulation literature on legal rules that govern the employer-
employee relationship. Other legal rules include workers’ compensation programs, employee fringe beneﬁts mandates,
wrongful discharge laws, unemployment insurance, and minimum wage laws. The law and economics literature on
employment law considers both the theory and the empirics of employment regulations, addressing the efﬁciency and
welfare consequences of these legal interventions. Interventions through employment law are particularly relevant in
the face of market failure, such as informational asymmetries and externalities.
In the area of workplace safety, in the absence of market failure, one would expect that less safe working condi-
tions would be offset by higher wages through compensating differentials. But there are often informational failures
such that employees are not aware of the risks associated with a certain workplace, and workplace injuries often have
externality effects that are not redressed through the market, leading to an oversupply of labor at a given wage. Work-
place safety mandates can then in theory improve both efﬁciency and employee welfare, but is ultimately an empirical
question.
4.3.2. Enforcement
Theories behind OSHA compliance and penalty provisions are well situated within a larger literature on public
enforcement of law, reviewed by Shavell and Polinsky (2000). At the most basic level, enforcement depends a choice
of the probability of sanction, as well as the magnitude of sanctions which affects the behavior of regulated parties.
The administrative agency in charge of OSHA has control over a variety of enforcement tools including the number of
inspectors, the probability of inspection, the magnitude of violation penalties, and type of penalty (civil or criminal).
A priori, there is no reason to expect that states with state regulated OSHA programs would be more effective at
enforcement than states with federally regulated OSHA programs.
4.3.3. Federal versus State Enforcement
Previous research has mainly studied the effect of federal OSHA enforcement on inspections and injury rates,
while noting that changes in record keeping and other enforcement mechanisms lowered the rate of occupational
injuries and illnesses. As mentioned before, very few studies have explored the impact of state level OSHA programs.
While Morantz looks at the difference between state and federal enforcement, her analysis begins in the late 1980s,
after the majority of states with their own OSHA programs had adopted them. As a result, she is only able to use cross
state variation and not variation within state, over time. However, using data from the early 1970s on inspections and
101violations which covers the period during which state OSHA programs were initially approved and certiﬁed, I plan
to study the differential impact of state and federal OSHA programs on the use of these enforcement tools. I am also
able to exploit within state variation over time in my analysis of the impact of state OSHA implementation on wages
and employment. Data on nonfatal and fatal injuries are not available until after the implementation of state OSHA
programs, so these analyses rely only on cross state variation. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 plot the distribution of initial
approval, certiﬁcation and ﬁnal approval for state level OSHA programs.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of States by Initial Approval Year
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of States by Certiﬁcation Year
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of States by Final Approval Year
Key in the research is the differential impact of federal versus state regulation as studied by Morantz and Bradbury.
Bradbury notes that interjurisdictional competition between states, created when states administer and regulate their
own OSHA programs, can lead to the optimal level of regulation. Furthermore, state regulators may be more aware
of local industry and business conditions. Given more information regarding monitoring costs, state level regulation
can certainly be more efﬁcient than federal regulation. Scholz and Gray (1997) argue that OSHA programs should not
only increase safety through the use of penalty systems, but also by facilitating greater cooperation between employers
and workers. It is likely that this cooperation can be greater when OSHA programs are regulated at the state level.
On the other hand, it is important to note that state regulation can also lead to corruption between industry and state
regulators from political pressure, leading to “regulatory capture." (Bradbury 2006). This type of regulatory capture
may be stronger at the state than federal level as state OSHA ofﬁcials may have a greater connection with state industry
interests than federal OSHA ofﬁcials.
However, these studies have treated the state and federal OSHA programs as homogeneous, focusing only on the
differential enforcement of these programs. Yet, different state programs were plausibly created for very different
purposes. Depending on the political party in power at the time, certain states may have implemented a state OSHA
program in order to avoid federal enforcement and regulation. Additionally, many state OSHA programs adopted the
federal OSHA mandate almost verbatim and there are no innovations beyond those required in the federal OSHA.
104Therefore, to the extent that federal OSHA has been ineffective, it is likely that these states have also had minimal
effects on workplace injury rates.
On the other hand, there are also signiﬁcant differences between some state programs and the federal OSHA.
In particular, four states (California, Michigan, Washington and Oregon) have OSHA programs that are much more
rigorousthanthefederalOSHA.Itseemsplausiblethatthesestatelevelinnovationscanleadtodifferencesinoutcomes
of interest, as measured by inspection and violation rates, injury rates, and potentially wages and employment levels
of employees.
Thus, a comparison between federal and all state regulated OSHA programs can be potentially misleading. I
hypothesize that depending on the political afﬁliation of a state at the time OSHA was implemented, as well as
the degree to which state programs differ from the federal program, there can be two distinct effects of state OSHA
regulation. Thus, I study the differential effects of federal and state regulation by disaggregating states by their political
climate and their OSHA standards.
4.3.4. Differences in Penalty Structures
Employers who do not comply can be subject to abatement orders or violations, which result in civil penalties. In
the original OSHA Act, inspectors who conducted health and safety inspections at workplaces could propose penalties
ranging from nothing for nonserious violations, often due to noncompliance with technical requirements, to $1,000
for serious violations, and up to $10,000 for willful or repeat violations, issued when employers are not in compliance
with safety standards or when a high number of injuries have occurred in the previous period.
One of the most important differences between the federal and state OSHA programs is the penalty structures.
Since the inception of the federal OSHA in 1970, there has been only one change in the penalty structure, passed
in the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. The Act signiﬁcantly increased the penalty maximums for serious,
willful and repeat violations, although many critics argue that the penalties and inspection rates are still far too low.
The penalties increased seven fold, to penalty maximums of $7,000 for serious, other-than-serious, failure to abate,
and posting violations, $70,000 for willful and repeat violations, and a $5,000 ﬂoor for willful violations.
Following the federal act, states with approved OSHA programs were required to adopt these federal changes,
effective in 1991 and 1992. However, since then, several states have further increased penalties, sometimes even
subjecting willful violations to criminal charges.
California is recognized as having the most strictly enforced OSHA program in the nation. In 2000, California
passed a new OSHA act that subjected employers to greater civil penalties and more importantly, introduced large
criminal penalties for willful violations of health and safety regulations. The deﬁnition of serious violation was
expanded and civil penalties for a serious violation were increased from $7,000 to $25,000. Employers were also
newly liable for criminal penalties of $1,500,000 and imprisonment for three years. The law also was the ﬁrst time
105that public agencies were subject to monetary violations so government entities were no longer exempt from penalties.
More importantly, the burden of proof on serious violations was effectively reversed to fall on employers.
4.3.5. Incentive Programs
Additionally, many state OSHA program ofﬁcials recognize that enforcement and ﬁnancial penalties are not the
only way to incentivize employees to keep workplaces safe. Incentive programs have frequently formed from state
level OSHA experimentation. For instance, the most famous incentive program was the Maine 200. Created in
1993, the Maine 200 pilot program asked the 200 most hazardous workplaces in Maine to cooperate with OSHA
in developing and implementing a comprehensive health and safety program in exchange for a low rate of future
inspections. OSHA ofﬁcials found that participating companies signiﬁcantly reduced their injury and illness rates.
Following success in Maine and nine other states with similar pilot programs, President Clinton expanded the Maine
200 program nationally in 1995 in his ÒNew OSHAÓ plan in the form of the Cooperative Compliance Program (CCP).
However, industry groups challenged the CCP program and in 1999, the Federal Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia held that the CCP was not properly adopted by OSHA and invalidated the program. Subsequently, OSHA
cancelled the program.
Nevertheless, many states have created other forms of voluntary compliance programs for hazardous industries
since 1999. Created as an experimental program in California in 1979, and adopted federally by OSHA in 1982, Vol-
untary Protection Programs (VPP) recognize outstanding participating employers. If a worksite passes the standards
of the VPP program in the form of very low injury rates and various other health and safety standards, employers
are exempt from routine inspections for three years. States also have Safety and Health Achievement Recognition
Programs (SHARP) that offer eligible employers exemptions from programmed inspections. However, the VPP and
SHARP programs involve the cooperation between state OSHA program and employers with a history of excellent
safety, rather than targeting the most hazardous workplaces.
4.4. Data
I use a variety of data sets for this paper. All data is state panel data, either at the industry or individual level, where
industry is characterized as the major division into which an occupational industry falls into. There are 9 industry level
divisions: Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance
and Services.
I obtained data on inspections and violations through OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System (IMIS).
The IMIS contains complete records of all inspections (type and scope), violations (type and penalty amount) by state
and industry level since 1972. For states that eventually pass their own OSHA programs, IMIS contains federal
inspection data up to the year the state was certiﬁed.
106Data on occupational injury and fatality rates is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I obtained data on workplace
fatalities from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) from 1992 to present. The CFOI contains records of
all workplace fatalities broken down by state, industry, and type of fatality, from 2003 to present. Data on nonfatal
workplace injuries and illnesses is from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII), which contains state
level data from 1976 to present, although I only currently have access to SOII data from 1996-. The SOII contains
information on all types of injuries and time away from work by state by industry.
Data on wages and employment levels come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which begins reporting
hourly wages in 1978. Control variables at the industry level are obtained from the CPS. State level demographic vari-
ables are obtained from the Statistical Abstract. Data on state workers’ compensation programs is from the National
Academy of Social Insurance.
When regressions exploit the within-state variation, over time, in the creation of state OSHA programs, where
the dependent variable is inspections, violations, or violation rate, I control for number of inspections instigated by
employee complaints, unionization rate, industry size and average age of workers at the industry division level. I also
control for state population, real per capita income. These are controls that are deemed to be important by previous
researchers, such as Weil (1998) and Morantz (2009). See the following Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for summary statistics
of state regulated and federally regulated OSHA programs.
Since data on nonfatal and fatal injuries are only available since the late 1990s, I am only able to exploit cross
state variation in state vs. federal OSHA programs since the majority of state regulated OSHA programs had already
been implemented at this point. In these regressions, I control for all the industry division characteristics, as well as
one year lagged number of inspections and one year lagged number of violations, and state worker’s compensation
characteristics such as total number of workers covered under workers’ compensation, total workers’ compensation
beneﬁts, and workers’ compensation replacement rate, calculated as beneﬁts as a proportion of covered wages.
107Table 4.2. Summary Statistics for State OSHA Programs
Variable 1980 Mean 1990 Mean 2000 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Inspections 58.63 412.57 291.79 580.94 1 10805
Violations 151.59 1082.39 663.13 1367.08 0 23276
Violation Rate .505 .584 .565 .217 0 1
Employee Complaints 18.02 66.35 59.47 109.71 0 2117
Population (in 1000s) 4794.36 5383.17 6115.74 6468.44 402 35484.45
Real Per Capita Income 128.04 146.32 168.43 26.70 93.55 242.35
Industry % Union .019 .009 .022 0 1
Industry Size 600.88 444.69 383.61 642.24 0 5907
Industry Average Age 38.72 42.17 42.96 6.57 18 62.24
Note: Data from IMIS, CPS and Statistical Abstract.
Table 4.3. Summary Statistics for Federal OSHA Programs
Variable 1980 Mean 1990 Mean 2000 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Inspections 241.62 149.34 118.88 440.38 1 9025
Violations 467.74 512.51 231.98 1290.11 0 46756
Violation Rate .475 .589 .545 .251 0 1
Employee Complaints 59.60 34.97 27.36 81.50 0 1434
Population (in 1000s) 5133.52 4753.83 5334.39 4765.99 519 22118.51
Real Per Capita Income 115.49 138.89 163.54 27.28 85.04 274.23
Industry % Union .016 .007 .016 0 .5
Industry Size 530.38 441.55 384.99 541.03 0 4148
Industry Average Age 38.82 42.61 43.41 6.74 18 66
Note: Data from IMIS, CPS and Statistical Abstract.
4.5. Empirical Methodology
4.5.1. Impact of State OSHA programs on Inspections and Violations
To analyze the effect of state OSHA programs on inspections and violations, I use a differences-in-differences
methodology exploiting cross time and state variation, using states that do not have state OSHA programs as controls.
Regressions are variations of the following empirical speciﬁcation:
108IndependentVariablei,s,t =  Xi,s,t + ↵STATELAWs,t +
X
i
Industry ﬁxed e↵ectsi
X
s
State ﬁxed e↵ectss +
X
t
Time ﬁxed e↵ectst
(8)
The independent variables of interest are the total number of inspections per capita, violations per capita and
the violation rate, deﬁned as the probability of violation, given an inspection. I also run regressions breaking down
the total number of inspections into type of inspection, which includes Accident, Followup, Planned, State, Federal,
Complete and Partial. In the above speciﬁcation, i indexes industry, s indexes state and t indexes time during the period
1972-2009. STATELAW is the explanatory variable of interest, and Xi,s,t is a vector of both industry level and state
level covariates, as described in the previous section. When industry level covariates are used, the data covers the
period 1979-2009. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The explanatory variable, STATELAW, equals 1 in each year after the state OSHA program was created. I deﬁne
STATELAW in three ways, based on initial approval, certiﬁcation and ﬁnal approval. My deﬁnition of choice is
certiﬁcation. Bradbury (2006) suggests that there is no real disinction between certiﬁcation and federal approval,
indicating that after certiﬁcation, federal enforcement is essentially suspended.
I also disaggregate state OSHA programs to better explore the differences between state OSHA programs. I
analyze the impact of state OSHA programs that have different standards from all other states, including those that
have identical standards to the federal program. In these regressions, I deﬁne STATELAW to equal 1 in each year after
a state OSHA program with different standards was created.
I also compare across state OSHA programs by political afﬁliation of the state, deﬁned as the political party of the
governor in power at the time of the creation of the state OSHA program. When I disaggregate states with their own
OSHA programs by political afﬁliation of the state, I deﬁne STATELAW equal to 1 in each year after a state OSHA
program was created by a Democratic governor, and a separate STATELAW variable for state OSHA programs created
by a Republican governor.
4.5.2. Impact of State OSHA programs on Nonfatal and Fatal Injuries
I analyze the effect of state OSHA programs, compared to federal programs, on nonfatal injuries and illnesses,
from 1996-2008. Because of a change in industry classiﬁcation in 2002, from the standard SIC to NAICS system,
speciﬁc occupations are not directly comparable before and after the change, but at the industry level, the comparisons
are more valid. I also study the effect of state OSHA programs on fatalities at the state and industry level, from
2003-2008.
Since nonfatal and fatal injury data is only available post certiﬁcation of state OSHA programs, I can only com-
pare across states, using states that do not have state OSHA programs as controls. Regressions are variations of the
109following empirical speciﬁcation:
IndependentVariablei,s,t =  Xi,s,t + ↵STATELAWs,t +
X
i
Industry ﬁxed e↵ectsi
+
X
t
Time ﬁxed e↵ectst
(9)
Here, the explanatory variable of interest, STATELAW, equals 1 if a state has its own OSHA program. Similar
to the previous subsection, comparison are also conducted by different standards and political climate at the time of
implementation.
4.5.3. Impact of Changes in Penalty Structure
To study the impact of the California penalty change in 2000, I use a similar differences in differences method-
ology to analyze the change in inspections per capita , violations per capita and violation rate following the change.
STATELAW is equal to 1 in each year after California adopted the penalty change, using various control groups to test
the robustness of the results.
4.5.4. Impact of State OSHA Programs on Wages and Employment
As before, I use a differences-in-differences methodology exploiting cross time and state variation, using states
that do not have state OSHA programs as controls. I use individual level observations when exploring the effect of
state regulated OSHA programs on wages and employment (as measured by hours worked). Individual covariates that
are controlled for are age, sex, race, education, marital status and union coverage.
4.6. Results - Impact of State OSHA programs on Inspections Per Capita and Violations Per Capita
Table 4.4 presents the regression results for the impact of all three stages of implementation of a state OSHA pro-
gram: initial approval, certiﬁcation and ﬁnal approval. It is clear from the results that initial approval of a state OSHA
program has no signiﬁcant effect on total number of inspections, whether one controls for industry level characteris-
tics, state level demographics, or both. However, by the time a state OSHA program is certiﬁed, there is a signiﬁcant
positive effect on inspections per capita. Similarly, there is a signiﬁcant increase in inspections per capita by the time
of ﬁnal approval, although the point estimate is smaller.
Similarly, it appears that certiﬁcation and ﬁnal approval of a state OSHA program are both associated with an
increase in the total number of violations per capita (Table 4.5). While both inspections and violations increase at the
time of certiﬁcation, the overall violation rate did not change signiﬁcantly after either initial approval, certiﬁcation or
ﬁnal approval. See Table 4.6. I will henceforth use certiﬁcation as the indicator for when state enforcement begins.
110Table 4.4. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Inspections Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Inspections Inspections Inspections Inspections Inspections Inspections Inspections Inspections Inspections
State Law/Initial Approval -0.00657 -0.00555 -0.00626
(0.0058) (0.0044) (0.0058)
State Law/Certiﬁed 0.0717*** 0.0712*** 0.0723***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
State Law/Final Approval 0.0250** 0.0263** 0.0259**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Employee Complaints 0.000145* 0.000138* 0.000138 0.000146* 0.000139* 0.000134 0.000139 0.000131 0.000130
(0.000084) (0.000080) (0.000085) (0.000085) (0.000079) (0.000089) (0.000091) (0.000086) (0.000093)
Population 0.00000320 0.00000366 0.00000206 0.00000351 0.00000406 0.00000244
(0.0000026) (0.0000025) (0.0000021) (0.0000031) (0.0000031) (0.0000026)
Real Per Capita Income 0.0000424 -0.0000625 0.000137 0.0000400 -0.0000676 0.000134
(0.00034) (0.00036) (0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00038) (0.00035)
Industry % Union -0.116 -0.120 -0.121 -0.115 -0.119 -0.120
(0.083) (0.086) (0.082) (0.083) (0.086) (0.082)
Industry Size 0.00000262 0.00000340 0.00000443 0.00000363 0.00000467 0.00000503
(0.0000064) (0.0000061) (0.0000069) (0.0000072) (0.0000068) (0.0000075)
Industry Average Age 0.000159 0.000156 0.0000598 0.000211 0.000182 0.000129
(0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00096) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
State Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9257 9257 9257 11552 11552 11552 9257 9257 9257
R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the total number of inspections. Data are industry-state-year observations. State, industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions with state controls have data from 1972-2004, regressions with industry level controls have data from 1979-2009. Coefﬁcients that are
signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
1
1
1Table 4.5. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Number of Violations Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Violations Violations Violations Violations Violations Violations Violations Violations Violations
State/Initial Approval 0.0184 0.0148 0.0172
(0.015) (0.010) (0.016)
State/Certiﬁed 0.144** 0.141** 0.144**
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063)
State/Final Approval 0.0505* 0.0525* 0.0506*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Employee Complaints 0.000398 0.000383 0.000383 0.000423 0.000409* 0.000399 0.000408 0.000391 0.000390
(0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00025) (0.00027)
Population 0.00000788 0.00000886 0.00000564 0.00000718 0.00000830 0.00000512
(0.0000061) (0.0000058) (0.0000052) (0.0000066) (0.0000062) (0.0000057)
RPC Income -0.000186 -0.000340 0.0000613 -0.000196 -0.000357 0.0000418
(0.00080) (0.00088) (0.00079) (0.00082) (0.00089) (0.00081)
Industry % Union -0.257 -0.266 -0.268 -0.256 -0.265 -0.266
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
Industry Size -0.00000928 -0.00000782 -0.00000575 -0.00000697 -0.00000503 -0.00000438
(0.000016) (0.000015) (0.000016) (0.000017) (0.000016) (0.000017)
Industry Average Age -0.00100 -0.00104 -0.00123 -0.000976 -0.00105 -0.00115
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020)
State Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9257 9257 9257 9257 9257 9257 9257 9257 9257
R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the total number of violations. Data are industry-state-year observations. State, industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. Regressions with state controls have data from 1972-2004, regressions with industry level controls have data from 1979-2009. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the
.1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
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2Table 4.6. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Violation Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate
State/Initial App 0.0149 0.0187 0.0145
(0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
State/Certiﬁed 0.0214 0.0154 0.0213
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
State/Final App 0.00250 0.00228 0.00219
(0.010) (0.0092) (0.010)
Employee Complaints 0.0000174 0.0000150 0.0000164 0.0000188 0.0000173 0.0000178 0.0000227 0.0000200 0.0000217
(0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000026) (0.000026) (0.000026)
Population 0.00000632** 0.00000648** 0.00000623* 0.00000599* 0.00000618* 0.00000592*
(0.0000032) (0.0000032) (0.0000033) (0.0000033) (0.0000033) (0.0000033)
RPC Income 0.00000311 0.00000206 0.0000405 0.00000942 0.00000699 0.0000443
(0.00031) (0.00030) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00031)
Industry % Union -0.103 -0.105 -0.104 -0.123 -0.124 -0.123
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Industry Size -0.00000205 -0.00000210 -0.00000219 -0.00000363 -0.00000340 -0.00000358
(0.0000050) (0.0000050) (0.0000050) (0.0000061) (0.0000061) (0.0000061)
Industry Average Age -0.000661 -0.000673 -0.000685 -0.0000222 -0.0000413 -0.0000388
(0.00082) (0.00082) (0.00082) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Observations 9257 9257 9257 11552 11552 11552 9257 9257 9257
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the violation rate, the percentage of inspected ﬁrms in each industry that are charged with at least violation. Data are industry-state-year observations.
State, industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Regressions with state controls have data from 1972-2004, regressions with industry level controls have data from 1979-2009.
Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
1
1
3The control covariates also enter in with the expected signs. As expected, an increase in the number of employee
OSHA complaints in an industry is somewhat signiﬁcantly and positively associated with the total number of inspec-
tions per capita. An increase in state population is associated with a higher violation rate, or probability of violation
given inspection.
Additionally, since I have more years of data when using only industry controls, I use only these in all later regres-
sions. Tables 4.4-4.6 show that the inclusion of state level demographics does not change the regression coefﬁcient by
much. All later results are robust to the inclusion of state level controls.
One can also see the signiﬁcant increase in the mean number of inspections and mean number of violations after
certiﬁcation in Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
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Figure 4.4. Trends in Mean Inspections for State Regulated OSHA Programs
Note: Data from IMIS.
1140
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
M
e
a
n
 
I
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
 
I
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
 
I
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
1
9
7
0
1970
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1975
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1980
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1985
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1990
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
1995
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2000
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2005
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
2010
2
0
1
0
Y
e
a
r
Year
Y
e
a
r
S
t
a
t
e
 
L
a
w
State Law
S
t
a
t
e
 
L
a
w
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
L
a
w
Federal Law
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
L
a
w
Figure 4.5. Trends in Mean Inspections by Regulatory Status
Note: Data from IMIS.
There is a clear accelerated increase in inspections and violations after certiﬁcation, one which persists for at least
10 years after certiﬁcation, and not much of an upward trend prior to certiﬁcation.
Further, Figure 4b and 5b show trends in mean inspections and violations for states with state regulated OSHA
programs, compared to those that are federally regulated. Federal inspections and violations over time are much
smoother than state inspections and violations, generally reﬂective of a fairly constant trend over time. Thus, the
ﬁnding of a positive coefﬁcient on state OSHA certiﬁcation is not reﬂective of these states cutting back inspections
and violations less than federally regulated states. Instead, it appears there was an actual increase in inspections and
violations after certiﬁcation.
An increase in inspections might reﬂect the hiring of more inspectors, or a greater frequency of inspections. An
increase in violations might be a natural consequence of increased inspections. On the other hand, an increase in
violations might reﬂect the ability of state inspectors to better target unsafe local businesses and ﬁrms.
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Figure 4.6. Trends in Mean Violations for State Regulated OSHA Programs
Note: Data from IMIS.
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Figure 4.7. Trends in Mean Violations by Regulatory Status
Note: Data from IMIS.
116Furthermore, one can break down the number of inspections and violations by industry division. While there
appears to be in increase in inspections and violations in all industries following certiﬁcation, the largest increases
are in the construction and manufacturing divisions, which are the most dangerous. See Figures 4.8 and 4.9. The
clear break in the trends in both mean inspections and violations in these dangerous divisions further conﬁrms that
state OSHA certiﬁcation was effective at increasing the use of traditional enforcement tools, particularly in the most
dangerous industries.
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Figure 4.8. Trends in Mean Inspections, by Industry Division
Note: Data from IMIS.
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Figure 4.9. Trends in Mean Violations, by Industry Division
Note: Data from IMIS.
It is also interesting to note that certiﬁcation of state OSHA programs led to an almost universal increase in all
types of inspections. Inspections that were due to followups and inspections that were planned increased signiﬁcantly
following certiﬁcation. The number of state level inspections increased signiﬁcantly, but no increase in federal level
inspections. This is expected since federal enforcement is essentially suspended at this point in time. Complete and
partial inspections, which describe the scope of the inspection, also increased following state certiﬁcation. See Table
4.7.
118Table 4.7. Impact of State OSHA Law Certiﬁcation on Types of Inspections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Accidents Follow Planned State Federal Complete Partial
State Law -3.417 7.016* 114.0*** 132.5*** -11.17 109.0*** 18.28*
(2.25) (3.80) (22.7) (25.6) (21.6) (20.8) (9.65)
Complaints 0.249*** 0.226*** 0.992*** 1.871*** 0.966*** 1.254*** 1.288***
(0.0037) (0.0062) (0.037) (0.042) (0.035) (0.034) (0.016)
Ind. % Union -17.30 -4.572 -184.7 -365.4** 125.3 -195.4 -74.29
(14.7) (24.8) (148) (167) (141) (136) (63.0)
Ind. Size -0.00703*** 0.0186*** -0.0544*** -0.0349*** -0.0416*** -0.0857*** 0.0173***
(0.00078) (0.0013) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0033)
Ind. Average Age -0.631*** 0.983*** 0.458 -5.782*** 3.999*** -0.178 -2.596***
(0.13) (0.22) (1.29) (1.45) (1.23) (1.19) (0.55)
Observations 11552 11552 11552 11552 11552 11552 11552
R2 0.56 0.32 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.65
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is a particular type of inspection. Data are industry-state-year observations. State, industry and
year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. These regressions include only industry level controls, so data is from 1979-2009. Coefﬁcients
that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
4.6.1. Differential Impact of State OSHA Programs
State OSHA programs are likely to differ in their original purpose and in the degree to which they adhere to federal
standards. From the results in Table 4.8, it appears that certiﬁcation of an OSHA program initially created under a
Democratic governor is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in the number of inspections per capita, and violations
per capita, compared to federally regulated states. At the same time, certiﬁcation of an OSHA program created
under a Republican governor also leads to a signiﬁcant increase in inspections and violations per capita, and also the
violation rate, compared to federally regulated states. One possible hypothesis is that more conservative states sought
to avoid federal enforcement and regulation by the creation of their own state OSHA programs. While inspections and
violations may have increased, this does not indicate that workplace injury rates were reduced. This will be explored
in the next section.
Additionally, it is often the case that the party afﬁliation of the governor at the time of state OSHA creation differs
from the overall political climate that followed. If states with OSHA programs initially created under a Republican
governor eventually became more liberal, one might see changes in inspections and violations over time. There have
been very few changes and amendments to the original state OSHA laws over time, but enforcement could have
changed as the politics changed within states.
119Table 4.8. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Inspections/Capita, Violations/Capita and Violation Rate, By Political Climate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inspections Violations Viol Rate Inspections Violations Viol Rate
Certiﬁed - Republican 0.160*** 0.367*** 0.107**
(0.037) (0.074) (0.048)
Certiﬁed - Democrat 0.0637*** 0.123*** -0.0233
(0.019) (0.037) (0.040)
Employee Complaints 0.000231* 0.000733* 0.00000839 0.0000850* 0.000237* 0.0000136
(0.00012) (0.00039) (0.000055) (0.000047) (0.00013) (0.000026)
Industry % Union -0.0935 -0.388 -0.0202 -0.0695 -0.0817 -0.180
(0.15) (0.33) (0.21) (0.051) (0.064) (0.17)
Industry Size -0.00000429 -0.0000237 0.00000596 0.00000984* 0.0000102 -0.00000105
(0.000011) (0.000027) (0.0000065) (0.0000052) (0.000011) (0.0000055)
Industry Average Age -0.0000745 -0.00179 0.000535 0.000298 0.0000946 -0.00206
(0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.00097) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Observations 6559 6559 8156 7444 7444 9284
R2 0.56 0.52 0.21 0.50 0.51 0.21
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is either total number of inspections, violations or violation rate. Data are industry-state-year observations. State, industry and year ﬁxed effects are
included in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. These regressions include only industry level controls, so data is from 1979-2009. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1,
.05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
1
2
0Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show that indeed, state OSHA programs implemented under both Republican and Demo-
cratic governors experienced an increase in mean inspections and violations in the years following certiﬁcation, al-
though the relative increase was larger for states with Republican governors.
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Figure 4.10. Trends in Mean Inspections, By Political Climate
Note: Data from IMIS.
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
M
e
a
n
 
V
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
 
V
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
M
e
a
n
 
V
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
-
1
0
-10
-
1
0
-
5
-5
-
5
0
0
0
5
5
5
1
0
10
1
0
1
5
15
1
5
Y
e
a
r
s
 
S
i
n
c
e
 
C
e
r
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
Years Since Certification
Y
e
a
r
s
 
S
i
n
c
e
 
C
e
r
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
Democrat
D
e
m
o
c
r
a
t
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
n
Republican
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
n
Figure 4.11. Trends in Mean Violations, By Political Climate
Note: Data from IMIS.
122In addition to state OSHA programs being implemented for potentially very different purposes, some state pro-
grams have adopted rules more rigorous than the federal OSHA, while other state programs are identical to the federal
OSHA. Table 4.9 presents the effects of these two types of state OSHA programs on inspections and violations. It
appears that state certiﬁcation of a program with more stringent standards than the federal OSHA lead to a signiﬁcant
increase in inspections per capita, violations per capita, and the violation rate, suggesting a huge rise in the probability
of issuing a violation charge. Given that violation charges are viewed as most costly from the perspective of employ-
ers, particularly as penalties increased, this would suggest that these states with different standards should also be the
most effective at reducing injury rates. This will be explored next.
Table 4.9. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Inspections, Violations and Violation Rate, By Standards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inspections Violations Viol Rate Inspections Violations Viol Rate
Certiﬁed - Diff Standards 0.155*** 0.360*** 0.137***
(0.032) (0.080) (0.044)
Certiﬁed - No Diff Standards 0.0514** 0.0865 -0.00777
(0.022) (0.054) (0.032)
Employee Complaints 0.000137* 0.000401* 0.0000112 0.000136** 0.000435** 0.0000210
(0.000078) (0.00024) (0.000025) (0.000056) (0.00017) (0.000045)
Industry % Union -0.121 -0.270 -0.107 -0.0943 -0.184 -0.197
(0.084) (0.18) (0.15) (0.097) (0.21) (0.16)
Industry Size 0.00000346 -0.00000741 -0.00000181 0.0000123** 0.00000643 -0.00000104
(0.0000060) (0.000014) (0.0000051) (0.0000053) (0.000014) (0.0000071)
Industry Average Age 0.000182 -0.000983 -0.000646 0.000843 0.000349 -0.00121
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.00094) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Observations 9257 9257 11552 8553 8553 10656
R2 0.50 0.49 0.22 0.50 0.49 0.21
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is either total number of inspections, violations or violation rate. Data are industry-state-year
observations. State, industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. These regressions include only industry level controls, so data
is from 1979-2009. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with
*, **, ***, respectively.
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show that indeed, state OSHA programs with different standards had a greater increase in
mean inspections and violations in the years following certiﬁcation, although the increase seems to begin between
5-10 years after certiﬁcation, potentially due to lags.
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Figure 4.12. Trends in Mean Inspections, By Standards
Note: Data from IMIS.
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Figure 4.13 Trends in Mean Violations, By Standards
Note: Data from IMIS.
1244.7. Results - Impact of State OSHA programs on Injuries
Table 4.10 presents the cross sectional comparison of states with own OSHA programs versus states with federally
enforced OSHA programs. The outcome of interest is total nonfatal injuries and illnesses incidence rates as well as
the total non fatal injuries and illnesses incidence rates that led to lost workdays. The incidence rates represent the
number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time workers.
The dummy for state law is the variable of interest. I regress the outcome variables on industry level characteristics
and state level workers’ compensation variables.
One sees that states with their own OSHA programs are not associated with a signiﬁcantly lower incidence rate of
both total nonfatal injuries and illnesses and those leading to days of lost work from 1996-2008. Nor are states with
their own OSHA programs associated with signiﬁcantly lower number of fatalities, compared to federally regulated
states.
LikeMorantz, Iﬁnd thatthatthe degreeofunionization isnot signiﬁcantlyassociatedwith nonfatalinjuryrates that
lead to lost work days, although Weil has argued that unionized workplaces have higher rates of OSHA compliance.
Morantz argues that this may be because the link between unionization and nonfatal injuries is less strong. However,
I also ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant relationship between unionization and fatalities.
The average age of workers in an industry division does not appear to have a signiﬁcant effect on total nonfatal
injuries, but is positively associated with total nonfatal injuries that lead to lost workdays. It appears that older workers
are more likely to be nonfatally injured and take days off from work. However, it seems that the greater the average
age, the fewer the number of fatalities, suggesting that younger workers are more likely to be fatally injured. This
make sense as younger workers generally select into more dangerous industries.
Table 4.10 also shows that greater coverage of workers provided through the state’s workers’ compensation pro-
grams is associated with a lower rate of nonfatal injuries, but a higher rate of fatalities. This may indicate that workers’
compensation coverage is more expansive in states with more dangerous industry composition. Furthermore, total
workers’ compensation beneﬁts are positively associated with nonfatal injuries leading to lost work days. The positive
relationship between the workers’ compensation replacement rate, beneﬁts as a proportion of payroll, and lost work
nonfatal injuries potentially indicates a moral hazard effect, whereby workers are more likely to report being injured
the greater their wage replacement. Similarly, the positive relationship might indicate that workers are just more likely
to claim (which takes time and effort), the greater the replacement rate.
125Table 4.10. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Non Fatal Injuries and Illnesses 1996-2008, Fatal Injuries 2003-2008
(1) (2) (3)
NonFatal Lost Work Fatal
Dummy for State Law -0.300 0.172 -0.412
(0.64) (0.13) (0.96)
Industry % Union 2.684 0.171 3.014
(2.35) (1.33) (15.3)
Industry Size -0.000259 -0.00000335 0.0000451
(0.00019) (0.000057) (0.00078)
Industry Average Age 0.0332 0.0730*** -0.463**
(0.026) (0.013) (0.19)
WC Covered Workers -0.000273*** -0.000104** 0.00415***
(0.000095) (0.000046) (0.0011)
Total WC Beneﬁts 0.000000361** 0.000000138** -0.00000306*
(0.00000015) (0.000000064) (0.0000016)
WC % Rate 0.341 0.344*** 1.613
(0.38) (0.094) (1.25)
Observations 5042 5031 2100
R2 0.05 0.31 0.41
Note: The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is the total nonfatal injury and illness incidence rates and the incidence rates for cases
leading to total lost workdays. Incidence rates represent the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full time workers. The dependent variable in
regressions (3) is the total number of fatalities. These data are from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, from 1996-2008, and the
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, from 2003-2008. Data are industry-state-year observations. Industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in
all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with
*, **, ***, respectively.
4.7.1. Differential Impact of State OSHA Programs
It is also interesting when one disaggregates state regulated OSHA programs by political climate at time of creation
of state OSHA program and by their standards, as compared to all other states. Table 4.11 shows that state OSHA pro-
grams created by a Republican governor have been ineffective at reducing the incidence rate of total nonfatal injuries
and those resulting in lost workdays from 1996-2008 at the industry level, compared to all other states. Additionally,
state OSHA programs implemented by a Republican were ineffective at reducing fatalities from 2003-2008. Similarly,
state programs created by Democratic governors appear to be ineffective at reducing both nonfatal injury rates and the
total number of fatalities.
As seen in Table 4.8, state program certiﬁcation was associated with an increase in the use of traditional en-
forcement tools such as inspections per capita and violations per capita, particularly among state programs created
by a Republican governor. However, data on injuries and fatalities in the more present period suggest that there are
no signiﬁcant differences between state regulated OSHA programs (both Democratic and Republican), compared to
federally regulated OSHA states.
126Table 4.11. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Non Fatal Injuries and Illnesses, 1996-2008 and Fatalities, 2003-2008, By Political Climate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NonFatal Lost Work Fatal NonFatal Lost Work Fatal
Dummy for State Law - Republican -0.368 0.0791 -0.609
(0.69) (0.18) (1.01)
Dummy for State Law - Democrat -0.437 0.201 -1.545
(0.69) (0.13) (1.14)
Industry % Union 5.120 1.216 -14.90 1.461 -0.454 17.84
(3.38) (1.83) (15.5) (2.70) (1.51) (24.4)
Industry Size -0.000322 -0.0000000631 -0.00113 -0.000318 -0.0000104 -0.0000292
(0.00031) (0.000091) (0.0010) (0.00023) (0.000057) (0.00083)
Industry Average Age 0.0399 0.0656*** -0.376** 0.0279 0.0854*** -0.522**
(0.030) (0.014) (0.17) (0.040) (0.015) (0.24)
WC Covered Workers -0.000120 -0.0000597 0.00622*** -0.000249** -0.0000879** 0.00412***
(0.00018) (0.000054) (0.00056) (0.000094) (0.000043) (0.0012)
WC Beneﬁts -0.000000137 2.55e-09 -0.00000811*** 0.000000351** 0.000000115* -0.00000289*
(0.00000048) (0.00000013) (0.0000015) (0.00000015) (0.000000057) (0.0000016)
WC Rep Rate 0.335 0.338*** 3.342* 0.368 0.365*** 1.141
(0.40) (0.095) (1.65) (0.41) (0.10) (1.15)
Observations 3607 3598 1561 4054 4046 1748
R2 0.04 0.39 0.43 0.04 0.28 0.41
Note: The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (4) is the total nonfatal injury and illness incidence rates and in regressions (2) and (5) the incidence rates for cases leading to total lost workdays.
Incidence rates represent the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full time workers. The dependent variable in regressions (3) and (6) is the total number of fatalities. These data are from the Survey of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, from 1996-2008, and the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, from 2003-2008. Data are industry-state-year observations. Industry and year ﬁxed effects are
included in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
1
2
7When I disaggregate state OSHA programs into those with different standards from the federal program and those
identical to the federal program, I ﬁnd that state OSHA programs that are more stringent than the federal program
are associated with no signiﬁcant differences in total nonfatal injury rates, but seem to have a higher proportion of
nonfatalities leading to lost workdays. See Table 4.12.
Table 4.12 also shows that state OSHA programs with different standards have a substantially lower number
of fatalities than other programs, whereas state OSHA programs identical to federal standards have no signiﬁcant
difference in fatalities, from 2003-2008. Compared to the mean industry number of fatalities from 2003-2008 of
27.45, this reduction by 2.799 is an approximately 10% reduction, suggestive that more stringent OSHA standards
reduce workplace fatalities.
Overall, the results suggest that states with different standards for their own OSHA programs also issue more
inspections per capita, violations per capita and have a higher violation rate, as seen in Table 4.9. This increased use
of enforcement tools can potentially explain the signiﬁcant reduction of fatalities in these states.
The effect of federal versus state enforcement is most clear when one just compares state regulated OSHA pro-
grams identical to federal standards to federally regulated OSHA programs. Table 4.9 shows that when states adopt
programs identical to the federal program, there is a signiﬁcant increase in inspections per capita. However, Table 4.12
presents evidence that there is no reduction in total nonfatal injury rates and fatalities from 1996-2008.
128Table 4.12. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Non Fatal Injuries and Illnesses, 1996-2008 and Fatalities, 2003-2008, By Standards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NonFatal Lost Work Fatal NonFatal Lost Work Fatal
Dummy for State Law - Different 0.585 0.467*** -2.799*
(0.44) (0.084) (1.66)
Dummy for State Law - Not Different -0.521 0.0882 -0.232
(0.66) (0.15) (0.78)
Industry % Union 2.822 0.228 2.403 2.423 0.364 -8.161
(2.39) (1.33) (14.8) (3.17) (1.77) (18.5)
Industry Size -0.000228 -0.00000656 0.00000179 -0.000291 0.0000332 -0.00119
(0.00016) (0.000057) (0.00078) (0.00029) (0.000091) (0.00096)
Industry Average Age 0.0421** 0.0705*** -0.443** 0.0333 0.0700*** -0.282**
(0.019) (0.012) (0.19) (0.029) (0.012) (0.13)
WC Covered Workers -0.000218** -0.000102** 0.00407*** -0.000114 -0.0000820 0.00621***
(0.000084) (0.000039) (0.0011) (0.00016) (0.000061) (0.00054)
WC Beneﬁts 0.000000208* 0.0000000970* -0.00000273* -0.000000213 0.0000000265 -0.00000796***
(0.00000011) (0.000000050) (0.0000016) (0.00000041) (0.00000015) (0.0000015)
WC Rep Rate 0.406 0.316*** 1.698 0.383 0.335*** 3.399**
(0.33) (0.083) (1.22) (0.39) (0.092) (1.55)
Observations 5042 5031 2100 4533 4521 1878
R2 0.05 0.31 0.42 0.05 0.31 0.43
Note: The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (4) is the total nonfatal injury and illness incidence rates and in regressions (2) and (5) the incidence rates for cases leading to total lost workdays.
Incidence rates represent the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full time workers. The dependent variable in regressions (3) and (6) is the total number of fatalities. These data are from the Survey of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, from 1996-2008, and the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, from 2003-2008. Data are industry-state-year observations. Industry and year ﬁxed effects are
included in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
1
2
94.8. 2000 California Penalty Change
The following tables show the effects of the California penalty increases on issuance of inspections and violations,
and also the ultimate policy outcomes of interest, nonfatal and fatal injuries.
The dependent variable of interest, Penalty Change, equals 1 in California, in each year after the penalty change
was implemented. In each of the tables, there are three sets of control states that I use and results are robust to choice
of control group. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, I use all other states as controls to California. In the second speciﬁcation,
I include only those other states with state regulated OSHA programs as controls. Finally, in the third speciﬁcation,
I include only the three other states, with state regulated OSHA programs, and which have more restrictive standards
than the federal program.
Table4.13showsthatthepenaltychangeinCaliforniawasassociatedwithasigniﬁcantincreaseinboththenumber
of inspections and the number of violations. Inspections in California increased compared to all other states, all other
states with state regulated OSHA, and all other state regulated OSHA program with more stringent standards than the
federal program. Violations in California increased compared to all other states and compared to other states with
state regulated OSHA programs. However, the number of violations between California and the other three states with
more stringent OSHA programs did not differ signiﬁcantly following the penalty change.
130Table 4.13. CA Penalty Change on Inspections, Violations and Violation Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Inspections Inspections Inspections Violations Violations Violations Viol Rate Viol Rate Viol Rate
Penalty Change 364.4*** 379.7*** 204.8** 705.0*** 753.0*** 439.2 0.0150 0.0198 0.0202
(47.8) (57.6) (96.8) (110) (142) (270) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Employee Complaints 2.849*** 2.783*** 1.655*** 7.313*** 6.769*** 4.052*** 0.0000188 0.0000140 -0.0000203
(0.042) (0.059) (0.12) (0.098) (0.15) (0.33) (0.000024) (0.000026) (0.000030)
Industry % Union -201.5 -296.0 -765.3 -551.2 -590.8 -2091 -0.103 -0.0491 0.315*
(170) (250) (718) (391) (616) (2008) (0.095) (0.11) (0.18)
Industry Size -0.0752*** -0.0494*** -0.0460 -0.0307 0.0499 -0.00661 -0.00000218 -0.00000849 0.00000288
(0.0090) (0.013) (0.031) (0.021) (0.033) (0.087) (0.0000050) (0.0000058) (0.0000080)
Industry Average Age -1.764 -0.860 -3.042 3.592 3.849 7.639 -0.000680 -0.000371 0.00437**
(1.48) (2.51) (8.38) (3.40) (6.19) (23.4) (0.00082) (0.0011) (0.0021)
Observations 11552 5438 896 11552 5438 896 11552 5438 896
R2 0.65 0.68 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.22 0.26 0.35
Note:
The dependent variable in all regressions is either total number of inspections, violations or violation rate. Regressions (1), (4) and (7) include all other states as controls. Regressions (2), (5), and (8)
include states with own OSHA programs as controls. Regressions (3), (6) and (9) include only other state OSHA programs with different standards as controls. Data are industry-state-year observations.
State, industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. These regressions include only industry level controls, so data is from 1979-2009. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01
percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
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1Table 4.14 shows that subsequently, there was no signiﬁcant change in the incidence rate for nonfatal injuries
at the industry level from 1996-2008. While the penalty change does not seem to be associated with reductions in
nonfatalities, there is a signiﬁcant decrease in the number of workplace fatalities at the aggregate private industry level
during the same time period. See Table 4.15. When compared to all other states, the penalty change is associated
with a 113.3 decrease in fatalities. The mean number of private industry fatalities in all states during this time was
111.0876, so the penalty reform corresponded with an over 100% reduction in fatalities. When compared to the
control group of states with state regulated OSHA programs, the penalty reform leads to a 84.12 reduction in fatalities.
Compared to the mean number of private industry fatalities in states with state regulated OSHA programs of 118.1632,
the penalty reform was associated with a 70% decrease in fatalities. However, compared to the three other states with
more stringent standards then the federal program, with mean fatalities of 205.96, the penalty reform does not appear
to have been any more effective at reducing fatalities.
132Table 4.14. CA Penalty Change on NonFatal Injuries, 1996-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) )
NonFatal NonFatal NonFatal Lost Work Lost Work Lost Work
Penalty Change 0.0145 0.0847 -0.400 -0.0140 -0.124 0.0509
(0.86) (0.59) (0.50) (0.28) (0.52) (0.53)
Industry % Union 3.905 0.369 1.762 0.0487 -0.931 -0.799
(3.27) (1.49) (0.78) (1.21) (1.24) (0.77)
Industry Size -0.000374** -0.000184** -0.0000847** -0.000111** -0.0000589 0.0000181
(0.00015) (0.000082) (0.000026) (0.000053) (0.000071) (0.000044)
Industry Average Age 0.0475** 0.0550** 0.0601** 0.0669*** 0.0701*** 0.101
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.071)
WC Covered Workers -0.0000811 0.00000913 0.000530 0.0000489 0.0000657 0.000461
(0.00023) (0.00033) (0.00040) (0.000031) (0.00023) (0.00035)
Total WC Beneﬁts 0.0000000948 0.000000171 0.000000218* 0.0000000836 0.000000119 -0.000000123
(0.00000031) (0.00000011) (0.000000089) (0.000000091) (0.00000012) (0.000000088)
WC Rep Rate -0.222 -0.255 -0.470 0.136 -0.103 0.556*
(0.51) (0.44) (0.29) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19)
Observations 5042 2423 509 5031 2418 510
R2 0.11 0.54 0.59 0.35 0.30 0.35
Note: The dependent variable in regressions (1) - (3) is the total nonfatal injury and illness incidence rates and in regressions (4) -(6) the incidence rates for cases leading to total lost workdays. Incidence
rates represent the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full time workers. Data for nonfatalities are from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 1996-2008. Regressions (1), (4) include all
other states as controls. Regressions (2), (5), and (8) include states with own OSHA programs as controls. Regressions (3), (6) include only other state OSHA programs with different standards as
controls. Data are state-year observations for the private industry. State, industry, and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Coefﬁcients that
are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
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3Table 4.15. CA Penalty Change on Fatalities, 1996-2008
Private Industry Totals
(1) (2) (3)
Fatal Fatal Fatal
Penalty Change -113.3*** -84.12*** 28.29
(18.9) (28.6) (53.6)
Industry % Union 668.7*** 63.43 7639*
(242) (282) (2734)
Industry Size 0.00385 0.00170 0.0185*
(0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0069)
Industry Average Age -0.528 -2.683 3.267
(1.61) (2.96) (19.1)
WC Covered Workers -0.00230 -0.00743 -0.0817**
(0.0029) (0.024) (0.021)
Total WC Beneﬁts -0.0000158** -0.0000247*** -0.0000330*
(0.0000063) (0.0000050) (0.000011)
WC Rep Rate 2.300 6.424 82.73
(6.69) (6.16) (36.5)
Observations 672 246 44
R2 0.98 0.98 0.99
Note: The dependent variable in the regressions is the total number of fatalities. 1996-2008. Data for fatalities are from the Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries, from 1996-2008. Regression (1) includes all other states as controls, regression (2) include states with own OSHA programs
as controls, and regression (3) includes only other state OSHA programs with different standards as controls. Data are state-year observations for
the private industry. State and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Coefﬁcients that
are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
Figure 4.14 shows that after the California penalty reform in 2000, there was no change in the nonfatal injury
incidence rate in California beyond the trend of a decreasing nonfatal injuries. However, Figure 4.15 shows that total
fatalities did appear to decrease post 2000 reform in California, while the trend in mean fatalities in all other states
was relatively constant.
Ultimately, it seems that increases in civil penalty maximums and criminal penalties, and thus the magnitude and
type of sanction, can be an effective way to increase workplace safety. Increased penalties, particularly criminal
sanctions, lead to an increase in traditional enforcement tools in the form of issuance of inspections and violations,
and reductions in the number of fatalities.
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Figure 4.14. Trends in Nonfatal Injury Rates
Note: Data from SOII, 1996-2008.
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Figure 4.15. Trends in Mean Fatalities
Note: Data from CFOI, 1992-2008.
1354.9. Results - Impact of State OSHA programs on Wages and Employment
Table 4.16 presents the results of the impact of a state regulated OSHA certiﬁcation, on the log real wages of
workers. Speciﬁcation 1 shows the results for all employed workers. Speciﬁcation 2 looks only at workers in the
private sector, who were covered by federal OSHA before a state regulated OSHA program was certiﬁed. Finally,
speciﬁcation 3 presents the results for those workers in the public sector, who had no mandated workplace safety
regulation prior to to the creation of state regulated OSHA programs.
Table 4.16. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Log Real Wages
(1) (2) (3)
All Workers Private Sector Public Sector
State Law/Certiﬁed -0.00594*** -0.0201*** 0.00626*
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0036)
Age 0.00644*** 0.00607*** 0.00794***
(0.000017) (0.000020) (0.000044)
Female -0.207*** -0.215*** -0.160***
(0.00045) (0.00053) (0.0011)
Black -0.0979*** -0.111*** -0.0600***
(0.00078) (0.00094) (0.0018)
Hispanic -0.124*** -0.140*** -0.0421***
(0.00086) (0.00099) (0.0026)
Other - NonWhite -0.0807*** -0.0915*** -0.0391***
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0026)
HS Degree 0.196*** 0.190*** 0.224***
(0.00068) (0.00075) (0.0023)
Some College 0.307*** 0.301*** 0.319***
(0.00072) (0.00080) (0.0023)
College Degree 0.622*** 0.613*** 0.628***
(0.00080) (0.00093) (0.0023)
Advanced Degree 0.812*** 0.799*** 0.837***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0024)
Married 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.101***
(0.00046) (0.00053) (0.0012)
Union Coverage 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.104***
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0020)
Observations 4678018 3464320 654721
R2 0.42 0.42 0.40
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log real wage, in 2009 dollars. Data are individual level observations, from the 1979-2009
CPS ORG. State, 2 digit industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent
level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
136Overall, it appears that the certiﬁcation of a state regulated OSHA program led to a .594% decrease in real wages.
This fall in wages seems to be driven by the decrease in wages of private sector workers following certiﬁcation, by
about 2%. There does not seem to be a signiﬁcant change in the wages of public sector workers who were not covered
under any federal workplace safety mandate before the certiﬁcation of state regulated OSHA programs. It could be
however, that public sector industries had already taken workplace safety measures.
Table 4.17 presents the wage results broken down by industries within the private sector. The results suggest that
the compensating differential in wages is largest for those industries that are the most dangerous, in particular, the
most dangerous, construction. Wages in the construction industry fall by 1.5% after certiﬁcation of a state regulated
OSHA program. There are also falls in manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade and services.
137Table 4.17. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Log Real Wages, by Private Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Agriculture Mining Construction Manufacturing Transp Whole. Trade Ret. Trade Finance Services
State Law/Certiﬁed 0.0485*** -0.00762 -0.0151** -0.0474*** -0.00730 -0.0206** -0.0168*** -0.00841 -0.0175***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0080) (0.0097) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0044)
Age 0.00529*** 0.00786*** 0.00853*** 0.00764*** 0.00802*** 0.00725*** 0.00642*** 0.00644*** 0.00508***
(0.00011) (0.00019) (0.000080) (0.000038) (0.00010) (0.000096) (0.000044) (0.000084) (0.000037)
Female -0.153*** -0.250*** -0.246*** -0.253*** -0.208*** -0.238*** -0.256*** -0.236*** -0.160***
(0.0029) (0.0061) (0.0029) (0.00096) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0010)
Black -0.0182*** -0.0437*** -0.0754*** -0.0618*** -0.0503*** -0.0670*** -0.0361*** -0.0583*** -0.0469***
(0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0013) (0.00062) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.00081) (0.0016) (0.00065)
Education 0.119*** 0.179*** 0.133*** 0.223*** 0.167*** 0.211*** 0.131*** 0.199*** 0.236***
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.00045) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.00060) (0.0011) (0.00043)
Married 0.129*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.138*** 0.173*** 0.112*** 0.160***
(0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0010)
Union Coverage 0.136*** 0.0505*** 0.163*** 0.0811*** 0.139*** 0.0555*** 0.147*** 0.0162 0.0827***
(0.024) (0.016) (0.0084) (0.0038) (0.0063) (0.014) (0.0070) (0.013) (0.0045)
Observations 129053 38578 204211 866317 168394 160887 585137 220945 1044056
R2 0.17 0.30 0.27 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.36
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log real wage, in 2009 dollars. Data are individual level observations, from the 1979-2009 CPS ORG. State, 2 digit industry and year ﬁxed effects are
included in all speciﬁcations. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
1
3
8While the wages of all workers fell following state law certiﬁcation, the mean number of hours increased signif-
icantly by 0.0615. For private sector workers, however, the fall in wages was accompanied by no change in hours
worked, while for public sector workers, there was a signiﬁcant fall in hours of .129. See Table 4.18.
Given that for all workers, real wages decreased while hours worked increased, this also seems to suggest that the
supply of workers increased as workers put value on the beneﬁt of greater workplace safety. In the case of just private
workers, the decrease in wages, but no change in hours, potentially indicates that while the supply of workers increased
following state regulation of OSHA, there was a decrease in worker demand. This could occur if state regulation of
OSHA increased employer’s costs of hiring workers, particularly if regulation is better enforced or becomes more
stringent. From the theory of mandated beneﬁts, the fact that employment did not change signiﬁcantly suggests that
workers valued the beneﬁt of greater workplace safety at its cost to employers.
For public sector workers, there was no change in real wages along with a signiﬁcant decrease in hours worked.
Given that there was no federal mandate of workplace safety prior to creation of state regulated OSHA programs, it is
almost likely that employer costs increased afterwards, leading to a fall in worker demand in the public sector.
139Table 4.18. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Hours Worked
(1) (2) (3)
All Workers Private Sector Public Sector
State Law/Certiﬁed 0.0615** 0.00730 -0.129**
(0.026) (0.035) (0.063)
Age 0.0189*** 0.0180*** 0.0249***
(0.00029) (0.00033) (0.00078)
Female -2.554*** -2.628*** -2.013***
(0.0077) (0.0091) (0.020)
Black 0.0993*** -0.176*** 0.669***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.031)
Hispanic 0.581*** 0.440*** 0.324***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.045)
Other - NonWhite -0.228*** -0.248*** -0.293***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.047)
HS Degree 2.794*** 2.787*** 2.842***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.040)
Some College 2.433*** 2.455*** 2.420***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.040)
College Degree 3.968*** 3.802*** 4.486***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.041)
Advanced Degree 5.179*** 4.840*** 5.959***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.043)
Married 0.818*** 0.883*** 0.711***
(0.0078) (0.0090) (0.021)
Union Coverage 1.016*** 0.699*** 1.766***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.036)
Observations 4676322 3464730 654109
R2 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is number of usual weekly hours worked. Data are individual level observations, from the
1979-2009 CPS ORG. State, 2 digit industry and year ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05,
.01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
Table4.19. breaksdownthechangeinhoursworkedwithintheprivatesector. Whilehoursworkedhasnotchanged
signiﬁcantly across most industry sectors, there have actually been increases in hours worked in the construction and
wholesale trade industries. Given that construction is by far the most dangerous industry to work in, workers might
have valued the increased safety from state certiﬁcation of OSHA to an extent greater than cost to employers, leading
to large increase in supply. Interestingly, there has been a signiﬁcant fall in hours worked in the services sector after
state certiﬁcation of an OSHA program.
140Table 4.19. Impact of State OSHA Laws on Hours Worked, by Private Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Agriculture Mining Construction Manufacturing Transp Whole. Trade Ret. Trade Finance Services
State Law/Certiﬁed -0.409 0.353 0.361*** 0.0200 0.0994 0.513*** -0.0765 -0.130 -0.277***
(0.28) (0.37) (0.11) (0.043) (0.15) (0.14) (0.097) (0.12) (0.077)
Age 0.00520** -0.0438*** -0.00195 0.00432*** 0.00724*** -0.0135*** 0.0663*** -0.00938*** 0.00947***
(0.0021) (0.0045) (0.0012) (0.00042) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.00099) (0.0012) (0.00064)
Female -2.987*** -5.191*** -2.951*** -1.343*** -3.081*** -2.832*** -4.146*** -2.077*** -2.651***
(0.056) (0.14) (0.043) (0.011) (0.045) (0.036) (0.025) (0.032) (0.018)
Black 0.0363 -0.643*** -0.245*** -0.103*** -0.443*** -0.201*** 0.0782*** -0.189*** 0.0606***
(0.032) (0.078) (0.019) (0.0069) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.023) (0.011)
Education 0.670*** -0.160*** 0.593*** 0.474*** 0.176*** 0.704*** 1.466*** 1.035*** 1.140***
(0.027) (0.049) (0.015) (0.0050) (0.021) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.0075)
Married 2.107*** 0.397*** 0.914*** 0.532*** 0.939*** 0.884*** 2.698*** 0.290*** 0.386***
(0.060) (0.12) (0.029) (0.011) (0.046) (0.037) (0.028) (0.032) (0.017)
Union Coverage 0.0500 -1.581*** 0.866*** 0.168*** -0.650*** 0.683*** 1.003*** 0.949*** 1.137***
(0.45) (0.37) (0.13) (0.042) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.079)
Observations 130146 38472 204678 866297 167872 161028 584528 221431 1047455
R2 0.78 0.82 0.90 0.94 0.83 0.89 0.72 0.86 0.78
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is number of usual weekly hours worked. Data are individual level observations, from the 1979-2009 CPS ORG. State, 2 digit industry and year ﬁxed
effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcant at the .1, .05, .01 percent level are indicated with *, **, ***, respectively.
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14.10. Conclusion
The creation of state regulated OSHA programs provides an interesting study of the differential impacts of state
versus federal enforcement. I ﬁnd that state regulation of OSHA, as measured by certiﬁcation of the state program,
leads to an increased number of inspections per capita and citation of violations, as compared to federal regulation of
OSHA.
Despite state regulated OSHA programs employing greater inspections and violations per capita, in the more recent
period, state OSHA programs have not been associated with fewer nonfatalities from 1996-2008 or fewer fatalities
from 2003-2008. This may suggest inefﬁciencies at the state level or regulatory capture/corruption of state inspections
by local business interests.
I also explore the differences that exist between state OSHA programs, depending on the political climate in which
they were created and the degree to which they differ from the federal program. I ﬁnd that state programs generally
experienced an increase in number of inspections per capita and violations per capita compared to federal programs,
but do not have lower rates of nonfatal injuries or fatalities in the more recent period. It may be that current political
climate is a better indicator of enforcement and more research will be needed on this topic.
Interestingly, state programs that adopted standards beyond those required by the federal statute are associated
with a signiﬁcantly lower number of fatalities, compared to states that only attain the minimum requirements of the
federal law. This suggests that more stringent requirements are effective at improving workplace safety.
Evidence from the CA 2000 penalty changes suggests that increasing penalty maximums, as well as subjecting
violations to criminal charges, may be an effective means of improving workplace safety. The California reform was
associated with an increased number of inspections and violations, accompanied with a signiﬁcant reduction in the
number of fatalities following the penalty change.
Finally, I explore the impact of state regulation of OSHA on wages and employment. The increased use of inspec-
tions and issuance of violations following state regulation may have also increased costs for employers of maintaining
safer workplaces, affecting the hiring cost of workers. There certainly appears to be a compensating differential for
workplace safety, as wages fall signiﬁcantly, particularly in the more dangerous industries, such as construction and
manufacturing. However, the supply of workers also seems to have shifted out, as workers valued the beneﬁt of greater
workplace safety, leading to no change in employment, or hours worked, or even an increase in hours worked.
These ﬁndings can be particularly informative as OSHA reform continues to be a widely discussed topic. I hope to
supplement my analysis with more detailed information on the types of violations issued and the magnitude of penal-
ties, to assess whether there are differential issuance of violations and penalties by state regulated OSHA programs,
compared to federally regulated programs. Further work remains to be done on the impact of voluntary compliance
programs implemented by many states and the more recent reforms to increase the number of inspection ofﬁcers.
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